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INTRODUCTION 
!
 When nearly three years ago I started my doctoral research in Department of Social Sciences 
at the University of Naples “Federico II” I intended to study the conflict resolution issues with 
reference to the Colombian civil war and its partially accomplished peace process in 2003-2006. I 
wanted to focus on the evaluation of the already applied resolution scheme in order to understand its 
achievements and shortcomings in terms of their implications for presently negotiated peace 
accords with the biggest insurgent group still operating in Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). What I found particularly interesting within the topic was 
the relationship between conflict resolution design/implementation and post-conflict risks of 
violence reemergence. I chose to analyse the Colombian war since it constituted an ideal case for 
comparative research with widely available systematic data. First of all, the Colombian conflict 
represents a particular type of sub-state wars with more than one violent conflict simultaneously 
going on in the territory of a single country. Even though waged almost independently, all of these 
sub-state conflicts belong to the same kind of irregular warfare characterised by the absence of 
ethnic, sectarian, or religious background which could have made a viable compromise 
unachievable (see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007a). For policymakers, the existence of such myriad of 
largely similar but still independent conflicts means total mess (Arias Ortiz 2012). For researcher, it 
guarantees perfect conditions for comparative research design.  
 More importantly, the most recent peace process in Colombia (2003-2006) was concluded 
amid the ongoing warfare. Paradoxically, it actually facilitates the evaluation of the resolution’s 
successes and failures because it ensures the continuity of conflict data collection. What usually 
happens in the situation of fully resolved armed contests are radical changes in conflict monitoring 
strategies. The states, NGOs and international community observers tend to overlook the existence 
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of low-intensity post-conflict violence as long as it does not take any political turn. Call (2002) 
observes, for example, that in El Salvador post-conflict violence was on a constant increase for the 
period of at least ten years since early 1990s, and still went almost unnoticed internationally. Call 
finds that although the majority of post-conflict violence was either perpetrated by armed gangs 
formed by ex-conflict participants, or reflected newly-established law enforcement authorities’ 
inability to control crime, it was never considered as having anything to do with just terminated 
civil war. As a result, Salvadoran conflict resolution is unanimously judged as the success story, 
even if it left the country as one of the world’s most insecure places — the situation which 
continues until present. Coming back to Colombian case, the fact that the most recent peace process 
offered only partial conflict resolution meant, among other things, that the monitoring of conflict-
related violence has never been interrupted in the country since 2006. Thanks to that, analysts have 
nowadays more data to evaluate Colombian resolution’s outcomes than any other peacefully 
terminated civil war since 1945.  
 Practicalities apart, my research agenda centred on the evaluation of the already concluded 
Colombian peace process seemed limited enough to allow me to address the problem empirically 
within the time of three-year doctoral programme. On the other hand, it was broad enough to make 
it potentially interesting for more general social sciences audience. Not surprisingly, after few 
months of exploratory period I found that the dynamics of conflict-related violence since the first 
applications of negotiated solution in 2003 remain still largely under-researched topic (for the 
difficulties of conflict resolution evaluations see Pugel 2009). Having completed vast background 
and theoretical reading I came up with an idea that my research could venture to explain the 
variation in the intensity of organised violence perpetrated amid partially resolved conflict with 
reference to the hypotheses derived from organised crime theory. I believed that such an analytical 
approach could make my study relevant for political conflict theory, organised crime research, as 
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well as policy design (both anti-criminal and conflict resolution policies) — which by an large 
proved true at the end of three-year doctoral period. 
 For organised crime research, the present study may be interesting because it tests 
quantitatively (and confirms) the until now unverified hypotheses about criminals’ violent 
behaviour appeared on the side of some prominent organised crime research (Gambetta 1992; Paoli 
2003) or derived from predominantly ethnographic observations (Sánchez-Jankowski 1991; 
Gambetta 2009). The Colombian case gives a great occasion to address the problem of organised 
crime violence with systematic, disaggregated and publicly available data. The information on 
organised crime violence is usually more difficult to obtain than the information on violence 
perpetrated by civil war participants. To begin with, domestic conflicts attract more attention than 
criminal problems. NGOs and international institutions play a huge role in reporting the dynamics 
of ongoing conflicts, while they rarely have competences and interests in registering organised 
crime violence. Once conflicts terminate, survived participants, victims and international mediators 
usually insist on making war crimes public, establishing truth commissions or creating transitional 
justice institutions. Thanks to those initiatives (or pressures) the information of conflict-related 
violence is made public and gets released relatively quickly after its perpetration, which is rarely the 
case of the information on organised crime violence. The case of Colombian war is interesting in 
such respect because some of the contemporary conflict participants can be considered as real 
organised crime actors (even if engaged politically) whose violent behaviour follows a similar logic 
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as violent behaviour of gangs, organised crime groups and mafias (even if both phenomenas differ 
in scale).   1
 For political conflict research, my criminologically-inspired model of violence dynamics in 
the ongoing Colombian civil war since 2003 may be innovative because it tries to improve the 
existing studies with the insights from organised crime research. To put it in another way, I make an 
attempt to explain the recent dynamics of paramilitary violence (responsible for roughly 70 per cent 
of all conflict-related violence experienced in the country since 1970s; GMH 2013) arguing that the 
explanation based on criminological insights should provide more consistent fit to the data 
compared to the existing political science arguments. In fact, during the exploratory period of my 
research I discovered that, contrarily to Kalyvas’ (2006) predictions, most of Colombian 
paramilitary violence took place in the areas of most disputed territorial control. What is more, I 
established that Weinstein’s (2007) hypothesis about irregular armed groups’ violence as a function 
of the nature of their initial endowments did not hold in paramilitaries’ case since it could not 
address the heterogeneity of paramilitary violence observed across time and space. Finally, I learnt 
that Sanín and Wood’s (2014) claim that conflict participants use more or less violence dependent 
on their ideology accounted only for the instances of high-intensity paramilitary violence but did 
not explain those situations when paramilitaries used relatively little coercion. My preliminary tests 
of these political science theories against empirical data from Colombia revealed that more 
!9
!  While I do not claim that all political violence in the Colombian war can be interpreted as criminal 1
one, I still believe that there is a significant proportion of violence in the Colombian conflict which 
classifies as such. I am referring here to the violence perpetrated by paramilitary groups who can 
best be understood as politically engaged organised crime actors (or politically engaged extra-legal 
governance providers in control of large range of criminal markets). Political involvement is 
nothing new among complex forms of organised crime, with the Sicilian mafia being an obvious 
illustration of such phenomena (see Catanzaro 1988; Lupo 1993). The interpretation of Colombian 
paramilitaries as organised crime actors is bound to be controversial (as I learnt during my first 
seminar talk in Bogotá on 23.10.2013), and thus I am going to spend considerable time later in the 
thesis to demonstrate that no matter how we interpret paramilitary groups their violence dynamics 
can surely be accounted for with criminological tools (see Chapter Two).
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comprehensive explanation is still needed to address the problem of violence dynamics in such 
highly criminalised wars as the Colombian one. 
!
Road Map 
!
 The thesis is organised in the following way. The first part offers a theoretical introduction 
to the problems of conflict resolution design and its implementation with a special attention to the 
Colombian case. To begin with, in Chapter One I explore the possible consequences of forthcoming 
peace accords between Colombian government and the biggest insurgent group still operating in the 
country, FARC. I identify on what premises the future peace agreement is expected to affect 
Colombians’ well-being and improve country’s security situation. I claim that the expectations of 
peace accords’ largely positive effects seem rather unfounded. The historical micro analysis shows 
that conflict resolution negotiated with FARC is unlikely to put an end to the perpetration of 
organised violence in the country and therefore may not eliminate the most significant costs 
provoked by the Colombian civil war. The analysis of conflict’s dynamics reveals its strong 
regionalisation and the omnipresence of private ordering competition. One could hardly expect that 
such violent competition will be stamped out once an agreement with FARC is reached. Contrarily, 
it may actually be aggravated by post-conflict fragmentation of local and regional extra-legal 
governance providers. 
 To support these claims with empirical evidence, in Chapter Two I propose an analytical 
model to evaluate the achievements of already accomplished peace process with paramilitary 
groups which led to their almost complete demobilisation in 2003-2006. Moreover, I try to explain 
in what sense the outcomes of that process can be informative for the predictions of FARC’s 
possible demobilisation’s consequences. The chapter presents the central argument of the paper 
where I argue that there exists positive relationship between post-demobilisation paramilitary 
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violence and state’s anti-paramilitary repression launched simultaneously with peace negotiations in 
2003. In other words, I claim that wherever the state committed itself to truly peaceful conflict 
resolution it brought evident security improvements. On the other hand, wherever the state defied 
on their peace agreement’s promises, or refused to negotiate with selected paramilitary factions, the 
security situation was largely aggravated. I hypothesise that the relationship between repression and 
violence is driven by two mechanisms which make paramilitaries intensify their coercion along 
with state’s repressive action either (a) because of the destruction of their non-violent resources, or 
(b) due to the lack of control over the centrifugal predatory initiatives within their organisations.  At 
the end of Chapter Two I describe my research design based on comparative analysis of two 
Colombian macro regions representing the areas which improved (Eastern Plains) and aggravated 
(Pacific Coast) their security records since the implementation of the first negotiated solutions in 
2003. Finally, I outline the key properties of the data used in the rest of the work.   
 In the second part of the thesis (Chapters Three and Four) I evaluate quantitatively the 
consequences of negotiated conflict resolution with paramilitary groups. As hypothesised, I find that 
the positive impact of this process was far from uniform - it varied not only across regions but also 
within them. Following my theoretical considerations I pay special attention to the post-
demobilisation behaviour of the state in order to identify the conditions which made negotiated 
solution successful. To begin with I address the puzzle of the persistence of high levels of post-
demobilisation paramilitary violence in Colombian Pacific Coast compared to an evident reduction 
in Eastern Plains region. The usual explanations derived from political conflict theories are 
empirically tested here against my criminologically-oriented argument. In fact, the results of my 
analyses show that Colombian post-demobilisation paramilitary violence could not be explained 
with the argument of the weakness of the state as proposed by Restrepo and Muggah (2009) or 
Howe, Sanchez and Contreras (2010). Contrarily, I demonstrate the the observed high levels of 
violence in some Colombian (sub-)regions covary positively with the abundance of state’s 
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repressive intervention. Quite surprisingly, the results hold only for Pacific Coast sample which 
leads me to the introduction of new empirical puzzle to my analyses. 
 The third part of the thesis (Chapters Five and Six) investigates the new puzzle qualitatively 
trying to answer why the logic of post-demobilisation paramilitary violence varied across regions. I 
discover that this heterogeneity can be explained with reference to the nonpartisan character of anti-
paramilitary crackdown adopted against paramilitary groups in some regions but not in others. More 
specifically, both chapters find that the paramilitaries challenged by the state in nonpartisan manner 
(as happened in Pacific Coast) used more violence either as a way of substituting their non-violent 
resources most affected by law enforcement activities, or in response to crackdown-related 
intensification of predatory tendencies within their respective organisations. At the micro level, 
violence is found to reflect risk-driven adaptations of paramilitary organisations. At the macro level, 
violence seems to be the consequence of paramilitaries’ losses in terms of their non-violent resource 
which provoke general instability at paramilitary governance markets. Eastern Plains analyses 
presented in Chapter Six confirm those findings showing that none of violence reinforcement 
mechanisms can be evidenced among the paramilitaries of this “control” region. The thesis 
concludes with theoretical and practical implications of its key findings. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Part I: Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Risks. Lessons 
from Colombia 
!
CHAPTER ONE: Rethinking Colombian Civil War(s) 1946-2014. The role of 
forthcoming peace accords 
  
 In the first half of 2014 Colombia experienced extremely tight presidential contest between 
the incumbent candidate, Juan Manuel Santos, and his challenger Óscar Iván Zuluaga. The distance 
between the candidates apparently represented the fracture of Colombian society, which made the 
contest especially heated. The main difference between Santos and Zuluaga’s political agendas lied 
in their ideas how to put an end to the ongoing civil conflict (Fisas 2014) which made the pre-
election debate almost exclusively dedicated to the Colombian civil war (COHA 2014). Apparently, 
the fact finds its justification in the sentiments of Colombian population:  
!
The most profound fracture is in the streets: between those who can accept the fact that with 
the passage of time the guerrilla [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC] will 
be transformed into political party, and those who cannot accept it; between those who believe 
that the government is making too many concessions in exchange for nothing, and those who 
believe in the peace process to be evaluated only by its joint outcomes; and, above all, 
between those who believe that prison sentences for some members of FARC are necessary, 
and those who would tolerate other types of sanctions (Blanco 2014).   2
!
!13
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In a schematic way, Santos’ pre-election promises included unconditional peace negotiations with 
main insurgent group. Zuluaga, on the other hand, insisted to condition further peace negotiations 
with FARC on their fulfilment of certain prerequisites which, in practice, would most probably 
mean the abandonment of negotiated solution and the return to military escalation (COHA 2014). 
 In the end, Santos marginally won the presidency, but election’s turnout demonstrated that 
politicians might have overestimated the importance of peace process for Colombian voters. “The 
Colombian population’s disenchantment with their political system has reached unprecedented 
levels, with an abstention rate of 60 percent in the first round of elections” (COHA 2014). Some 
people hinted at people’s relative indifference towards peace process with FARC insurgents: “I 
don’t feel that the negotiations in Havana with FARC are real, we don’t know if they bear fruits. All 
happens there in Cuba, as if behind our backs […] Here you look at things from different 
perspective. When you hear about a massacre, about an attack, it impresses you no longer […] 
We’re used to it, we grew up with it” (Blanco and Reyes 2014). What is more, “[t]he war remains 
concentrated in 10 per cent of 1,100 municipalities in twelve regions of Colombia, where only 5 per 
cent of the population live” (Ibid.). It makes majority of Colombian society relatively unaffected by 
war cruelties — at least in the last few years of the conflict since its partial resolution agreed 
between the state and paramilitary groups in 2003-2006. When accused of an overemphasis of war-
related issues in the pre-election debates, the politicians argued that although the war affects directly 
only a marginal fraction of Colombian population it represents the crucial factor for Colombian’s 
future well-being. Santos campaign’s advisor claimed that: “The state destines about 5,000 million 
dollars to fight against the guerrilla, which are not invested into health, education, hygiene… it 
comprises between 1 and 1.5 per cent of GDP” (Ibid.). According to the Colombian Minister of 
Economy, Mauricio Cardenas, the country will grow 1 per cent more once peace accords with 
FARC are reached (Saiz 2013). 
!14
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 Are the politicians right to stress the importance of the peace process as a determinant of 
Colombians’ future well-being? Does Colombians’ disinterest with conflict resolution reflect their 
ignorance, or the insensibility towards compatriots suffering from war-related violence? I believe 
that the turnout at 2014 elections should rather be interpreted as the population’s largely correct 
mistrust in the promises that an accomplished peace process with the FARC could be central to the 
improvement of country’s well-being and that it could provide fully satisfying solution to serious 
security problems experienced in the country for decades now. To demonstrate the plausibility of 
such argument in macro historical perspective I will proceed in the following manner. Firstly, I will 
individuate the mechanisms which make Colombian civil conflict damaging to Colombians’ well-
being, discovering that the most important of them concerns the perpetuation of organised violence. 
Secondly, I will argue that the mechanisms which drive the persistence of organised violence are 
unlikely to be eliminated by forthcoming peace accords. Such a claim will be supported by 
historical reconstruction of Colombian civil conflict’s dynamics since its very origins in 1946. This 
discussion will introduce us to the later parts of the thesis where I will evaluate empirically the 
already concluded peace process with Colombian paramilitary groups (and some individually 
demobilised insurgents).  
!
How Does War Damage Country’s Well-Being?  
!
 Political economy literature is rife with arguments which identify the mechanisms linking 
slow economic growth to conflict and violence. It is important to realise that the relations between 
growth and violence, and between growth and conflict are distinct. Conflict does not always 
produce violence (in fact, in most situations it does not) and non-violent political conflict affects 
economic growth via different mechanisms than violent one. In brief, non-violent conflict slows 
down growth because it increases the risks of unpredictable and inconsistent reforms, which makes 
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entrepreneurs reluctant to make long-term investments — a condition sine qua non for development 
(Frye 2010; Easterly 2006). I am obviously more interested in violent political conflict and its 
impact on growth. Riascos and Vargas (2011) offer a complex review of the literature dedicated to 
this problem identifying four micro mechanisms which explain why violence impedes development. 
In short, violence inhibits growth because (a) it precludes the accumulation of human capital, (b) 
influences the growth-unfriendly micro decisions of the productive firms, (c) negatively interferes 
with early childhood development, and (d) creates the sovereign risks (Riascos and Vargas 2011, 
12). 
 Do we observe these micro mechanisms at work in case of the ongoing Colombian conflict? 
The activities of the Colombian biggest guerrilla group, FARC, undoubtedly affect economic 
growth by all above mentioned mechanisms. The group’s operations exercise unquestionable 
influence on accumulation of human capital (kidnappings, torture, disappearances, homicides), and 
on early childhood development (child recruitment, Spartan discipline among the populations 
subject to FARC’s local governance; see HRW 2003). Although a lot of media coverage is dedicated 
predominantly to those two aspects of FARC’s activities, it seems that they provoke only minimal 
obstacles for growth. Only 5 per cent of population live in the areas of occasional FARC’s 
activities, and at the present stage of war only tiny fraction of them is actually affected. The 
sovereign risks are arguably no longer a threat given FARC’s practically inexistent hopes of taking 
over the state.  
 Probably the most negative influence of group’s activities on growth should be identified in 
the pressure FARC exercises on the decisions of productive firms via imposition of extra-legal 
“taxation” (see Duncan 2005; Vargas 2004; Medina Gallego 1990). The growth-unfriendliness of 
insurgency taxation lies in the negative incentives it creates for productive activities by affecting 
competition and provoking insecurity of property rights. Colombian guerrillas, similarly to the 
mafias, exercise “violent redistribution of revenues which alternates the rationality of consumption 
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and the use of savings in the areas of [their] presence, discouraging local investments and impeding 
formation of trust networks with the result of an increase in transaction and information 
costs” (Centorrino and Signorino 1997, 11-2; author’s translation from Italian). At the individual 
level guerrilla taxation actually duplicates the legal one. In the macro perspective it effectively 
substitutes legal taxation since it reduces local fiscal entries (via influence on consumption patterns) 
and encourages legal tax evasion   (Ibid., 26-7). As a consequence, guerrilla’s extra-legal governance 3
(private ordering), even if present in relatively small fraction of Colombian territory, may bear 
directly on public deficit. 
 There is another reason why mafia-like private ordering exercised by guerrilla groups 
impedes growth and makes it the most economically damaging aspect of low-intensity Colombian 
armed conflict. One of the fundamental characteristics of private ordering systems is the fact that 
they work for the benefit of some at the cost of others. Private ordering cannot be delivered as a 
public good because no one pays for those who cannot afford to pay for themselves, and, 
additionally, it must guarantee some exclusive benefits (club goods) for the payers in order to make 
them participate in the exchange on the voluntary rather than purely coercive basis (see Nozick 
1974, 10-25; Gambetta 1992, ch. 1). The exclusiveness of private ordering system makes it 
inescapably conflictual and persistently rife with violence. Proneness to conflict between protectors 
and protégées is reinforced by the fact that the latter ones usually do not possess mechanisms of 
collective control over their protectors. It, in turn, incentivises private protection providers to be less 
benevolent than they would have been if they had dealt with clients (rather than victims) at truly 
competitive markets of private security (Varese 2010). 
!17
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There is every likelihood that they will opt for legal tax evasion rather than mafia-like one. The 
former taxation is impersonal and relatively easy to evade, compared to the mafia-like taxation 
supervised via personalised monitoring system and collected with a substantial doses of coercion 
(Centorrino and Signorino 1997, 24).
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 In sum, the most important conflict-related damage to Colombians’ macro-economic well-
being lies in the guerrilla’s extra-legal governance and its impact on the decisions of productive 
firms. Does FARC’s demobilisation suffice to overcome this problem? Meléndez and Harker (2008, 
2) argue that the cessation of organised violence perpetuated by irregular armed groups must be 
accompanied by the restoration of public order to stimulate development and produce security 
improvements. Otherwise, the disarmament of organised violence perpetrator cannot eliminate all 
the conflict-related obstacles for development (e.g. negative entrepreneurial incentives rooted in 
distorted competition and the absence of property rights protection). In such case, there is every 
likelihood that new forms of organised violence emerge in place of the old ones (see Duncan 2009). 
In sum, I believe that the forthcoming peace accords with FARC could eliminate only some macro-
economic side effects of the ongoing war, but arguably not the most significant ones. 
  
Forthcoming Peace Accords as Unlikely Solution to Organised Violence Problem in Colombia  
!
 The present section is dedicated to the particulars which make possible peace agreement 
with FARC unlikely to improve security situation in Colombian peripheries. More specifically, I 
show the limitations of peace negotiations’ design stemming from erroneous assumption that FARC 
represents an exogenous organised violence actor. According to this assumption, FARC imposes its 
governance in certain areas of Colombian territory via coercion, and for the mere purpose of 
effective pursuit of group’s political interests. In the empirical part of the section I will show that it 
is hardly the case. In fact, FARC’s extra-legal governance turns out to be driven by endogenous 
local-level dynamics. Given the limitations imposed on peace negotiations expressed in the agenda 
set in 2012, it seems that, whatever the exit of Havana talks will be, the local private ordering 
markets presently dominated by FARC are not going to disappear, and, consequently, local-level 
violent conflict is unlikely to cease even if it changes its main protagonists. In short, the present 
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agenda of Havana negotiations does not consider the real raison d’être of organised violence in 
Colombia, which is the existence of myriad of private ordering markets. 
 Contrarily to the common expectation, the demobilisation of well-disciplined and 
hierarchically organised extra-legal governance provider, such as FARC, may increase the potential 
for conflict at private ordering markets and may even reinforce the negative economic incentives 
which impede development in certain parts of Colombia. The absence of private ordering 
monopolist usually deteriorates the quality of extra-legal governance services and intensifies 
predatory tendencies among the operating governance providers. Easterly (2006, 309) argues that 
the fragmentation of private ordering markets creates a dilemma of decentralised predation, in 
which everyone maximises the volume of his own “loot” because he knows that whatever he leaves 
will undoubtedly fall prey to his fellow predators. What shall we expect to happen once FARC 
decides to sign peace agreement and to dissolve its organisation? One answer is that we may expect 
that there will be some groups eager to take over FARC’s abandoned businesses (newly-emerged 
ones or those already operating in cooperation or in competition with insurgents as extra-legal 
governance providers). Colombians have already observed this process in the aftermath of 
paramilitaries’ collective demobilisation (2003-2006) followed by almost immediate replacement of 
disarmed groups by so-called bandas criminales, new illegal armed groups (NIAG), or 
neoparamilitary squads, all of them glad to reincorporate demobilised ex-combatants (Villarraga 
2013; ICG 2012; CNRR 2009). In short, the peace process under way does not design any solution 
to quench demand for private ordering. Such a solution would require state’s round-the-clock 
presence in Colombian peripheries — the presence based on trust, rather than on emergency 
crackdowns against local suppliers of extra-legal governance (DT 2011). Emergency interventions 
may be successful to eliminate actors from private ordering markets, but they cannot eliminate the 
markets themselves, which makes organised violence perpetual (I develop the point in Chapter 
Four). 
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 Before moving on to empirical evidence, I ought to advert that my thesis should not be read 
as controversial. I believe that peace accords are crucial for ending bloodshed amid civil conflicts. 
All the same, I argue that at times they promise tangible results, at times they do not. The peace 
process with Colombian paramilitaries concluded during Álvaro Uribe’s presidency in 2003-2006 
undoubtedly produced substantial security improvements (see Restrepo and Muggah 2009 and 
Chapter Three), but those accords were designed on regional rather than national basis, and 
therefore more accurately addressed the complexity of the past strife. Moreover, the present stage of 
the conflict with its low-intensity warfare does hardly resemble the fully-fledged war from the 
beginning of Uribe’s presidential mandate in 2002. For these reasons, I argue that nationally-
designed peace accords cannot become a successful solution to low-intensity conflict driven almost 
exclusively by regional dynamics. To make it clear: peace process with FARC is necessary, but 
given its present shape one should not overestimate its practical importance in improving 
Colombia’s immediate security or in boosting the country´s development. 
!
Rethinking Colombian Civil Conflict(s): Historical Reconstruction of Regional Dynamics 
!
 In order to demonstrate the plausibility of the hypothesis of non-centrality of national peace 
accords in improving Colombia’s well-being I am going to rethink the dynamics of Colombian civil 
conflict in a historical perspective. Political scientists usually identify two Colombian civil conflicts 
since 1946: the first one, the Violencia, started between 1946 and 1948, and terminated between 
1958 and 1963 (dependent on the coding rules applied); and the second one, which I shall call the 
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guerrillas insurgency, dated at mid-1960s, yet unresolved  . Given the proximity between the end of 4
the first civil war and the beginning of another, the conflicts are often interpreted as causally 
related, even if they usually get coded as independent rebellions (Arjona and Kalyvas 2006, 3).  For 
the purpose of present work I find it opportune to think of the continuum of Colombian civil 
conflict(s) since 1946 with the various degrees of warfare’s intensity. To avoid excessive 
simplification I distinguish between the conflict’s two phases: the Violencia (1946-63) and 
guerrillas insurgency (1966-2014) periods. 
 One of the most perplexing characteristics of Colombian civil war lies in the impossibility to 
identify what the war is about. The Violencia phase of the conflict, schematically classified as a war 
about eliminating party-driven privileges and partisan clientelism in the rural areas of Colombian 
peripheries, under close analyses reveals extremely complex dynamics. Zamosc (1986, 18) says that 
“although the Violencia was largely a peasant war, the peasants did not fight to win the agrarian 
issue. They fought for their interests only in the course and as a derivation of fighting for the 
interests of others, and this usually involved direct conflict with each other.” In some places conflict 
focused on demands for land, in others on demands for state’s services (health, roads, schooling), 
and yet elsewhere on demands for credit and peasant economy subsidies (Zamosc 1986). What 
about the guerrillas insurgency? It seems equally hard to find a common denominator for the 
majority of the violent struggles since mid-1960s. Insurgent movements alone present complexity 
of motivations for war waging, making anti-state forces extremely fragmented, not rarely in direct 
military competition among themselves (Núñez 2012; Kline 2007). Considering only the remaining 
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insurgent groups, the rebellion gravitates either towards a systemic change towards socialism, land 
redistribution and more egalitarian society (as declared by FARC), or towards delegalising 
multinational corporations’ activities and the abandonment of neoliberal policies in Colombia (as 
declared by Ejército de Liberación Nacional, later ELN). How come each rebel group finds its own 
casus belli irreconcilable with those of its fellow insurgent factions? Barely sketched complexity of 
the revolutionary strife since 1966 reveals that neither in this phase of war one can find a 
straightforward answer to the question of what the Colombian civil war is about. 
 In the remaining part of the section I will search for an explanation of the persistence of 
violent conflict in Colombia — an explanation coherent not only for each phase of war separately, 
but for both of them simultaneously. As I have already said in the previous section my hypothesis 
identifies the reasons of the perpetuation of the Colombian civil conflict in the intrinsically 
irresolvable competition over local private ordering markets. Coming back to the main point of this 
chapter, I will demonstrate that the conflict from its very origins was driven by the multitude of 
local- or regional-level feuds which could not (and still cannot) be solved by nationally designed 
peace treaty. This evidence suggests that whatever happens at Havana negotiations table there is 
every likelihood that Colombia will not get rid of irregular armed groups involved in extra-legal 
governance, and that the conflict will continue (even if no longer under political umbrella).  
 The section is organised in the following way: I begin with an identification of the raison 
d’être of this world longest civil war testing a privatisation of war hypothesis. This argument says 
that the war is driven by local dynamics associated with private ordering competition which inscribe 
themselves in the national insurgency master cleavages for instrumental purposes. In the first 
empirical part, I show that the Colombian conflict could better be understood from local rather than 
national perspective. Secondly, I discuss how Colombian warring parties make use of instrumental 
politics which help them to dress particularistic interests in universal objectives and values 
expressed via insurgency discourse. I conclude with an explanation why these insights demonstrate 
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the non-centrality of present negotiations with FARC in an effort to eliminate organised violence 
from Colombian landscape. The data used in the section comes from detailed ethnographic studies 
of the Colombian civil conflict — quoted at length in various parts of the text. 
!
Privatisation of War Thesis 
!
 Political conflict analysts often observe the disparity between grass-root and top-down 
motivations for war waging (Lichbach 1994). They often show that rank-and file rebels react to 
different incentives to join insurgency than rebellion’s to-be commanders and its political leaders. 
Lichbach (1994) argues that the explanation of conflict’s outbreak requires good understanding of 
the modalities how disparate motivations to rebel converge. Kalyvas (2006) claims that disparity of 
goals and aspirations in civil war happens not only at the individual level (e.g. along the lines of 
insurgency hierarchies). He argues that there exists aggregate-level discrepancy of motivations, for 
example, between warring localities which join rebellion for the convenience of furthering their 
local or regional goals, not necessarily coincident with those of national insurgency. Kalyvas adds 
that the phenomena is hardly observable because of “master cleavage” adherence. Master cleavage 
adherence happens when small warring sides, with publicly irrelevant reasons to fight, prefer not to 
be explicit about their actual motives (e.g. plunder of a neighbouring village), and consequently 
decide to conceal their actual aspirations under the language (values and objectives) of national 
armed resistance. These tactics gains them legitimacy, simultaneously obscuring the complexity of 
conflict’s dynamics for bird-eye observers (Kalyvas 2006).   5
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 What kind of particular gains make people adhere to the master cleavages of national 
rebellion if they do not really care about the pursuit of common political cause? These gains can be 
divided into exogenous or endogenous ones. The exogenous benefits usually exist prior to the 
conflict’s outbreak, while the ongoing warfare simply creates an opportunity to effectively pursue 
them. Among exogenous incentives to participate in civil war we shall consider material benefits 
from plundering, pillage, or mercenaries’ pay. Despite a recent trend in academic literature to 
describe material incentives in war waging as a criminalisation of conflict (Kaplan 1994) or as an 
emergence of new generation of war (Kaldor 1999), the practice dates back to the ancient times (see 
Lucano 2006; Tucidide 1985). Another form of material incentive pursuable in a situation of 
collective violence is a relief from obligations and a dissolution of debts – equally ancient 
phenomena (see Sallustio 1982). The endogenous gains from joining rebellion’s master cleavages 
emerge as a consequence of an ongoing armed conflict. They comprise, among other things, the 
provision of private protection. Backing up one group can guarantee a form of security in a situation 
when normal forms of protection, such as police and army, become unreliable — either because of 
they are exclusively occupied with counterinsurgency struggle, or because they adopt indiscriminate 
counterinsurgency measures responsible for civilian casualties via mistargeting. A good example of 
endogenous war-adherence benefits can be observed in the Vietnamese war. American Operation 
Phoenix in Vietnam (aimed at identifying and eliminating rebels’ supporters) illustrate a situation 
when active participation in the conflict turned out to be safer than the otherwise preferable 
neutrality (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007b).    
 The master cleavage argument also helps us to understand one of the most puzzling aspects 
of the Colombian conflict, its unprecedented length. Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that civil 
war in general should be treated as empirical puzzles. Their high costs usually make each warring 
side worse off at the end of the fighting than they could have been if no fighting had ever occurred. 
The authors propose few hypotheses which may explain why people still embark on such 
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uneconomic enterprises as infinitely long civil wars, with informational setbacks and commitment 
problems among the most promising explanations (Ibid., 11). In Colombian case none of these 
accounts seems reasonable though. To begin with, Blattman and Miguel (2009, 11) hypothesise that 
people may continue uneconomic fighting because — due to informational asymmetries — they 
erroneously estimate the chances of winning the war by each of conflict participants. Yet, is it really 
possible that the Colombian warring parties are not aware of their respective strengths after forty 
eight years of continuous fighting? Fearon (2004), on the other hand, argues the prolonged 
uneconomic fighting may be explained by rebels’ awareness of the state’s incentives to fall back on 
commitments undertook during peace negotiations (usually in the moment of state’s weakness). In 
fact, there is a long history of Colombian state’s commitment problems — especially in case of 
1960s and 1970s resolution schemes (see Zamosc 1986). Nevertheless, since late 1990s the 
successive Colombian governments have forcefully signalled their determination to arrive at a 
durable peaceful solution for example, by creating demilitarisation zone under President Pastrana’s 
negotiations in 1998-2002 (Kline 2007), or by conducting successful paramilitary demobilisation in 
2003-2006 (Arjona and Kalyvas 2006). It is thus hardly possible that state’s commitment can still 
be perceived by insurgents as an obstacle to a peaceful conflict resolution in Colombia. 
 Once we agree though that the Colombian strife is a war about furthering private interests 
not realisable with alternative means, the persistence of conflict will become less of a puzzle (see 
war-as-business hypothesis in Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004). The master cleavage 
argument suggests that the extreme fragmentation of original casus belli (mainly land redistribution 
and exclusive politics) into an infinite number of non-zero-sum struggles makes the Colombian 
conflict so persistent simply because it cannot be placated with any single overarching resolution 
scheme. In the rest of the section I will illustrate empirically the plausibility of this hypothesis by 
showing that the behaviour of warring parties throughout the entire length of the Colombian civil 
war (until present) repeats the following sequence: (1) an outbreak of regional war-related disorder, 
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(2) an adoption of private means of order reestablishment, (3) legitimisation of private ordering 
providers via instrumental use of war politics. 
!
Disorder (1) and Private Ordering Solutions (2) 
  
 The outbreak of Violencia-related disorder in mid-1940s Colombia is a well documented 
phenomena. “[I]ndividuals spared execution were subjected to every depredation imaginable. […] 
[It] included the time-honoured tactics of agrarian conflict: the destruction of plantings, the theft of 
animals, tools, and harvests, and the burning of houses and structures for sugarcane and coffee 
processing” (Sánchez 1992, 206). In fact, Sánchez (1992, 191-2) claims that the Violencia’s original 
social protest was almost immediately transformed into violent rage and pillage:    
!
When the political objective of seizing the Presidential Palace was frustrated by the 
intervention of a small but effective military detachment, the crowd grew angrier and its 
attention turned to destruction and looting. […] The predominant form of their social protest 
was pillage, the objects of which were diverse. The crowd seized consumer goods, such as 
food, clothing, and household effects, as well as arms and metal tools that were useful not 
only in general but also for protecting one's loot. Liquor too was taken since drink supposedly 
can help one tolerate sadness, and that afternoon, on which the pueblo's most important figure 
had died, was one of immense popular mourning. And since there was no tomorrow to 
consider, anything that could not be used immediately was better destroyed. The crowd's 
actions represented a mixture of anger, impotence, and rebellion. 
!
 Meertens (2000) argues that at least since 1953 (the year of the first national-level peace 
accords) the Violencia-related political conflicts ceased to be orchestrated by the national political 
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elites and started to be driven by purely regional dynamics. She claims that the Violencia’s 
explosion of banditry was the result of the atomisation of private armed groups which contributed to 
the creation of decentralised predation dilemmas. “A factor of disintegration [of political conflict] 
lied in the atomisation [of armed groups] which implied their […] direct and compromising 
dependency on local patron, who conferred on [them] certain legitimacy only as long as they 
became subordinated to patron’s provincial interests” (Meertens 2000, 144).  
!
Simple greed and a willingness to profit at another’s expense were other important sources of 
Colombia’s late Violencia. Individuals throughout the region affected by the late Violencia, 
which embraced a great portion of the coffee zone, received coffee and other stolen property 
from violentos. The Violencia typically swept the region during the semiannual coffee harvest, 
when the crop was frequently stolen from farms whose owners were too frightened to guard 
them. Local merchants and other petty capitalists purchased such farms at bargain prices, 
frequently from the widows of Violencia victims (Henderson 2001, 396). 
!
 Predation was not the only form of disorder. Its other forms comprised the multiplication of 
private vendettas, extra-judicial retribution seeking and property destruction. Meertens (2000, 144) 
observes that the Violencia brought huge damage to rural populations leaving them with no other 
choice but to follow insurgency path. During that time, agricultural infrastructure was ruined in 
many Colombian peripheries and people’s morale got badly aggravated (Sánchez 1992, 206). 
Individual vendettas could not have been pursued by legal justice system and went to private hands 
— never reluctant to adopt extremely violent means. Demobilised combatants became the primary 
targets of “evening out old scores” initiatives. 
!
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[D]ifficulties inherent in stopping the Violencia were suggested by two incidents in Tolima 
during 1959. Early that year the young violento Teófilo Rojas Varón (“Chispas”) wrote to 
Father Germán Guzmán, who had formerly served as parish priest in the Violencia-lashed 
municipio of Líbano. Guzmán knew Chispas from the commission’s work in southern Tolima. 
The young man, at the time just twenty-three years old, had tried to take advantage of the 
government’s amnesty program, settling on a farmstead in the municipio of Rovira. But too 
many of his neighbours were interested in settling old scores, and this made it impossible for 
him to resume the life of a simple campesino. “Tell these people not to persecute me,” he 
implored Father Guzmán. But the priest was powerless to protect him. A short time later 
Chispas reconstituted his gang and resumed operations in western Tolima and southeastern 
Caldas (Henderson 2001, 388). 
!
 The extreme deterioration of public order (banditry, extrajudicial persecution, looting) 
created demand for private ordering solutions which ultimately resulted in the proliferation of 
private security agencies and self-defence armed bands. Given the fragility of political situation, 
army and police were not the ones to be trusted. Army’s counterrevolutionary strategy caused many 
mistargetings and in certain areas of the country significantly increased civilian’s risks of being 
killed. Moreover, the state was often unwilling to deal with crimes committed against the 
populations stigmatised as guerrilla supporters. “Many of those returning to claim homesteads 
abandoned during the fighting discovered that others had laid claim to their land and were 
supported by the army. A complicating factor for the peasants of the region was the fact that they 
counted socialists, Marxists, and Communist revolutionaries among their number” (Henderson 
2001, 370). Roldán (2002, 5-13) observes that the mistrust in legal authorities led many powerful 
local patrons (gamanoles) to invest in the creation of their own private protection agencies. It needs 
to be mentioned that the proliferation of this private ordering system occurred amid an ongoing 
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armed struggle which considerably contributed to the escalation of warfare at that time. It happened 
so because the newly-created agencies never limited themselves to the provision of private security. 
Quite contrarily, it seems that they used their violent skills more frequently for offensive purposes 
than for defensive ones. For example, they used violence to accumulate goods and properties for 
their patrons, to eliminate their political and economic competitors at the local level, or to 
intimidate their “unfriendly” neighbours (Roldán 2002; Henderson 2001; Sánchez 1992). 
 In the guerrillas insurgency phase of war, the frequent waves of disorder and predatory 
violence reinforced the already existent private protection system. Since mid-1960s the majority of 
extra-legal governance in war-torn Colombia was exercised by guerrilla groups emerged from the 
Violencia-originated rebels. It seemed that due to their powerful ideologisation, high degree of 
discipline and apparent inexistence of individual material incentives (Gutierrez 2008a) those groups 
might have created a stable, socially acceptable and relatively complex forms of private ordering 
(Molano 1975; Wickham-Crowley 1987). Nevertheless, by the late 1970s guerrillas’ governance 
was already transformed into organised predation as a result of unfavourable war dynamics. Medina 
Gallego’s (1990) analysis of FARC’s governance in Puerto Boyaca shows that in 1970s the 
guerrilla’s project of alternative state-making got unexpectedly interrupted. It happened so because 
the warfare-related financial exigencies forced the group to introduce very unfavourable private 
protection deals which made their governance become perceived as predatory (see Vargas 2004; 
Gutiérrez and Baron 2006; Gutiérrez 2008b). The guerrillas crisis at private ordering markets led to 
their almost immediate replacement by newly-emerged self-defence vigilance units or paramilitary 
squads (Medina Gallego 1990). By 1990s the latter groups took over the majority of private 
ordering niches in Colombian territory changing the very character of extra-legal governance 
exercised in the country. The traditional fragmentation of paramilitary organisations precluded even 
the most rudimentary regional consolidation of their governance which continued to be exercised on 
the local basis, and as such remained rather volatile, unstable and most often predatory (Gutiérrez 
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2008a). Given the limited territorial ambitions of poorly coordinated paramilitary units, they rarely 
managed to refrain from disorderly tactics of plundering neighbouring sub-regions and forced 
displacement of unprotected peasants (GMH 2013).   
  
Instrumental Politics  
!
 If this is how the Colombian civil conflict looks like from its regional dynamics perspective, 
what does it need national politics for? It seems that from the struggle’s very origins Colombian 
warring parties used national politics for dressing their own particularistic interests into publicly 
acceptable enterprises. Henderson (2001, 397), for example, discovers a rather perplexing fact that 
the Violencia’s combatants often maintained some mutually exclusive political affiliations. He 
explains the fact with a suggestion that different political identities served opportunistically for 
armed actors — which identity was brought forward at particular moment in time depended on the 
context and the audience of the situation: 
!
[E]specially vexing aspect of the late Violencia was the claim of violentos that they were 
fighting on behalf of the Liberal Party, at a time when Liberal supporters of the National Front 
struggled to combat the bloodshed. Paradoxically most Liberal bandits of the late Violencia 
claimed allegiance both to the splinter MRL [Movimento Revolucionario Liberal] and to local 
politicians having MRL ties. Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens, authors of the best work 
on bandits and their political allies, wrote that in Tolima “Pedro Brincos,” “Desquite,” and 
others “acted . . . under the aegis of the MRL, which occupied the space left by traditional 
gamonales; at the local and regional levels that made possible highly diverse interpretations of 
[the MRL’s] revolutionary slogans (Ibid., 397). 
!
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 Chacón’s (2003) quantification of the Violencia deaths shows that the correlation between 
intensity of violence and level of political polarisation within micro administrative units ceased to 
exist since 1958. How can we explain that? I would venture to interpret this finding along with a 
following reasoning: partisan divisions offered a convenient jumping point for those who wanted to 
use violence in order to pursue their private goals. Once the war was firmly on, and disorder crept 
over Colombian peripheries, organising an armed brigade with financial support of some 
independent local patrons appeared legitimate enough to make dressing one’s interests in publicly 
acceptable enterprise an unnecessary hassle. It is not to say that partisan competition was totally 
irrelevant. What I suggest instead is that easily malleable partisan identities meant that the 
adherence to the warring parties amid the Violencia conflict followed opportunistic patterns and 
quite quickly wore out the original partisan boundaries. “[War] became an umbrella under which 
every variety of criminality could be found. As the depredations of men under arms grew even more 
ghastly, it became clear that large numbers of psychopaths and common bandits had joined those 
who claimed to be fighting to maintain their political principles” (Henderson 1985, 149). In other 
words, the Violencia, which commonly appears as highly politicised struggle, under a more detailed 
scrutiny resembles more of a chain of private feuds than a truly bipolar armed contest. 
!
By 1951 and 1952, however, significant changes were occurring amid the uproar of the 
factional struggle. In the coffee areas and throughout the highlands, landlords and peasants 
were beginning to use the Violencia to settle by force old and new land disputes. In the central 
departments of Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Huila, the Communist Party was organising 
strongholds of self-defence among uprooted peasants who tried to resettle in marginal 
mountainous areas. In the Eastern Llanos, some Liberal armed groups were slipping away 
from the control of the political bosses, so that many Liberal landowners became targets for 
compulsory "contributions" to support the guerrilla activities. In addition, widespread 
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banditry was developing behind the partisan banners, as more and more of the originally 
political gangs were now bent on private revenge and economic profit (Zamosc 1986, 15). 
!
 In the guerrillas insurgency phase of Colombian conflict the instrumental use of war politics 
could be inferred from the fragmentation of insurgent movements. FARC, ELN, Ejército Popular de 
Liberación (EPL), Movimento Revolucionario 19 de Abril (M19), and many more smaller groups 
were never inclined to cooperate with each other despite representing highly convergent political 
views. Most authors argue that what divided (and still continue to divide) those groups was the 
diversity of their regional objectives (see Kline 2007; Romero 2003). Individual-level 
instrumentalisation of war politics can be illustrated by switching sides phenomena observed among 
rank-and-file rebels and counterinsurgency soldiers. Arjona and Kalyvas (2006) report that 
approximately 30 per cent of ELN’s demobilised combatants included belonged formerly to 
paramilitary groups. The same can be said about 20 per cent of demobilised FARC’s members. 
Respectively, 30 and 35 per cent of demobilised ELN and FARC members belonged previously to 
national army. Guerrillas’ strict measures against defection were high enough to deter rebels from 
switching sides, but still more than 10 per cent of them passed to paramilitary groups (Arjona and 
Kalyvas 2006, 16-7).   The frequency of switching sides phenomena seems high enough to make me 6
think that Colombian irregular fighters were more committed to armed conflict as a way of 
participating in private ordering, rather than to any particular political cause per se. 
 In fact, Zamosc (1986) confirms such hypothesis demonstrating that radical shifts in 
political affiliations during the second phase of Colombian conflict happened in response to 
selective incentives which appeared as a result of conjunctural economic changes. He argues, for 
example, that booming marihuana economy brought financial relief to poor peasants in some parts 
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of the country which induced them to abandon guerrillas-related peasant movements and to transfer 
their loyalties to marihuana-promoting irregular armed forces (drug-trafficking armed wings and 
paramilitary groups).   
!
In Magdalena and Cesar, the marihuana bonanza completely transformed the situation. The 
fierce land conflicts suddenly ended and were replaced by a vertical alignment in which 
landowners, peasants, and officials shared a common interest in the underground economy. 
The nature of the marihuana industry and the participation of the peasants in the new regional 
block of classes had a devastating effect on ideology, paving the way for attitudes and values 
that promoted mafiosi factional loyalties and relegated to the background class demands that 
had originally fed the fighting spirit at the grass-roots level (Zamosc 1986, 139).   
!
What made Colombian peasants at times less concerned about insurgents’ struggles for land 
redistribution was the fact that at times (e.g. during bad harvest season or in case of unavailability 
of credit) land could be more of a burden than a source of income. In such cases, peasants preferred 
to forgo land claims in exchange for new opportunities of seasonal employment in Venezuela 
(Zamosc 1986, 139). 
 Further example of the prevalence of instrumental politics in the Colombian conflict comes 
from the studies of paramilitary groups. In 1997 most of Colombian paramilitaries decided to 
politicise their movements under Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) umbrella, and launched 
vociferous public campaign of legitimising their presence in Colombian politics. Letters between 
AUC’s leaders from that period reveal that the organisation’s instrumental politics were to facilitate 
the pursuit of their particularistic interests, such as a delegalisation of extradition to United States 
those paramilitary members who were sentenced for drug trafficking, or a legalisation of 
paramilitaries’ financial assets amid demobilisation process (Camacho 2009; COP 2002). The letters 
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reveal also that paramilitary unification was hard to maintain given the irreconcilability of local and 
regional interests pursued by various paramilitary factions. Gutiérrez (2008a) argues that AUC 
union’s political failure stemmed from the fact that highly localised armed groups could not have 
been aggregated in a single political project encompassing mutually exclusive and highly 
particularistic interests. In short, paramilitaries’ political expression stands out as the fullest 
adoption of instrumental politics by mafia-like extra-legal governance providers omnipresent 
throughout Colombian civil conflict since 1946. 
!
Predicting Conflict Resolution Outcomes 
  
 In sum, the Colombian civil conflict turns out to be extremely complex phenomena without 
clear identities of its warring parties, with its main areas of clashes vague and incomprehensible for 
bird-eye observer. The lack of continuity and consistency in the political commitment to armed 
struggle indicate the prevalence of private motivations opportunistically inscribed at times in the 
master cleavages of national rebellion, at time in the master cleavages of counterinsurgency 
opposition. Coming back the main question of the preceding section, I should argue that the reason 
why Colombians produced such a long-lasting conflict does not lie neither in the exceptional 
skilfulness of its violence entrepreneurs, nor in population’s unprecedented greed, ruthlessness, and 
predatory drive. It is rather the intractability of conflict’s raison d’être which makes each attempt to 
solve it inefficient and rejected by significant parts of interested parties. War-related organised 
violence persists as result of state’s institutional collapse, which makes violent means of furthering 
one’s interests omnipresent in Colombia. In such panorama, private ordering markets emerged as a 
necessity to introduce some form of regulation into socio-economic exchange suffering from 
diffidence, unpredictability and insecurity: “Here people are desperate, they rob you things, there is 
more delinquency. All’s upside-down in this country” (Blanco and Reyes 2014). Politicisation of 
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particularistic interests via inscribing them into the master cleavages of national insurgency seems 
no more than instrumental rhetorics, or — at best — inconsistent and undetermined pursuit of fluid 
political project.  
 Having this picture in mind, how shall we estimate the hopes of putting an end to Colombian 
organised violence with forthcoming peace agreement with FARC? The historical evidence suggests 
to be rather modestly optimistic. Firstly, as I have demonstrated, in each phase of the conflict we 
observe myriad of various motivations for war waging. What happens in Colombian case is the fact 
that fighting does not strive for any single goal, but for many different ones simultaneously - barely 
traceable and not easily satisfiable by any single conflict resolution scheme. Sánchez (1992, 253) 
illustrates the elusive quest for peace in this world’s longest civil conflict by exposing intrinsic 
difficulties faced by any overarching resolution proposed: 
!
For peasants, peace meant, above all, that they would be recognised as the legitimate 
occupants of the land for which they had fought for decades, and which they had won with 
their blood albeit aided by the landowner exodus of the 1940s and 1950s. […] For 
landowners, peace only had one acceptable outcome: their guaranteed return to their 
properties and eviction of the peasants. 
!
Shall we assume that FARC’s diverse factions will be willing to lay down arms in exchange for the 
promises which can hardly satisfy all of them simultaneously?  
 Secondly, one may expect that demobilised FARC’s soldiers will suffer from all kinds of 
post-conflict reintegration difficulties already observed among various combatants voluntarily 
disarmed in 2003-2006 period (both paramilitary and guerrillas’ soldiers). There exist few studies 
describing the hardships which ex-combatants usually face when trying to re-enter into normal lives 
after a period of irregular army service. Villarraga (2013), for example, demonstrates that ex-
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combatants are not always welcomed back. They suffer from hate crimes committed by people who 
blame them for war crimes (Ibid., 130). Employers are reluctant to employ them given their rather 
negative perception among the society and their presumed minimal preparation for productive work 
(Ibid., 135). Finally, demobilised combatants’ lives are continuously endangered by survived armed 
groups willing to punish them for defection (Ibid., 134; see bombing episode in Bogota in Arjona 
and Kalyvas 2006, 5-6). In fact, Kaplan and Nussio (2013) prove econometrically that the post-
conflict reintegration of ex-combatants depends largely on their reception by communities — a 
thing hardly manageable by state’s intervention which, nonetheless, poses a serious obstacle for 
post-conflict security improvements (see Blattman and Annan 2009; Pugel 2009). What will be the 
future of demobilised FARC’s soldiers? Some of them may suffer from reintegration hardships and 
live on, but less resistant others could find it worthwhile to go back to relatively secure and 
lucrative criminal jobs, fuelling in turn organised violence in post-war Colombia (see Villarraga 
2013, 134; Nussio and Howe 2012). 
 Thirdly, another reason of possibly limited impact of forthcoming peace accords concerns 
the fact that state’s fragmented monopoly on violence, responsible for the collapse of public order in 
many parts of Colombian territory, cannot be pulled together by an elimination of one of the main 
extra-legal governance providers. The reestablishment of public order requires time-consuming 
trust-building and incremental expansion of state’s institutions to Colombian peripheries which 
most probably would take more time than signing peace treaty with remaining guerrilla forces. A 
following comment illustrates well similar preoccupations:  
!
40 billion has been promised for major infrastructure works. A new vetting office has been set 
up with a bureaucratic budget and the order to start handing out contracts has been received. 
But despite Santos’ fine words about building a modern and connected Colombia, despite 
throwing heaps of cash at the problem, all we have to show for the hard work so far is an extra 
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layer of bureaucracy. NOT A SINGLE [originally capitalised] project has started (Colombia 
Politics 2014; for more examples of the same see DT 2011).  
!
 Not surprisingly it seems that the problems associated with private ordering in many parts of 
Colombian peripheries are bound to remain unsolved whatever the outcomes of presently negotiated 
conflict resolution with FARC are. What could the state do with the persistence of extra-legal 
governance in post-conflict Colombia? There are two basic options. The first one is to tolerate those 
private ordering markets as long as they do not threat the national security. Another possibility is 
launch a repressive campaign against any forms of private ordering that fill up the power vacuum 
created by FARC’s demobilisation and its inevitable abandonment of some of its extra-legal 
governance dominiums. I would argue that neither of these two strategies could bring fully positive 
effects, but still the disadvantages related to each of them might differ quite significantly. The first 
strategy (tolerance of post-conflict extra-legal governance providers) can possibly reinforce the 
already discussed conflict-related negative effects on growth by an interference with local 
competition which would perpetuate the poor integration of Colombian peripheral economies into 
national markets (see Centorrino and Signorino 1997). The second solution (repression of post-
conflict extra-legal governance providers), on the other hand, may provoke slightly different 
impediments to development which would include an increase in insecurity (due to criminal 
competition), continuous violations of property rights, and successive discouragement of any long-
run investments in the territories abandoned by FARC (see Arias et al. 2014).  
 While individuating the lesser of two evils may fall beyond the powers of my thesis, I shall 
still venture to understand the content of each of these two “evils” in more detail. In practice, such 
an effort means trying to predict the specific outcomes associated with state’s tolerance and state’s 
repression in relation to FARC’s heirs at extra-legal governance markets. Making predictions of this 
kind is always risky but, fortunately, in the case at hand we do have some empirical record to learn 
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from. In 2003-2006 Colombian state concluded the collective demobilisation of more than 30,000 
paramilitary soldiers. Despite the success of this partial conflict resolution scheme, numerous 
Colombian regions experienced almost immediate return of rearmed paramilitary groups to their 
traditional areas of influence (ICG 2007; Porch and Rassmussen 2008). It created all sorts of 
problems which are likely to emerge in case of FARC’s successful demobilisation (insecurity 
increase, deterrence to long-run investments, extra-legal interference with competition, violation of 
property rights). To deal with post-demobilisation paramilitary crisis, the state adopted all sorts of 
reactions to reemerging paramilitary governance which ranged from an evident tolerance of some 
newly established factions to a dedicated anti-paramilitary crackdown. 
 In fact, the close inspection of regional variation in state’s treatment of post-demobilisation 
paramilitaries should provide us with insights worth considering in order to understand what might 
happen with post-demobilised guerrillas and their governance niches. Reviewing the achievements 
of regionally heterogeneous reactions to reemerging paramilitary governance seems to me a 
fundamental step in order to individuate the post-conflict policies which mitigate or aggravate the 
already discussed obstacles to security improvement. I believe that by comparing an aftermath of 
paramilitary collective demobilisation across regions (and sub-regions) we could improve our 
understanding of the trade-offs faced be the state when choosing the most appropriate reaction to 
the probable turbulences following the disarmament of a well-established extra-legal governance 
provider such as FARC. 
 In the rest of the thesis I am going to illustrate how sub-nationally and sub-regionally 
divergent outcomes of paramilitaries’ demobilisation depended on state’s management of post-
demobilisation paramilitary crisis. In other words, I will demonstrate long-term conflict resolution 
outcomes as a function of Colombian state’s response to the return of rearmed or survived (non-
demobilised) paramilitary groups. I will try to identify those conditions which favoured the most 
successful conduct of the peace process, and those which hampered the positive consequences of 
!38
Krzysztof Krakowski
negotiated solution. In the concluding section I will demonstrate that the conditions responsible for 
cancelling the positive impact of paramilitaries’ demobilisation are very likely to become the side-
effects of FARC’s (and possiblly ELN’s) future disarmament. As a consequence, there is every 
likelihood that once the existing guerrilla groups disappear from private ordering markets extra-
legal governance in some peripheral parts of the country will experience mass-scale fragmentation, 
accompanied by short- and medium-run escalation of organised violence. Sadly, I am going to show 
that most of the empirical evidence from paramilitary demobilisation point to the direction of this 
very prediction. 
!
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CHAPTER TWO: Partial Conflict Resolution 2003-2006: Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. Towards Empirical 
Evaluation 
!
 At the beginning of twenty first century Colombia was one of the most insecure places in the 
world. At that time violence perpetrated by civil conflict participants reached its highest levels since 
the outbreak of fully-fledged civil war in 1978. In 2003 the trend of almost uninterrupted fifteen-
year-old rise in conflict-related homicides finally reversed, and between 2003-2009 conflict-related 
homicides decreased nearly by half (see Figure 1). This security improvement was widely attributed 
to conflict resolution scheme designed by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, who offered an 
opportunity of voluntary disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) to all participants 
in the conflict. The most notable success of this scheme came from the collective demobilisation of 
paramilitary union, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which by the end of 2006 resulted in 
the disarmament of more than 31,000 paramilitary soldiers (Restrepo and Muggah 2009, 36). There 
is widespread consensus that paramilitary groups are responsible for the vast majority of conflict-
related violence since 1978, and, not surprisingly, their exit from Colombian conflict produced 
substantial security improvement. Restrepo and Muggah (2009) find quantitative evidence that 
paramilitaries’ demobilisation produced considerable national-level decline in insecurity by 
significantly decreasing paramilitary violence.  
 Nonetheless, there are areas where DDR application has not brought security dividends. 
Restrepo and Muggah (2009) argues that occasional DDR’s failure to improve regional security in 
some parts of Colombian territory can be explained with the absence of adequate state presence and 
consequent reappearance of paramilitary groups.  
!
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One of the main reasons for the lack of progress in terms of the paramilitary DDR relates to the 
absence of adequate state presence in those areas that were previously under paramilitary 
control. Despite the costly efforts of the Colombian armed forces and police to establish a 
presence in what were once considered isolated and marginal areas of the country, the 
continuation of the conflict and the emergence of new groups seem to be driving new forms of 
violence that undercut recent DDR gains. Like in other areas of disarmament, only the provision 
of strong protection centred security by the state plus DDR bring about sustained reductions in 
violence (Restrepo and Muggah 2009, 43)  . 7
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There are few questions which remains unaddressed in this account though. To name only the most 
evident ones, I would like to point out that the re-emergence of paramilitary groups after successful 
conclusion of demobilisation programme in 2006 was widespread phenomena, observed in all parts 
of Colombia and not limited to the areas of unimproved security. If paramilitary reappearance 
curbed DDR-related security improvements in some places, it most certainly did not curb them in 
most of Colombian territory, which begs for explanation. Secondly, the existence of extra-legal 
governance provider, such as paramilitary groups, not necessarily implies its frequent resort to 
violence. Some political scientists who developed specific arguments to account for the intensity of 
violence perpetrated by irregular armed groups in conflict situations (e.g. Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 
2007), would have actually predicted low levels of paramilitary violence in those areas which have 
experienced paramilitary violence escalation since 2006.   Given all these reasons, the instances of 8
security non-improvements in the wake of successful DDR application requires further academic 
work. 
 The remaining part of the thesis is dedicated to the re-examination of the heterogeneity of 
2003-2006 Colombian conflict resolution outcomes. The present chapter sets the stage for such 
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research agenda. In the first place I present a detailed discussion of the empirical puzzles and 
develop a conceptual approach which will guide my analyses throughout the rest of the work. I 
begin with demonstrating the insufficiencies of the existing explanations of observed DDR 
heterogeneity (including the one suggested by Restrepo and Muggah 2009). Then I review the 
theoretical arguments developed by criminal research which investigate the relationship between 
state’s repressive actions and organised crime violence. These insights allow me to formulate one 
testable proposition about the association between repression and violence, and two hypotheses 
which address the mechanisms driving the relationship. In the second place, I outline research 
design based on comparative analysis of two Colombian regions with strong paramilitary presence: 
security-improved (Eastern Plains), and security-unimproved (Pacific Coast). I argue that the 
findings from between-regional comparisons should be also verified by analysing within-regional 
variability in DDR outcomes for Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains regions separately. The final part 
of the chapter describes my novel dataset and discusses its advantages in addressing present 
research problems. 
!
Empirical puzzles 
!
 The peace process launched by President Uribe in 2003 ended up with successful 
demobilisation of approximately 40,000 irregular combatants, nearly 31,000 of whom were 
collectively demobilised paramilitaries. As I said before the successfully concluded 
“DD” (disarmament and demobilisation) components of Uribe’s resolution scheme did not prevent 
paramilitaries’ almost immediate reemergence in the panorama of Colombian organised violence.  9
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National Police estimates the presence of 4,170 paramilitary members operating within various 
groups in 2012 (INDEPAZ 2013, 4), 17% of whom are previously demobilised AUC’s members 
(CNRR 2007, 5). Despite almost immediate reemergence of some paramilitary groups1, Restrepo 
and Muggah (2009) find quantitative evidence that DDR programme contributed to considerable 
national security improvement by significantly decreasing the amount of paramilitary violence 
perpetrated in the country (so-called “deparamilitarisation” of the conflict). Nonetheless, they admit 
to have observed an important sub-regional heterogeneity in DDR-related security dividends 
hypothesising that the occasional DDR failure could stem from “the absence of adequate state 
presence […] the continuation of the conflict and the emergence of new groups” (Restrepo & 
Muggah 2009, 43). Howe, Sánchez and Contreras (2010) investigated this hypothesis quantitatively 
and found that DDR-related security improvements (reductions in homicide rates) were the most 
substantial in the municipalities with better policing (measured as arrests per homicides). In short, 
the usual suspect — state’s weakness — seems to blame for occasional DDR failure. 
 I believe that such explanation of the heterogeneity of DDR outcomes may still be 
improved. Both of the cited studies associate DDR-related security improvements with the decrease 
in paramilitary violent activities. If the argument of state’s weakness is correct, one should be able 
to demonstrate that better policing reduce paramilitary violence. Would it be theoretically expected 
outcome? It is a well-established criminological fact that law enforcement activities deter crimes 
(Cook 2008), but the relationship does not hold for all types of crime (Friedman 1995). Better 
policing may deter individual offences, but it does not necessarily deter crimes perpetrated by 
organised crime groups and other types of extra-legal governance providers (whom paramilitaries 
undoubtedly are). In fact, some studies argue that law enforcement activities actually provoke more 
violence in such cases (see Smith and Varese 2001; Carey 2006). Why should then Howe et al. 
(2010) find the negative relationship between policing and post-DDR security improvement 
implicitly attributed to the deescalation of paramilitary violence? There are two possible answers. 
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Firstly, Howe et al. (2010, 22) use the proxy of policing quality (arrests per homicides) at 
department level to explain municipal homicide rates. It is entirely possible that in some 
departments law enforcement activities are concentrated only in few municipal areas (see Sánchez, 
Vargas and Vásqeus 2011), and therefore the department-level measurement of policing may 
obscure within-departmental variability. Since the homicide rates are heterogeneous within 
departments, we could hardly exclude the possibility that the finding is spurious. More importantly, 
if post-DDR security improved with the “deparamilitarisation” of the conflict, Howe et al. (2010) 
might have omitted an important variable by not controlling for state’s anti-paramilitary offensive 
not reflected in police operational statistics. To the best of my knowledge it was not the police that 
challenged paramilitaries most seriously since 2003 but Colombian military forces. Failing to 
account for military repression along with conventional measures of policing may lead to an 
overestimation of the actual “weakness” of the state.  
 For the above reasons, I am going to reexamine the determinants of heterogeneous 
deescalation of paramilitary violence since the beginning of DDR process. To do so I will address 
two empirical puzzles. To begin with, I will try to explain the heterogeneity of DDR outcomes 
comparing paramilitary violence dynamics in 2001-2012 period in two Colombian macro regions: 
the one which experienced significant reduction in paramilitary violence since the conclusion of 
DDR process (Eastern Plains), and another one where paramilitary violence did not subside and 
even slightly increased since 2006 (Pacific Coast). Secondly, I will analyse municipal paramilitary 
violence trends in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains separately to account for the within-regional 
heterogeneity observed in 2003-2009 period.   The reduction of paramilitary violence constituted 10
the crucial mechanisms of security improvement according to all existing DDR evaluations, and 
thus I believe that in order to understand the heterogeneity of DDR success one shall analyse the 
determinants of paramilitary violence deescalation. In the next chapters I will demonstrate 
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empirically that, contrarily to the explanations which stress the state’s weakness as a root cause of 
occasional DDR failure, demobilisation’s heterogeneous outcomes could be explained with 
reference to the strength (or determination) of state’s repressive intervention against paramilitary 
groups. In other words, I argue that anti-paramilitary repression cancelled DDR-related security 
dividends in some parts of Colombia. My argument stems from the observation that, theoretically 
speaking, the law enforcement activities may have both positive and negative effect on violence 
perpetrated by extra-legal governance providers (such as paramilitary groups). The arrests and other 
repressive instruments may reduce violence at private ordering markets because they reduce the 
number of operating violence perpetrators. Yet, law enforcement actions may also provoke more 
violence since they interfere with extra-legal governance providers’ resources, their organisational 
arrangements and their relationships with the outer world (to be developed in theoretical section). 
The empirical puzzle addressed in the thesis can be expressed in twofold manner. Above all it is a 
question why since the beginning of DDR process paramilitary groups became more violent in 
some Colombian regions (or sub-regions) but not in the others. Alternatively formulated, the puzzle 
asks why some regions (or sub-regions) benefited from DDR-related “deparamilitarisation” of 
conflict more than the others. 
!
Conceptual Approach 
!
 We know little about the logic of paramilitary violence beyond its counterinsurgency aspect 
(Romero 2003; Medina Gallego 1990; Arjona and Kalyvas 2005). There are few studies which link 
the amount of violence perpetrated by Colombian paramilitary groups to their organisational 
models, but given then lack of systematic data these works usually limit themselves to 
straightforward claims about the association between paramilitary fragmentation (the quality of 
leadership) and within-paramilitary violence (Garzón 2008, 47-8; Rozema 2008, 448-52). Probably 
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one of the most overlooked and under-researched aspects of paramilitary violence is its relationship 
with law enforcement activities. This important gap may stem from the fact that paramilitary groups 
are usually known for their nonbelligerent relations with the state (Arjona and Kalyvas 2005, 28-9). 
In Colombia it was certainly the case at least until early twenty-first century (Medina Gallego 1990, 
Áviles 2006) but since 2003 the situation dramatically changed (Granada, Restrepo and Vargas 
2009). Academic studies of state’s repression and its impact on organised violence usually 
investigate the relationship between government repression and dissent movements (Moore 2000, 
Carey 2006, Henken Ritter 2014). It makes them inapplicable to the analysis of paramilitary 
violence because their underlying assumptions of the competitors’ distance on policy preferences do 
not hold in such context. I believe that in order to understand the relationship between state’s 
repression and paramilitary violence one needs to refer to the logic of organised crime violence, 
rather than political one. Why shall we treat paramilitary violence as organised crime one? I will 
answer this question by describing the nature of Colombian paramilitary groups as extra-legal 
governance providers which places them on the same analytical continuum as organised crime 
groups. Then I will demonstrate the mechanisms which link organised crime violence to law 
enforcement activities and formulate case-specific hypotheses to be tested empirically in the rest of 
this part of the thesis.  
 To begin with, Colombia has a long tradition of extra-legal governance (Henderson 2001). 
Its usual providers range from political rebels to all sorts of self-defence units (indigenous guards 
and armed wings of criminal syndicates included). The omnipresence of private ordering is often 
explained as a result of the country’s geographically fragmented territory and still not consolidated 
national identity which obstacle the establishment of strong central institutions (Thoumi 2012, 984). 
In this picture contemporary paramilitaries represent one of the most complex forms of private 
ordering. The history of contemporary paramilitarism started in 1980s when Medellín drug cartel 
urgently needed army-like structure to protect its interests from guerrillas advances. At that time 
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insurgent organisations, which had fought against Colombian state since mid-1960s, discovered 
drug economy as a perfect way to finance their war waging and posed a serious threat to the 
traditional drug-trafficking operators which decided to create their own armed wings. New-born 
paramilitaries rapidly spread across Colombian territory thanks to their counterinsurgency character 
and the favourable legislation which permitted anyone to create self-defence groups as a way of 
protecting oneself from all sort of political rebels whom Colombian state could not defeat single-
handedly (Áviles 2006, 385). The expanding paramilitarism took over most of smaller organised 
crime groups, up to the point of dominating big drug cartels (Duncan 2005; Camacho and López 
2008). Since its very beginning paramilitarism offered its services to legal enterprises run by land-
rich classes, such as cattle ranchers, commercial agriculture workers, and emerald barons - all of 
them dissatisfied with harsh conditions imposed by guerrillas’ extra-legal governance (Medina 
Gallego 1990).  
 All academics agree that Colombian paramilitaries’ primary business is the provision of 
private security and extra-legal governance (Arjona and Kalyvas 2005, 29). Varese (2010) shows 
that such groups can be incorporated in the criminal research and described with the same analytical 
categories as gangs, organised crime groups, mafias, and even states — each of them placed on 
various points of the same governance continuum. One of the fundamental characteristics of private 
ordering markets is their monopolistic character. Extra-legal governance do not allow for any 
market sharing; it is a zero-sum game where only the winner can effectively establish its authority 
(Nozick 1974, ch. 1). Those who operate as extra-legal governance providers (paramilitaries 
included) require very specific resources to monopolise private ordering markets. These resources 
include intelligence and secrecy, violence, reputation, and advertising (Gambetta 1992, ch. 2). 
Criminal research has shown that state’s repression can affect all of these criminal resources (see 
Reuter 1995, Rankin 2012), but it is more successful in affecting some of them (intelligence, 
reputation, and advertising) than the others (violence). As a result, extra-legal governance providers 
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can make up for the loss of most crackdown-affected resources by substituting them with those 
affected to a lesser degree. To illustrate the point, they can substitute reputation and advertising 
resources with violence. Gambetta (1992, 40-46) claims that mafia-type governance is more often 
exercised on the mere basis of reputation for violence (diffused thanks to criminal advertising) than 
the actual use of costly coercion. His argument implies that there exists an inversely proportional 
relationship between reputation and violence in the underworld: the latter intensifies when the 
former declines. Smith and Varese (2001) show that when an extortion racket suffers from 
reputation loss as a result of improved policing (or leadership succession) its members often get 
“tested” (disobeyed) by to-be victims who refuse to pay extortion money because they doubt the 
credibility of extortionists’ threats and their ability to deliver promised services.   By testing 11
racketeers’ credibility the victims can single out fakes, but the real racketeers (even if in crisis) will 
punish them in order to reestablish own reputation for violence. Thanks to these exemplary 
punishments other to-be victims realise the high costs of disobedience and decide to pay extortion 
money if demanded in the future (Smith and Varese 2001). In short, violence appears as a handy fix 
to reputation deficit in private ordering markets. 
 State’s repression provokes violence among extra-legal governance providers not only 
because it affects their resources. Sánchez-Jankowski (1991) claims, for instance, that gangs 
increase their use of violence when they feel threatened. Varese (2010, 18) elaborates the argument 
showing that fear-driven violence perpetrated by organised crime groups may reflect the situation 
when criminals turn to those criminal practices of wealth accumulation which require high volumes 
of violence but bring large rewards in short run (e.g. predation and extortion not exchanged for any 
services). Organised criminals choose these short-run profitable practices when they fear the 
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possibility of immediate death or imprisonment, and do not expect to stay in the business for a long 
time — which is precisely what happens under determined state’s crackdown. They appear 
disincentivised to invest in less violent long-run rewarding relationships with non-criminal 
environment, and as a result they switch from “stationary” to “roving” banditry (Olson 1993).  
 One could argue that criminal groups predate even if not under siege. Underpaid rank-and-
files and mid-level ambitious leaders may prefer “roving banditry” even in the absence of high 
underworld risks or fully-fledged crackdown (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000). State’s repression still 
reinforces these temptations by pushing criminal groups towards some organisational adaptations 
which, on the one hand, help them to avoid excessive public exposure and easy prosecution by law 
enforcement authorities, but at the same time preclude the centralised control over predatory 
tendencies. These adaptations include organisational horizontality with significant levels of 
outsourcing (Blok 2008, 18), and extra-legal governance limited to illicit commodities such as 
drugs or prostitution (Shortland and Varese 2014, 743). Decentralised organised crime structures 
with scarce interest in a wide range of socio-economic exchange intensify their use of violence 
because they face a dilemma of decentralised predation in which every predator maximises the 
volume of his own loot because he knows that whatever he leaves will undoubtedly fall prey to his 
fellow predators (Easterly 2006, 309). Decentralisation of this kind makes it difficult to coordinate 
the activities of various criminal factions which often enter into violent competition among 
themselves.  
 Coming back to Colombian case, there is no doubt that state’s anti-paramilitary repression in 
Pacific Coast provoked risk and reputation shocks among local paramilitary groups (see Sanchéz, 
Vargas and Vásques 2011). In order to understand the significance of these crackdown-related 
shocks, one needs to consider that until 2000 Colombian paramilitaries were almost never 
challenged by the state (Granada and Sánchez 2009, 262). Given the tradition of good relations with 
Colombian state, we may expect that paramilitaries were not well-prepared to confront public 
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forces, and that the rapid increase in state’s pressure (especially the military one) must have had 
profound consequences on their organisations and resources. Some researchers believe that from its 
very origins paramilitary governance was possible only thanks to the tolerance of Colombian public 
authorities (Medina Gallego 1990; Romero 2003; Áviles 2006). The end of nonbelligerent relations 
with the state must have provoked some behavioural changes among paramilitaries’ protégées and 
their governance competitors (e.g. guerrilla groups), which could have altered previously 
established equilibria. All theoretical arguments considered, I am going to formulate one general 
proposition about the relationship between state’s repression and paramilitary violence, as well as 
two specific hypotheses which identify the exact mechanisms driving the relationship: 
!
Proposition: Paramilitary violence increased with state’s repressive intervention since the 
beginning of DDR programme in 2003. 
Hypothesis 1: State’s repression affected such paramilitary resources as reputation, advertising 
and intelligence, which became substituted with violence (less crackdown-affected resource).  
Hypothesis 2: Risks increase associated with state’s repression intensified paramilitaries’ 
predatory tendencies and led to violent conflicts among the operating groups. 
!
 Before I move on, one caveat needs to be made. I do not claim that state’s repression is the 
only factor responsible for intensifying paramilitary violence. Yet, I believe it remains the most 
counterintuitive and the least understood one, and that is why I dedicated so much room for its 
theoretical explanation here. Other factors already found to be correlated with organised violence in 
general or paramilitary one in specific will be discussed at reasonable length in the empirical 
section of Chapters Three and Four when I overview all the variables considered for statistical 
analyses. 
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!
Comparative design 
!
 The aim of the rest of the thesis is to reconstruct the logic of paramilitary violence in the 
context of partial peace process (2003-2006) marked by successful demobilisation of close to 
40,000 irregular combatants, including nearly 31,000 collectively demobilised paramilitary soldiers 
(Restrepo and Muggah 2009). Some of the peculiarities of this DDR initiative have not been 
discussed yet. The first one regards the fact that the main beneficiaries of DDR programme were 
pro-state paramilitary groups rather than anti-state insurgents. Secondly, the programme did not 
extend to all paramilitary factions. It is true that some of them refused to participate in the scheme, 
but few groups which expressed their willingness to demobilise were denied this opportunity on the 
basis of very controversial and highly arbitrary criterions (Duncan 2005). In practice it meant that 
the DDR’s application left enormous space for to-be “spoilers” both on insurgent and paramilitaries’ 
sides. Given these limitations the objectives of Colombian DDR were not those of terminating the 
ongoing civil conflict, but rather of cooling it down. Because of such unusual context, the peace 
process got accompanied by heavy military crackdown on all conflict participants, paramilitaries 
included (Granada, Restrepo and Vargas 2009). Paradoxically, it seems that this “peace-supporting” 
intervention provoked paramilitary unilateral violence not necessarily related to the conflict 
participation, but certainly related to the exercise of extra-legal governance. Before I can verify this 
claim empirically, the data and comparative design need to be discussed in detail. There are two 
empirical puzzles addressed in the thesis. The first one regards between-regional heterogeneity of 
paramilitary violence trends (and thus DDR outcomes); while the second one deals with within-
regional heterogeneity of the same sort. Each one requires slightly different comparative design. 
!
Between-regional comparisons 
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!
 The only way to comprehend the lack of deescalation of paramilitary violence in Pacific 
Coast is to confront it with the region where such deescalation actually occurred. Eastern Plains, 
another Colombian peripheral area, offers an interesting comparison in such sense. Academic 
research identified some socio-economic conditions correlated with key extra-legal governance 
characteristics (social embeddedness, type of monopolies, organisational models). These conditions 
are: peripherisation (Catanzaro 1988), mistrust (Gambetta 1992), multitude and heterogeneity of 
economic transactions (Bandiera 2003), and type of illicit activities (Haller 1971; Zhang and Chin 
2003). I can control for these macro socio-economic characteristics while comparing Pacific Coast 
with Eastern Plains. To begin with, the history of institutional mistrust and tradition of extra-legal 
governance in both regions date back to the very origins of paramilitary phenomena (Verdad Abierta 
2014, González 2007). Moreover, both regions are characterised by poor incorporation into the 
markets, staggering economies and high poverty rates (NBI   index: 49.1 in Eastern Plains and 49.5 12
in Pacific Coast, against 27.8 nationally). On the other hand, they feature significant resistance to 
the concentration of land processes, which accounts for relatively small GINI index for land 
property structure (0.51 in studied regions, against 0.6 nationally), and multitude and heterogeneity 
of economic transactions observed in both regions (Sánchez, Vargas and Vásques 2011; González 
2007, 243-51). Additionally, Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains constitute today the key centres of 
Colombian coca leaves cultivations (UNODC 2012). Similarities apart, each region is composed of 
the territory of five administrative departments   which create both within- and between-regional 13
variation on key variables of interest (paramilitary violence trends and state’s anti-paramilitary 
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repression). The socio-economic characteristics of both regions will be discussed in a more detail in 
the following chapter. 
!
Within-regional comparisons 
!
 The comparative design necessary to address the second empirical puzzle seems much more 
straightforward since both Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains regions offer an opportunity for 
interesting sub-regional comparisons. Firstly, the trends in paramilitary violence during the period 
under study vary significantly across Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains municipalities. Figure 2 
demonstrates the departmental heterogeneity of violence dynamics in the former region. As we see, 
the trends range from overall violence reduction (Chocó), through its relative stability (Putumayo) 
to progressing escalation (Cauca, Nariño). Although in Eastern Plains the departmental 
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heterogeneity of violence dynamics appears less evident (see Figure 3), it still remains far from 
constant across region’s departments. Secondly, both Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains include some 
of the places with the most precarious state’s presence in terms of public infrastructure, institutions, 
and law enforcement activities. The existence of such localities gives me a chance to address the 
previously discussed arguments of state’s weakness and its alleged impact on DDR failure. Finally, 
in the period under study Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains hosted a mix of diverse organised 
violence actors. Apart from strong insurgents’ presence, there operated two of the biggest 
paramilitary groups which were refused the possibility of DDR participation (Rastrojos and Machos 
in Pacific Coast), and one group which declined an invitation to demobilise (Autodefensas 
Campesinas de Casanare in Eastern Plains). The presence of these paramilitary “spoilers” pushed 
the state to launch a heavy (though non-uniformly distributed) military crackdown against irregular 
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armed groups in the regions. As already stated, Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains in fact leave me 
with a considerable variation on dependent variable and key explanatory ones. 
!
Data 
!
 For the purposes of quantifying paramilitary violence I created my own violence dataset. It 
covers 2001-2012 period using the information from Noche y Niebla (NN) quarterly. I decided to 
embark on the creation of my own dataset for a number of reasons. To begin with, almost all 
available datasets on Colombian organised violence have some serious shortcomings:  
!
In the case of Colombia, existing data sets have the above and other problems. For example, 
the criminality DIJIN-Data set from the National Police includes information on guerrilla 
attacks. This data set has daily information, though only from 1993 when the conflict was 
well under way. More importantly, the data list events but without any intensity measure such 
as the number of people killed, as we have in our data set. The main basis for data inclusion is 
reports to police authorities or events known to police authorities in townships, excluding 
events that are not reported, particularly those that occur outside of institutional presence. 
Clashes between military forces, guerrillas and paramilitaries are not usually registered in this 
database because they do not involve the police. All police operations are registered but not 
all attacks by the guerrillas or paramilitaries are. Criminality data sets are available annually 
since 1960, but the formal classification is either that of health statistics or is criminological 
typology, making it difficult to isolate the effect of the armed conflict from various forms of 
organised crime, common crime and other types of violence. There are other data sets at the 
Colombian internal security agency (DAS) and at the Ministry of Defence, devised mainly for 
strategic purposes, but typically researchers are only allowed access to highly aggregated low-
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frequency subsets of them. Some NGO’s such as País Libre  and Codhes  produce data sets, 
but they are limited to specialised aspects of the conflict (kidnapping and internal 
displacement, respectively). (Restrepo, Vargas and Spagat 2004, 403) 
!
How does my dataset alleviate the problems described above? First of all, it lists violent acts 
registered in the territory of Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains ten administrative departments, and 
allegedly perpetrated by paramilitary groups. NN quarterly is published by Centro de Investigación 
y Educación Popular (CINEP) and reports violence attributable to all participants of Colombian 
Civil War since 2001 until present. NN gathers information from over 20 daily local and national 
newspapers and from large-scale fieldwork including interviews with human rights NGOs’ 
members, local public ombudsmen and Catholic church priests (Restrepo et al. 2004, 403-4). The 
number of registered cases is massive and each of them is described in extraordinary detailed way.  
 What is more, data collection procedure adopted by NN most probably minimises the 
visibility bias intrinsic to the data on organised violence related to the exercise of extra-legal 
governance. This type of data usually registers only those situations when something goes seriously 
wrong between extra-legal governance providers and their protégées (victims), overlooking inherent 
moderate-level violence (threats, intimidations, nonlethal injuries) which occurs on the continuous 
basis in turbulent private ordering environments (see Smith and Varese 2001). Since NN-registered 
denunciations are not really incriminating and cannot lead to legal prosecution, the quarterly has 
more chance to learn about violent incidences which would probably pass unobserved in official 
statistics. Researchers from Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (CERAC) verified the 
quality of NN data collection procedure and confirmed its compatibility with other data sources on 
conflict-related violence in Colombia:   
!
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In the original dataset and in quarterly updates the RSV team follows a stringent quality 
control regime in cleaning the data that proceeds in four stages, covering both event inclusion 
and the coding of events. First, they randomly sample a large number of events and check 
against the CINEP source that they are properly included and coded. Second, they randomly 
sample events, look up these events in press archives and again verify their inclusion and 
coding. This is a test both of the transfer of information from the CINEP source to RSV and of 
the quality of the CINEP raw information itself, which turns out to be high. Third, they find 
all the major events in the dataset and carefully investigate each one in the press record. 
Finally, they compare lists of significant events from other sources, such as Human Rights 
Watch and Colombian government reports, with RSV, occasionally adding events after 
thoroughly investigating them themselves.  (Restrepo et al. 2004, 406). 
!
 I decided to create my own dataset for yet another reason. Some of the existing datasets 
which do not seem systematically biased are still not detailed enough to address my research 
problems. One of the examples comes from CERAC dataset which was also compiled thanks to the 
same NN publications. I cannot use it because, given rather different research objectives, CERAC’s 
data collectors ignored a lot of information from NN raw sources which are relevant to my project. 
As a result, my dataset ends up more limited in terms of time span and the number of violent actors 
analysed, but at the same remains much richer in detail compared to CERAC database. To illustrate 
my effort, one can imagine magnifying glass put to a systematically filtered excerpt of CERAC 
data. The magnification could not have been done automatically, and thus I had to went back to NN 
original sources and re-read them in a more diligent manner. Apart from the yearly counts of 
paramilitary violent attacks aggregated at municipal and departmental levels, my dataset includes 
event matrix which specifies the modalities of violence, socio-economic profile of the victim 
(known for roughly half of the sample), number of victims per event, supposed violence motivation, 
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accompanying events (e.g. pillage accompanying homicides or sexual abuses), and the presence of 
co-perpetrator (e.g. police or armed forces).  
 The crucial characteristics of my dataset is a disaggregation of violence by its modality and 
by the nature of its perpetrator. NN publications do not differentiate between pre- and post-
demobilisation paramilitary groups which some sources interpret as two separate phenomenas. I 
shall not consider it as a problem given the fact that the ongoing debate about the nature of post-
demobilisation paramilitaries and their continuity with pre-demobilisation groups has already 
documented profound links between the two types of organisations (CNRR 2007, ICG 2007). 
During some paramilitary raids registered in NN more than one violent events occurred at the same 
time (e.g. homicide of entire family and displacement of their neighbours). Restrepo et al. (2004, 
406) report a similar problem encountered while preparing CERAC dataset: “On many occasions 
there are different types of actions associated with one event (e.g., ambush and attack on the 
military, minefield and ambush, etc.).” To deal with such cases CERAC researchers prescribe to 
code similar events as single acts attributing the modality which offers the “greatest descriptive 
richness” (Ibid., 406). I chose not to follow CERAC’s prescription becasue it seems excessively 
arbitrary. Consequently, I coded all cases of multiple violent events within one paramilitary raid in 
two ways: once as two (three, four, …, n) separate events, and then as one event with double (triple, 
quadruple, …, n) modalities of violence. In the quantitative analyses I will use the second coding 
rule as a default one, and then evaluate the robustness of my findings using paramilitary violence 
variable coded in the first manner. In case of more than one type of victimisation, I chose the most 
lethal type and coded it as a principal modality of violence. To understand how it works, consider a 
following case: if a woman was sexually abused and consequently killed, I coded an event as a 
homicide. A more problematic cases included those where both modalities of violence seemed 
equally (non-)lethal, such as tortures accompanied by arbitrary imprisonment, or sexual abuse 
followed by tortures. In the former case I coded torture as principal violence modality since it 
!59
Krzysztof Krakowski
somehow implied that a tortured person had been arbitrarily detained during its victimisation (even 
if for a short period of time). In the latter case I coded an event as sexual abuse, since it represents a 
limited case of torture which arguably gives more specific information about the event. 
 CINEP publishes conflict-related violence reports quarterly since 1988. Their original 
publications used to be released as Justicia y Paz quarterly which in 2001 was renamed as Noche y 
Niebla. I am going to use the data published in NN only. While I am primarily interested in the 
paramilitary groups operating since 2003 onwards (the beginning of state’s anti-paramilitary 
repression), I also want to compare their use of violence with immediately preceding period. Year 
2001 offers a good cutting point since it happened by that time that Colombian paramilitaries had 
managed to establish themselves virtually in the territory of almost entire country. If I had decided 
to add prior data on paramilitary violence to my analyses, the comparisons could have been biased 
by inflated violence rates for some regions where at the end of 1990s paramilitarism was in the 
phase of conquering new territories. In other words, the inclusion of pre-2001 data might have 
revealed the regional heterogeneity in paramilitary violence trends attributable not to different 
group characteristics or non-uniformly distributed state’s repressive actions, but to some 
theoretically less interesting factors (e.g. entering new private ordering markets required intense 
short-run violence not necessarily bearing on long-term trends). Still, the analyses relative to 
2001-2003 years remains vital for my study since they reveals the regional violence baselines and 
allows me to check whether post-2003 differences in the levels of paramilitary coercion are not the 
legacies of previously established trends. To put it in another way, thanks to the longer analysed 
period I can control for the history of paramilitary violence in each region. 
!
!
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Part II: Successes and Failures of Paramilitaries’ 
Demobilisation 2003-2006. Quantitative Evidence 
!
!
CHAPTER THREE: DDR in Two Colombian Regions. Between-Regional 
Comparisons 
!
 Having shown the comparative rationale of proposed research design and having described 
my data, I am going to proceed with empirical analyses. Table 1 shows the basic descriptive 
comparisons between Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains in terms of paramilitary violence trends 
observed in each of the regions in 2001-2012 period. In the pre-demobilisation   period 14
(2001-2006) both regions experienced very similar number of violent events. If we acknowledge the 
fact that Pacific Coast has a population roughly three times as bis as Eastern Plains, we may 
conclude that in 2001-2006 Eastern Plains region was much more insecure place in terms of 
paramilitary violence than Pacific Coast. Nevertheless, it needs to be noticed that paramilitaries not 
necessarily spread to the entire Pacific Coast region as they did in Eastern Plains. In 2005 
paramilitary population in Pacific Coast was approximately only half as big as paramilitary 
population in Eastern Plains, judging from crude police estimates and paramilitary demobilisation 
statistics reported by Alto Comisionado por la Paz.   Given the comparability issues relative to 15
absolute violence numbers, it seems more meaningful to compare the dynamics of paramilitary 
violence trends and see how they differed across regions in 2001-2012 period rather than report the 
!61
!  “Pre-demobilisation period” is somehow misleading but practical term. More precisely, years 14
2001-2006 could be referred to as “pre-demobilisation and demobilisation negotiations period”.  
!  Consulted at: www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co and www.policia.gov.co.15
Krzysztof Krakowski
exact counts of paramilitary attacks. In order to understand the divergent violence trends in the two 
analysed regions, one should consider that 79.51 per cent of all Eastern Plains violence took place 
in pre-demobilisation period. Post-demobilisation paramilitary violence there was nearly four times 
lower. In Pacific Coast the counts of pre- and post-demobilisation violent events attributable to 
paramilitary groups are nearly equal: 48.79 per cent of all events occurred before 2007 and 51.21 
per cent afterwards. In sum, the basic descriptive data relative to 2001-2012 period shows us the 
progressive de-escalation of paramilitary violence in Eastern Plains and its evident persistence in 
Pacific Coast.  
 Yet, the aggregate persistence and de-escalation of paramilitary violence can be interpreted 
from still another angle. One need to be aware of the fact that paramilitary population in each 
Colombian region was much smaller in post-demobilisation period compared to pre-demobilisation 
one. Although it is hard to estimate the exact number of paramilitaries operating in both analysed 
regions for each single year between 2001 and 2012, by using the data relative to two data points — 
2006 as the concluding year of Uribe’s DDR and 2012 as the final year of my study — I calculated 
that in Eastern Plains there were roughly four times less paramilitaries in post-demobilisation period 
compared to pre-demobilisation one.   The reduction of paramilitary population in the region 16
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Table 1: Paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast and in Eastern Plains  
per time period.
Number of attacks Pacific Coast Eastern Plains Total
pre-demobilisation 
(2001-2006)
787 815 1,602
post-demobilisation 
(2007-2012)
826 210 1,036
Total 1,613 1,025 2,638
Note: T-test: p < .00. Source: Noche y Niebla (author’s elaboration). 
!  Estimated thanks to the information consulted at: www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co, and in 16
INDEPAZ (2013).
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corresponds to 75 per cent reduction of paramilitary violence perpetrated in the same time. It 
suggests that paramilitaries in Eastern Plains did not become neither less nor more violent after the 
application of Uribe’s DDR programme but simply that their presence in the region diminished 
significantly after 2006, which seems to explain how the violence reduction occurred in the area. In 
Pacific Coast, on the other hand, the paramilitary population appears to have been reduced only by 
half in the analogical period (between 2006 and 2012).   Since we do not observe 50 per cent 17
aggregate reduction of paramilitary violence in the region, one may conclude that Pacific Coast 
paramilitaries became twice as violent from 2006 onwards than they had been before. With this 
observation in mind, we should bear in mind that what appears as the persistence of paramilitary 
violence in Pacific Coast aggregate statistics, in fact represents the sheer escalation of violence if 
observed from the perspective of regional paramilitary units’ propensity to use coercion. 
 The descriptive statistics demonstrated so far point to the evident difference in paramilitary 
violence trends observed in the two analysed regions. They confirm thus the usefulness of Pacific 
Coast and Eastern Plains joint analyses. The explanation of the observed heterogeneity will be the 
subject of most of the present chapter and will occupy the entire length of Chapter Four. Firstly, I 
will try to address the previously outlined puzzles (see Chapter Two) with the hypotheses already 
present in Colombian academic literature which try to account for regional divergence of post-DDR 
security improvements with reference to socio-economic and historical variables. My extended 
discussion of socio-economic realities in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains along with the 
intertwined history of paramilitarism in both regions will bring me to the conclusion that the 
existing hypotheses do rather poorly to account for regions’ divergent paramilitary violence trends 
in 2001-2012 period. For this reason in the subsequent part of the chapter I will try to explain 
different trends in paramilitary violence with a help of between-regional comparisons trying to 
establish the plausibility of my repression hypothesis which sees paramilitary violence as a function 
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of state’s anti-paramilitary repression. In the final section of the chapter I will present more detailed 
qualitative characteristics of paramilitary violence in the regions. This section will deviate slightly 
from the central puzzle of this work but, in turn, it will introduce us to some of the new questions to 
be addressed in the case studies discussed in Chapters Five and Six. 
!
Regional Heterogeneity in Paramilitary Violence Trends 2001-2012 (I). Socioeconomic 
Explanation? 
!
 The existing socioeconomic hypothesis tries to explain the heterogeneity of paramilitary 
violence trends across Colombian regions claiming that the violence is a function of the 
paramilitaries’ social embeddedness as extra-legal governance providers. Some academics argue 
that national dynamics of Colombian civil conflict are responsible for crowding extra-legal 
organised violence groups in some parts of the country (Pacific Coast included). It creates, in turn, a 
situation when extra-legal governance providers do not emerge endogenously in response to local or 
regional demand for private ordering but arrive from the outside (exogenously) imposing their 
services in the contexts where those are not really needed (Guzmán and Moreno 2007; Vásques and 
Vargas 2011; Barreto Henriques 2009, 554-8). Other authors claim, on the other hand, that in some 
Colombian regions paramilitaries try to create their monopolies where other extra-legal governance 
providers are already well-established and legitimised locally, which provokes violent competition 
the two actors. In Pacific Coast, for instance, indigenous and negro collective communities are often 
believed to represent efficient and well-embedded extra-legal governance providers   who minimise 18
demand for exogenous private ordering in the region and provoke violent tensions between Pacific 
Coast populations and paramilitary soldiers (Ávila Martínez 2011; Romero 2011; Barreto Henriques 
2009, 552, 558, 566). 
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 Even though the above quoted arguments seem reasonable and convincing, they cannot 
explain the difference between Eastern Plains and Pacific Coast paramilitary violence trends if 
verified via diligent empirical examination. To begin with, the socioeconomic conditions and 
historical legitimacy of some extra-legal governance providers may in fact explain the baseline 
variation in regional insecurity, but it remains unclear how these variables can account for the 
divergent dynamics of certain phenomenas. What is more, it turns out that paramilitaries’ 
exogeneity in Pacific Coast may actually be exaggerated. To demonstrate that socioeconomic 
conditions have nothing to do with long-run patterns of paramilitary violence (at least in the regions 
analysed in this thesis), I am going to trace down the social roots of private ordering in Pacific 
Coast and Eastern Plains consequently, to name the principal extra-legal governance actors in each 
region, and to determine their areas of influence going through the history of groups’ embeddedness 
and social support among subjected populations. In the present chapter I will show that while the 
embeddedness in extra-legal governance markets is far from irrelevant for paramilitaries’ short-term 
behavioural patterns, it does not appear capable of explaining violence dynamics in the longer 
perspective.  
 In the present section I am going to show that socioeconomic conditions and paramiltiaries’ 
embeddedness did not differ greatly between Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains at the beginning of 
XXI century, and as such the variables cannot account for significant difference in the use of 
violence by paramilitary groups of each region. The historical reconstruction will demonstrate that 
contrarily to common opinion paramilitary governance is not a new phenomena in Pacific Coast (as 
claimed in Guzmán and Moreno 2007). In fact, paramilitary governance in Pacific Coast seems 
equally ancient as the one in Eastern Plains, since both regions saw the surge in paramilitarism in 
the late 1970s (the same as most of other Colombian regions). The idea of the following 
comparisons is to outline socioeconomic commonalities between Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains 
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and to show the inadequacy of socioeconomic arguments in accounting for different use of violence 
by paramilitary groups from each region. 
!
Social Roots of Paramilitarism in Pacific Coast 
!
 “Pacific Coast” is somehow misleading and imprecise term, since not all the departments 
considered in my study as a part of Pacific Coast region lie on the coast of the Pacific Ocean. I 
adopt the term because it appears quite frequently in Colombian literature denominating the area 
which I analyse here. What I refer to as Pacific Coast is the territory of five Colombian 
departments: Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo and Chocó. The territory is relatively 
heterogenous and for descriptive clarity I decided to divide it in two distinct areas discussed in turn. 
(1) The first area could be identified along the Interamericana highway which includes huge part of 
relatively developed department of Valle del Cauca, the central part of Cauca and tight 
Interamericana carriageway in Nariño. (2) The second group of territories lies both to the left and to 
the right of Colombian main transit route (Interamericana highway) and includes the entire 
departments of Chocó and Putumayo, large extends of Cauca and Nariño, and Northern part of Valle 
de Cauca. For the simplicity purposes let me refer to these two sub-regional areas as more (1) and 
less (2) developed parts of Pacific Coast. 
 (1) The beginning of the colonisation of Pacific Coast's more developed area dates back to 
the mid-nineteenth century. It happened via spontaneous occupation of tierras baldias (up-for-grabs 
public unused land, free to occupy) by the peasants and indigenous groups migrating from adjacent 
departments (Antioquia, Caldas, Quindia, Tolima, and Cundinamarca). The present territory of Valle 
del Cauca department was the most popular migrants’ destination in nineteenth century due to its 
agricultural advantages including fertile soil and moderately mountainous terrain which allowed for 
growing virtually any kind of crops (VR 2006, 5). The legal regulation of those settlements 
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favoured rapid colonisation given the fact that the legal rights were relatively more easily obtainable 
in Valle del Cauca compared to tierras baldias in other parts in Colombian peripheries (Ibid., 5-6). 
In the mid-twentieth century Valle del Cauca was characterised by modernity and by relatively high 
level of urbanisation. Apparently, it resulted in firmer presence of the state in the region (Guzmán 
and Moreno 2007, 166). Nevertheless, one should not overlook the important role of paramilitary-
like private social intermediaries who served as “communication bridges” between state’s actors 
and Valle’s population, and who largely dominated “public” institutions in the area (VR 2006, 5).  
 The industrialisation and urbanisation of Valle del Cauca was linked to the production of 
sugar cane and coffee. It had profound effects on the type of rural property and the structure of 
agricultural classes and their settlement patterns. “The industrialisation driven by sugar cane 
cultivations meant the passage from hacendados [big landowners] to tenants and capitalist 
entrepreneurs; from peasants and hacienda labourers to agriculture workers. It brought the 
consolidation of the network of cities, in part cities-dormitories of agriculture workers, with urban 
culture and modern organisations and progressive political claims” (Guzmán and Moreno 2007, 
167). As a result, the citizens in Valle were more democratic and characterised by greater equity 
than average Colombian citizens from other regions. The capital accumulated during sugar boom 
helped to diversify the agricultural production and contributed to the creation of internal markets 
and the establishment of relatively high local consumption (Duncan 2005, 28). The picture should 
not be idealised though. “One  can talk about “top-down” modernisation, backed by the powerful 
elite which committed itself to the management of the state and which constructed the vision of the 
public by large as an extension of their private interests” (Guzmán and Moreno 2007, 168). 
 The regional economy experienced an “earthquake” in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 
1990s with the fall of sugar prices. It forced many people to switch to other types of agricultural 
production whose preferred option, not surprisingly, included coca cultivation (Guzmán and 
Moreno 2007, 168). Because of its location and favourable geographic conditions, the area 
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progressively got transformed into drugs production region. It also started to serve as a strategic 
corridor for the transportation of drugs, with transport routes connecting Pacific Coast seaports of 
Tumaco and Buenaventura with poorly controlled border crossings with Ecuador in Ipiales, up to 
the third biggest Colombian metropolitan area of Cali (HRW 2010, 77). Those changes contributed 
to the modernisation and development of large stretches of Pacific Coast territory along 
Interamericana highway (such as Ipiales and Popayan municipalities in Nariño and Cauca) making 
differences between more and less developed parts of the region ever starker.  
 A described shift toward illicit economy required some powerful underworld organisation to 
regulate the emerging market. Given a dispersed character of the settlements, along with area’s 
relative modernity, urbanisation and firmer presence of the state, the armed groups operating in the 
region were not very big historically. The majority of them could be classified as urban gangs or 
small armed bands (VR 2006). Those groups were never stable and consisted of considerable 
number of mercenaries contracted on the pay-as-you-go basis (Guzmán and Moreno 2007, 170). 
The arrival of the coca industry created powerful incentives for the centralisation and the 
establishment of mafia-like structures with unified the existent extra-legal violence apparatus. 
Those who managed to consolidate extra-legal governance market (founders of Cartel de Cali and 
its later paramilitary associates) descended from the group of original social intermediaries dating 
back to colonisation days:  
!
[O]ne of the decisive factors in the consolidation of drug-trafficking in Valle department was 
the high level of penetration achieved by the cocaine mafias into social, economic and 
political structures of the department, principally thanks to such practices as psychological 
pressure, buying votes, corruption in general, as well as thanks to tight territorial control 
exercised via infliction of violence and terror (VR 2006, 7). 
!
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These criminal groups were well equipped to inflict violence, and found considerable social 
support, which facilitated their political and economic advances, and put them in the best position to 
monopolise growing private ordering markets. Their main competitors, guerrilla groups, could 
hardly make any significant inroads into the territory of predominantly urban character given their 
preferences for operating in rural milieus (Duncan 2005, 4-6; Gutiérrez 2008).  
 (2) The second type of Pacific Coast territories (the less developed part of the region) covers 
the entire Chocó and Putumayo departments, as well as the majority of Nariño and Cauca ones. This 
area is characterised by late colonisation often explained by difficult settlement conditions: a 
landscape dominated by rain-forests and mountainous terrain (Vásques, Restrepo and Vargas 2011). 
Ethnic minorities, either indigenous or Afro-Colombians, comprise a high percentage of regional 
populations there. A significant fraction of Pacific Coast less developed territories has the legal 
status of the collective property of these ethnic groups. Although the hectarage of their properties is 
not impressive compared to the hectarage of the entire departments, the concentration of collective 
property titles makes ethnic groups the most important landowners in certain sub-areas of Pacific 
Coast. For example, in Tumaco diocesan district 78 per cent of 15,558 square-km area have the 
legal status of the collective properties of negro or indigenous communities (DT 2011, 17). The 
collective properties explain the relatively small concentration of land in Pacific Coast (contrarily to 
a general tendency in Colombia), because they cannot be sold in the real estate market, even if a 
community expresses its will to do so (for example under the pressure of organised violence actors). 
“These territories are inconfiscable, imprescriptible, and inalienable, which means that they fall (by 
and large according to the constitution and the law) beyond the market mechanism of demand and 
supply, and constitute an important space for afro and indigenous populations to survive and 
develop” (DT 2011, 17). The relative equality in the land tenancy is outbalanced, however, by huge 
income inequality. In some areas of Southern Nariño Gini index for revenues inequality amounts 
to .65 which seems dramatically high (see Sánchez, Vargas and Vásques 2011). This fact can be 
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explained by poor fertility of collective land — usually less productive because located in such 
areas as rain-forests, swamps, or high mountainous terrain where agricultural opportunities remains 
very limited (Sánchez, Vargas and Vásques 2011). 
 Contrarily to other Colombian peripheries, the less developed part of Pacific Coast remained 
relatively unaffected by the events that determined the massive migration movements in the mid-
twentieth century (especially by the Violencia war).   It was only recently, in the 1990s and 19
especially in the beginning of the twenty-first century, that migrations in Nariño, Cauca and 
Putumayo became more dynamic due to the explosion of coca economy in Putumayo (Torres 2012). 
More recently, the main reasons behind migrations across the less developed parts of Pacific Coast 
lie in the massive displacements related to the expansion of civil conflict warfare (Sánchez, 
Solimano and Formisano 2005) and to the consequences of state’s actions against coca cultivations 
(aerial eradications) responsible for enormous agricultural damage in the region (Thoumi 2013). 
“Now there is no plantain, chontaduro, Chinese potatoes, yuca, rice, etc. The little that had survived 
was razed to the ground by “manual eradications” which entered the area in October 2009. The 
agriculture substitution projects offered to the communities have not been noticed yet” (DT 2011, 
28). The cyclical agricultural damage, related to the waves of US-sponsored anti-drug repressive 
actions, provokes virtually constant migration flows in the region (Sánchez, Vargas and Vásques 
2011). What are the consequences of this process? First and foremost, the constant migrations 
destroyed most of the autoconsumo economies (close-circuit “street-corner” economies organised 
around communities) in the region. As a result, the rural communities became more dependent on 
organised violence actors such as guerrilla groups or paramilitary squads which offered them 
employment in illicit economies (Torres 2012; Vargas 2004). In other cases, many ex-rural 
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communities — forced to abandon their traditional territories — transformed themselves in the 
urban proletariat living in the shantytowns on the outskirts of metropolitan areas of bigger cities 
(NN, Valle del Cauca, 14.03.2003).  
 The public institutions and non-migrating residents of the less developed parts of Pacific 
Coast seem very inhospitable towards conflict-related migrants: “[D]isplaced people are stigmatised 
as indigenous or beggars. Moreover, they are requested proof [of their displacement]; if they do not 
have any, they cannot receive any public assistance, which violates the rights established in Law 
387” (DT 2011, 25). Given the encountered hostility, the displaced communities began to organise 
themselves in various forms of associations and human rights protection groups to defend their 
rights for land and dignity in a legal way. It brought, in turn, a lot of violence and hatred against 
them, and contributed to the farther atomisation of the society in Pacific Coast — historically 
famous for tight communities and strong reciprocity networks, no longer existent in the period 
under study (Barrieto Henriques 2009). Some authors argue that the deterioration of problem and 
growing hostility towards displaced communities have their roots in the ambiguous stance of the 
state, which at times seemed very far from supporting the victims of massive displacement in 
Pacific Coast, if not victimising them itself (Romero 2011). 
 The presence of the state in the less developed areas of Pacific Coast is historically weak. 
The inadequacies of state’s presence manifest themselves in high insecurity, as well as in the lack of 
health, education and transportation infrastructure. In fact, the health and education infrastructure 
deficiencies (see DT 2011, 22-8) go hand in hand with the problem of underdeveloped 
transportation routes:  
!
From this principal carriageway to the highlands of Junín one turns in a secondary route 
which leads to Barbacoas, an unpaved road in the worst conditions: to drive its 56 km one 
needs at least five hours. During President Andrés Pastrana’s administration 18 km were 
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announced to be paved. The half  of it was done in reality. During President Álvaro Uribe’s 
administration (Presidential Program 2005) out of 25 km contracted, nine has actually been 
paved, and the work remains incomplete. In August 2010 the same President Uribe charged 
FFAA [a construction company] with the final execution of the project. So far no works have 
started… […] El Charco municipality has a population of 27,000 citizens, 17,000 of them 
displaced. One can reach the municipality via river, or in a small plane which operates three 
times a week (DT 2011, 17, 24). 
!
The security problem remains related to the omnipresence of various armed groups engaged in such 
profitable industries as coca cultivation, natural resources extractions, and industrial agriculture 
(e.g. palma africana). It cannot be easily resolved because some of these groups have managed to 
achieve certain level of legitimacy at the local level as power brokers, community protectors, or 
informal employers. “It must to be admitted that public authorities redoubled their efforts to offer 
security for the citizens, increasing their presence in the area and punishing delinquents. 
Nevertheless, these actions do not resolve the core problem which is profoundly rooted in the 
society and which reappears in one or another form defying established controls by modifying its 
facets” (DT 2011, 10).  
!
Social Roots of Paramilitarism in Eastern Plains 
!
 The second region analysed in this study, Eastern Plains, represents another Colombian 
peripheral area, composed of five administrative departments of Arauca, Casanare, Guaviare, Meta, 
Vichada. Analogically to Pacific Coast, the region is heterogenous with important sub-regional 
differences. In order not to oversimplify the entire picture, for the purpose of present analyses I will 
discuss Eastern Plains specifying its two distinct sub-areas. (A) The first sub-region comprises most 
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of Meta department as well as Guaviare and Vichada departments. The most important geopolitical 
characteristic of the region is the predominance of impenetrable jungle covering most of this part of 
Eastern Plains territory. This area is mainly rural with the prevalence of scarcely populated tropical 
forests, characterised by very precarious communication network. The state’s presence in Vichada 
and Guaviare is minimal — each of these territorially huge departments comprises only four 
municipalities. The deficiencies of institutional coverage include health and education 
infrastructure, as well as inefficient policing. (B) The second sub-area is composed of the extreme 
part of Northern Meta, and the entire Casanare and Arauca departments. It represents more 
developed and more urbanised part of the region, where the state’s absence is less evident but still 
preoccupying. What I find common across the entire Eastern Plains territory is the heavy presence 
of extra-legal governance providers which substitute inexistent or inefficient public institutions 
since it very colonisation period in the late 1940s. For the convenience I will refer to the two 
specific sub-regions as Southern Eastern Plains (A) and Northern Eastern Plains (B). 
 (A) Southern Eastern Plains cover the territory of Meta, Guaviare, and Vichada departments. 
For the sake of a greater precision the sub-region can be further divided into two quite distinct areas 
— complementary from economic point of view. The Southern part of the sub-region (along Ariari 
and Guayabero rivers) forms one of the principal centres of coca cultivations in the country. The 
relatively small territory in Northern Meta, on the other hand, concentrates the majority of 
latifundio-type structures (big land properties), not necessarily tuned to coca economy. The 
colonisation of the area along Ariari and Guayabero rivers started roughly in 1930s as a result of 
hacienda crisis in Southern part of Huila department (González 2007, 244-5). Those who could not 
obtain or consolidate their fincas (real estates) in Huila decided to march towards so-called tierras 
baldias which were widely available either in the West (already discussed Pacific Coast and Valle 
del Cauca department), or in the East (Meta and Guaviare departments). According to the legislation 
of that time the poor or displaced peasants could claim the land titles of tierras baldias which they 
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had effectively managed to occupy (Molano 1975). Nevertheless, the peasants found obstacles from 
“territorial entrepreneurs” and corporate colonisers which made the effective occupation of up-for-
grabs land problematic. “[T]his massive displacement of the rural poor towards tierras baldias 
almost immediately had to confront itself with the aspirations, manipulations and exploitation of 
territorial entrepreneurs and corporate colonisers, who, via various mechanisms, impeded, deceived 
or made it difficult for newly arrived colonisers to achieve property titles despite the existing 
legislation” (González 2007, 247-8). In response to the similar difficulties, migrating peasants 
decided to organise themselves in bigger colonising groups and purchased military protection from 
irregular armed groups in order to pursue the effective occupation of tierras baldias (Molano 1975). 
 The second wave of massive colonisation occurred in 1940-50s as a result of the Violencia 
civil war. Masses of victimised or threatened peasants from Huila and Tolima departments (the most 
heated centres of the Violencia war) decided to escape the conflict and settled in the Eastern parts of 
the country, usually in Meta, Casanare and Guaviare departments (González 2007; Pérez 2011; 
Zamosc 1986). There were two distinct forms of this war-related colonisation: so-called armed 
colonisation and spontaneous colonisation (Molano 1975). The armed colonisation model 
dominated along Guyabero river and was characterised by autoconsumo, hunting, fishing, and fruit 
and vegetable picking. It was organised around caudrillos (military leaders) of armed self-defence 
groups who led displaced people to their new territories and organised their daily routines. The 
armed groups which protected colonisers were perceived as legitimate because they guaranteed 
better survival in the jungle given the introduction of organised forms of collective labour. In fact, it 
has been argued that in 1960-70s the armed colonisation limited the spread of latifundio model in 
Eastern Plains (Ibid., 46). Another form of Violencia-related colonisation prevailed along Ariari 
river and did hardly present any collective traits. Its spontaneous character determined its 
rapaciousness and made it harder for the colonisers to survive given the lack of any enforceable 
rules within settlers’ communities. The hostility of the jungle made this model rather inefficient and 
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quickly abandoned (Molano 1975, González 2007). As a result, the spontaneous colonisers were 
pushed further into the jungle (towards Amazonas and Vichada departments) and their original 
settlements were overtaken by organised violence actors which opened the way towards drug 
economy expansion.    
 The consequent marihuana boom in the 1960-70s brought a lot of money into the region 
concentrated in the hands of regional economic bonanzas. Initially, the drug industry was controlled 
by the caudrillos of original armed colonisation leaders. With the advance of FARC, the guerrilla 
took control of the drugs industry which did not meet with any significant resistance of the 
agriculture workers. Molano (1975, 75) quotes few coca cultivators who claimed that fixed taxation 
imposed by the guerrilla was more acceptable than the fluent and arbitrary bribes demanded by 
state's authorities who were never perceived as legitimate actors in this part of the country. The end 
of 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s marked the introduction of the coca cultivation in most 
parts of the Meta and Guaviare departments. The rapid enrichment of regional power brokers 
contributed to the redefinition of general lifestyles of the local population. With the introduction of 
beauty centres, bars, and discos Eastern Plains dwellers re-evaluated their aspirations and modified 
their daily habits (Molano 1975, 62). All of that aggravated the social conflicts and resulted in the 
growing support for various guerrilla groups (especially among the poorest peasants). It lasted until 
the coca boom of 1980s which put an end to the politically-related preferences for specific extra-
legal governance providers. At that time, guerrillas and paramilitaries were as good as the precise 
deals they were prepared to offer to local coca economy workers. 
 The traditional latifundio areas, on the other hand, occupy rather small territory in Southern 
Eastern Plains — situated between Puerto López and Manacacias municipalities, as well as in San 
Martín—Mapiripán—Puerto Concordia triangle. Progressing lantifundisation (concentration of land 
and creation of extended land properties) combined with expanding commercial agriculture makes 
this sub-area rather exceptional case of land tenancy structure in Eastern Plains region. It may be 
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explained with the fact that some of its parts have good connections with big urban centres of 
Villaviciencio and Bogotá which favours their greater integration into national markets (González 
2007, 250). Southern Eastern Plains latifudio area concentrates also the highest percentage of 
indigenous populations who, nevertheless, live on the least productive and least accessible lands 
(Molano 1975). 
 (b) The extreme parts of Northern Meta, along with Casanare and Arauca departments 
constitute the Northern Eastern Plains sub-region. It experienced somehow similar colonisation and 
economic development history as its Southern counterpart. The area served as a refuge place for the 
persecuted Liberals during the Violencia war in 1940-50s (Henderson 2001, 317-22). The 
colonisation of the place was driven by the war dynamics and the first colonisers migrated to 
Casanare in the search of security along with their self-defence or guerrilla-like armed groups 
(Zamosc 1986, 15). These colonisers included Liberal landowners not powerful enough to survive 
Conservatives’ pressure in the Violencia’s fight centres, but still capable of creating their new 
dominiums elsewhere. The initial land structure in the area resembled the one observed in Southern 
Eastern Plains. The land tendency patterns were dominated by minifundios (small land properties) 
dedicated to small-scale stockbreeding, as well as to corn and beans cultivations. The agricultural 
entrepreneurs protected their businesses with private means from the very beginning, contracting or 
creating self-defence irregular armed groups.  
 The agricultural decline in the sub-region came with the discovery of oil extraction 
opportunities. Arauca department started its oil extraction immediately after the end of major 
Violencia’s hostilities, roughly in 1953. The Casanare’s oil resources were discovered in 1990s 
which resulted in the emission of the so-called regalias (state’s subsidies for infrastructural 
development) and the consequent construction boom in the area. The publicly-sponsored 
investments in Northern Eastern Plains were intended to foster rapid infrastructural development of 
the region which might have helped to expand petrol extraction and to increase state’s oil-related 
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revenues in relatively short period. The reality saw regalias grabbed by the political and economic 
elites (both legal and illegal ones) supported by paramilitaries and other organised crime groups 
grew out of self-defence units created by the first Casanare’s colonisers (Garay and Salcedo 2012, 
99-100). These organised violence actors were the only ones who could protect the new businesses 
from guerrillas’ incursions or banditry, and who could guarantee the enforceability of often informal 
contracts. The armed regalias’ addressees invested heavily at the local and regional level, which 
made them perceived as regional benefactors and gained them substantial level of social support, 
subverting in fact the Colombian state as legitimate governance provider in the region (ICG 2012, 
6).  
!
[I]t is comprehensible that local electoral operators were easily subordinated to the projects of 
major financial liquidity and greater economic capacity, ready to invest in electoral campaigns 
[…] The new constitution of 1991 reflected institutionally those new realities and established 
the bases for incentivising the flourishing of multiple small political movements. In the end, 
the power relations were resolved in favour of local operators, the proprietors of the votes, 
and led to the detriment of big departmental and national political movements of the past. 
Once electoral resources ended in the hands of those who enjoyed the major liquidity to 
“mobilise popular vote”, civl and economic life in those territories became completely 
subordinated to expanding criminal projects (Pérez 2011, 14).  
!
 In sum, I would argue that the above analyses demonstrate the far-reaching commonalities 
between the socio-economic realms of Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains. The economic panorama in 
both regions appears dominated by relatively limited concentration of land, and by 
underdevelopment and poverty observed across small agricultural units. The agricultural production 
concentrates on the cultivation of coca leaves, and other crops necessary in the chemical processing 
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of drugs (e.g. palma africana). The public infrastructural development initiatives are either 
inexistent, or conducted under the auspices of mafia-like structures. It makes the latter groups very 
powerful actors at the local private ordering markets and helps them to diversify their revenues (in 
order to avoid overwhelming dependence on drug trade). The social panorama in Pacific Coast and 
in Eastern Plains reveals advanced atomisation and marginalisation of strong communities (such as 
indigenous groups). They are constantly intimidated, threatened and displaced as long as they form 
an obstacle to the interests of the major economic actors, paramilitaries and drug-traffickers 
included. The social relations start to be instrumental, norms of reciprocity weaken, distrust 
becomes prevalent, and denunciations among neighbours intensify.  
 The situation has great potential for self-reinforcement: the social atomisation makes it 
easier for economic bonanzas to oppress the peasants; the process which, in turn, makes it less 
viable to rebuild community trust and to produce well-concerted collective action. “In sum, the 
colonisation processes related to land conflicts, the illegal cocaine bonanzas, the precarious state’s 
presence, and the weakness of social and communitarian organisations, all of that aggravated the 
regional crisis and invigorated the presence of illegal armed groups in every nook and cranny of the 
department” (González 2007, 251). There is nothing in these analyses which could support the 
claim that paramiltiaries in one region are more violent than paramilitaries in another region simply 
because of their different embeddedness in the socio-economic reality at the regional level or 
because of their fewer legitimacy at local private ordering markets. In short, the structural 
explanatory variables appear to have too little variation in order to account for the considerable 
heterogeneity of organised violence patterns observed across regions. 
!
Regional Heterogeneity in Paramilitary Violence Trends 2001-2012 (II). Repression 
hypothesis? 
!
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 With socioeconomic explanation clearly insufficient, one needs to look further for a 
convincing account of paramilitary violence dynamics and markedly different violence trends 
observed in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains regions. To do so I would like to test the repression 
hypothesis proposed and discussed in detail in the theoretical section in Chapter Two. In short, 
following Granada, Restrepo and Vargas (2009, 28), I believe that “today more than ever before 
state’s actions determine violence dynamics” in Colombia. Consequently, I hypothesise that there is 
an association between state’s repression and paramilitary violence in the analysed regions. Such 
explanation implies that one should observe the repression dynamics to mirror paramilitary violence 
trends which makes the hypothesis falsifiable and feasible for empirical verification. In the present 
section I am not going to probe into the specific mechanisms driving the possible relationship 
(described by two hypotheses spelled out in Chapter Two) and I will limit myself to test the general 
proposition of this thesis, namely the hypothesised association between paramilitary violence and 
anti-paramilitary repression.   
 To begin with, I am going to compare the compatibility of the trends in anti-paramilitary 
crackdown and paramilitary violence. I decided to measure anti-paramilitary repression here as a 
number of paramilitaries arrested by law enforcement authorities in each region per year (source: 
National Police, the operational statistics reported in Criminalidad journal  ). Paramilitary violence, 20
on the other hand, is measured as the number of unilateral violent attacks attributable to 
paramilitary groups in each region per year (source: already discussed NN publications). The police 
operational statistics are available from 2003 onwards and unfortunately I will not be able to check 
the compatibility of the trends in anti-paramilitary crackdown and paramilitary violence for 
2001-2003 period. In the period covered by the forthcoming analyses (2003-2012 years), 65 per 
cent of paramilitary violent acts registered in my NN database could be classified as violence 
against physical integrity (e.g. homicides, torture), 29 per cent as psychological violence (e.g. death 
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threats, community expulsions), and 6 per cent as violence against property (e.g. forced 
abandonment of one’s accommodation or other mobile properties). These proportions vary slightly 
between regions and the issue will be addressed later in the chapter.  
 Figures 4 and 5 report year by year trends of paramilitary violence and state’s repression 
respectively — both for Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains regions. We can see that by and large 
repression and violence trends correspond to each other while comparing annual departmental 
means calculated for each region separately (as reported in Figures 4 and 5). Figure 6.1 confirms 
this correspondence demonstrating that in 2003-2012 period there was statistically significant 
correlation of .42 (p < .00) between state’s repression (log of the number of paramilitary members 
arrested in a department per year) and paramilitary violence (log of the number of violent acts 
attributed to paramilitary soldiers in a department per year) for department-level observations from 
Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains joint sample. The quartile of observations with the lowest 
!81
Krzysztof Krakowski
repression presents on average more than three times less paramilitary violence than the quartile of 
highest repression. These preliminary descriptive results contradict the already discussed evidence 
reported in Howe et al. (2010) who find negative association between law enforcement efficiency 
and DDR’a success/failure implicitly attributable to organised violence reduction/persistence. I am 
going to re-examine Howe et al.’s proposition in more systematic manner during within-regional 
analyses in the next chapter.  
 As I said in the introductory part of the chapter the policing measured as sub-regional arrest 
rates represented only one side of state’s repressive actions against Colombian paramilitaries in 
2003-2012 period. Another form of anti-paramilitary repression included military clashes between 
the Colombian armed forces and paramilitary groups. The information on this type of anti-
paramilitary repression is available thanks to CERAC dataset   which registers military 21
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confrontations between all participants in Colombian civil conflict at the municipal level since 1988 
until 2009. There is large empirical evidence that in case of the vast majority of state-vs-
paramilitary clashes paramilitaries had not been the initiating party of these disputes, and therefore I 
feel entitled to use the term “repression” rather than “confrontations” in reference to the clashes 
between these two armed forces (see Granada, Restrepo and Vargas 2009, 28). Figure 6.2 shows the 
department-level correlation of .47 (p < .00) between military repression (number of state-vs-
paramilitary clashes in a department per year) and paramilitary violence (number of paramilitary 
attacks in a department per year) for observations pooled from both analysed regions. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient relative to Figure 6.2 is statistically significant and its relatively high value 
suggests that the present association may be even stronger than the one between paramilitaries’ 
arrest rates and paramilitary violence (see Figure 6.1). Unfortunately, the two correlation statistics 
are not straightforwardly comparable given the fact that the second repression variable does not 
provide information relative to 2010-2012 years, while the first one does. I will probe into the 
comparisons between arrest rates and military repression variables and their respective effects on 
paramilitary violence in the following chapter dedicated to within-regional analyses. In sum, the 
descriptive facts presented so far lend some support to the central argument of the chapter which 
claims that between-regional difference in anti-paramilitary repression’s intensity could explain 
between-regional difference in paramilitary violence trends. 
 It needs to be said, though, that the correlation between state’s repression and paramilitary 
violence may capture other types of relationships. I have already shown that the socio-economic 
and historical factors cannot explain between-regional differences, yet quite a few non-structural 
variables accounting for regional conflict dynamics could possibly matter in the context of 
divergent paramilitary violence trends in the analysed regions. For example, guerrillas’ presence 
and guerrilla-vs-paramilitary disputes could potentially bias above quoted analyses. It is entirely 
possible that guerrillas’ presence provoked paramilitary violence, while at the same time it also 
!83
Krzysztof Krakowski
brought more law enforcement authorities to the region/department. Police/army might have not 
limited themselves to fight against insurgent groups exclusively, but following the logic of 
economies of scale they might have chosen to challenge paramilitaries as well. If this was the case, 
it could have meant that guerrillas’ presence made two phenomenas (paramilitary violence and anti-
paramilitary repression) meet quite accidentally and that they may not in fact be causally related.  
 To control for such possible bias, I am going to check if the guerrilla variables are not 
correlated with state’s repression ones. In case of very strong positive correlation between 
repression and guerrilla variables, state’s crackdown’s effect on paramilitary violence could 
represent a spurious correlation. Table 2 shows correlation matrix between the variables measuring 
guerrillas’ activities and anti-paramilitary crackdown proxies. There is very little evidence to 
confirm the concerns that Figures 6.1 and 6.2 suffer from spurious correlation bias. Although we 
observe quite strong and significant correlation between state-vs-paramilitary combats and 
guerrillas’ departmental presence, the same guerrilla variable is not correlated with another 
repression variable which would be inexplicable if it shall really confound state’s crackdown and 
paramilitary violence association. 
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Table 2: Paramilitaries, state and guerrillas’ interactions. Correlation matrix. 
Paramilitary 
attacks
Paramiliaries 
arrested
Paramilitary-
state clashes
Guerrillas’ 
attacks
Guerrilla-
paramilitary 
clashes
Paramilitary attacks -
Paramiliaries 
arrested
.238* -
Paramilitary-state 
clashes
.491** .190 -
Guerrillas’ attacks .474** —.054 .421** -
Guerrilla-
paramilitary clashes
—.305* —.044 .064 .377** -
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05. Source: Noche y Niebla (author’s elaboration). 
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 Spurious correlations aside, there is much more serious problem which could invalidate my 
findings presented until now. The association between anti-paramilitary repression and paramilitary 
violence is difficult to interpret due to uncertainty about the direction of causality. It is entirely 
possible that police actions intensify in response to prior paramilitary violence, rather than the other 
way round. Fortunately, in the present case there are good reasons to believe that direction of 
causality is the one hypothesised. Granada, Restrepo and Vargas (2009, 29) show that initial state’s 
repression was directed prevalently against those paramilitary groups which were not to participate 
in demobilisation scheme (labelled as “dissidents”  ). Duncan (2005, 30) claims that DDR non-22
participants were different from DDR participants only in their symbolic engagement in national 
politics with strong anti-insurgency rhetorics. To put it in another way, the state’s decision to 
exclude paramilitary group from demobilisation process (which was one way of group’s becoming 
DDR non-participant) seems motivated by political reasons, rather than by the criminal profile of 
repression targets (such as use of violence, organisational model, or type of governance)  
 To understand the point, one needs to know that demobilisation initiative brought heavy 
criticism upon the President Uribe’s administration culminating in the hypothesis of Uribe’s secret 
coalition with key representatives of Colombian paramilitarism (see Contreras and Garavito 2002). 
In order to repair its public image Uribe’s administration opted for some anti-paramilitary 
demonstrative action. It consisted of an exclusion of certain groups from demobilisation process and 
their subsequent military defeat. The targets (so-called “dissidents”) were chosen according to the 
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level of their political involvement. Those who failed to enter national-level politics and did not 
develop strong anti-insurgency discourse were deemed to become labelled as “dissidents” and 
consequently to suffer from state’s military repression (Duncan 2005, 30). Having said that, I am 
aware that the present discussion cannot exclude entirely the problem of reversed causality. It does 
exclude reversed causality between paramilitary violence and repression at the outset of anti-
paramilitary crackdown, but it cannot account for repression’s later dynamics. For this reasons, I 
will address reversed causality concern yet in a more systematic manner (using disaggregated 
regional data) in Chapter Four dedicated to within-regional analyses. 
 Putting two and two together, the results of between-regional comparisons are largely 
supportive to the central argument of this chapter. Although they leave many questions unanswered 
and few bias concerns unaddressed, I am going to deal with these issues further in the thesis when I 
reevaluate the present explanation with slightly different focus (moving away from between-
regional comparisons towards within-regional analyses). Thanks to the use of much more 
sophisticated statistical methods   I shall be able to discover more about the relationship between 23
paramilitary violence and state’s repression while controlling for numerous potentially 
counfounding factors not discussed yet. Before I continue my puzzle-solving with within-regional 
focus I would like to offer more detailed description of paramilitary violence structure and its multi-
faceted relationship with law enforcement anti-paramilitary intervention at the aggregate level. 
Even though such discussion will move me beyond the immediate solution to the puzzle of this 
chapter, it should be informative in other ways. Most importantly, it will confirm the fact that state’s 
repression has some effect on paramilitary violence — in this case, on its structure and its non-
quantitative properties 
!
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The Structure of Paramilitary Violence 
!
 Moving beyond the immediate puzzle of this chapter I am going to investigate the specific 
ways in which state’s repression influences paramilitary violence. I have already demonstrated 
some empirical support for the hardcore of my argument, namely for the hypothesis that 
paramilitary violence increases with the intensity of state’s repression. Nevertheless, the intuition 
suggests that apart from quantitative changes in the intensity of paramilitary violence we should 
also observe the changes in the structure of paramilitary violence provoked by state’s repressive 
actions. How different is the structure of paramilitary violence under state’s fully-fledged repression 
from “equilibrium” paramilitary violence — perpetrated irrespective of the actions of law 
enforcement authorities? The present case offers an interesting opportunity to address this issue 
given the huge variation on repression variable both within and between regions and across time 
periods. In the present section I will examine how paramilitary violence structure (measured in its 
three characteristics: lethality, average number of victims per attack, and victims’ profiles) changed 
with the intensity of state’s repressive action. Such a comparison seems possible given the 
established plausibility of the repression hypothesis as an explanation to the regional heterogeneity 
of paramilitary violence dynamics in 2001-2012. 
 To investigate the structure of paramilitary violence and its crackdown-related changes I 
coded three periods of anti-paramilitary crackdown’s intensity (low, medium and high) for each 
department-level observation in my data (N=120). Then I checked how structural characteristics of 
paramilitary violence (lethality, number of victims per event, and victims’ profiles) varied with the 
transition from one intensity period to another. I also controlled whether the sequence of these 
transitions mattered independently of the levels of intensity observed in each repression period. The 
repression periods were coded using National Police operational statistics which report the number 
of paramilitaries arrested in a department per year (the first operationalisation of repression variable 
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from previous section). To illustrate the coding process, I coded low-intensity repression period as 
the years 2001-2002 for all the analysed departments. Medium-intensity crackdown was coded as 
the years 2003-2005 for the departments of Chocó, Nariño, Valle del Cauca (Pacific Coast), and 
Vichada (Eastern Plains); and as the years 2007-2012 for the remaining departments: Arauca, 
Casanare, Guaviare, Meta (Eastern Plains), Cauca, and Putumayo (Pacific Coast). High-intensity 
crackdown corresponds to the years 2003-2005 for Arauca, Casanare, Guaviare, Meta (Eastern 
Plains), Cauca, and Putumayo (Pacific Coast), and to the years 2007-2012 for Chocó, Nariño, Valle 
del Cauca (Pacific Coast), and Vichada (Eastern Plains). I excluded all the observations from year 
2006 given its rather deceptive peacefulness related to the successful conclusion of paramilitary 
demobilisation and state’s temporal cessation of most of anti-paramilitary actions. Figure 7 shows 
that there were two trajectories of anti-paramilitary crackdown in the departments under study, let 
us call them “shock” (the sequence of low, high, medium repression periods) and “gradual” (the 
sequence of low, medium, high repression periods) treatments. It needs to be pointed though that 
my repression’s intensity coding does not refer to the actual counts of paramilitaries’ arrested in 
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Figure 7: Anti-paramilitary repressive strategy per time period, 
2001-2012.
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each department per year, but reflects the relative repression’s intensity levels with different 
reference baselines for each of the two analysed regions. In this way I did a sort of “standardisation” 
of the observations relative to two different regions in order to guarantee their less problematic 
comparability. 
!
Repression and lethality of paramilitary violence 
!
 Having coded three levels of anti-paramilitary repression for all the departments, I wanted to 
check how they vary with certain structural characteristics of paramilitary violence observed in each 
repression period. How did paramilitaries react to the changes in repression’s intensity in terms of 
modifying their modalities of violence? To examine this question I classified the modalities of 
paramilitary violence into three categories: lethal (homicides, disappearances), non-lethal (injuries, 
torture, sexual abuse, arbitrary detainment, displacement, abduction), and indirect (threats) ones. 
Table 3 shows the prevalence of these modalities in each repression period (representing years of 
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Table 3: The modalities of paramilitary violence per repression period, 2001-2012.
Type of violence Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Shock treatment
Lehtal 58.53 (223) 65.81 (433) 42.32 (193)
Non-lethal 17.59 (67) 15.50 (102) 17.11 (78)
Threats 23.88 (91) 18.69 (123) 40.57 (185)
Sub-total 100 (381) 100 (658) 100 (456)
Gradual treatment
Lehtal 47.84 (111) 59.69 (117) 50.35 (290)
Non-lethal 27.59 (64) 12.76 (25) 19.44 (112)
Threats 24.57 (57) 27.55 (54) 30.21 (174)
Sub-total 100 (232) 100 (196) 100 (576)
Note: T-test: p < .00. Frequency in parenthesis. Source: Noche y Niebla (author’s elaboration). 
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low, medium, high crackdown’s intensity) for two groups of departments: one subject to the shock 
treatment, another to the gradual one. The comparison reveals that the proportions of certain 
violence modalities tend to change along with the transition from one repressive period to another 
in somehow systematic manner. We can observe that under both shock and gradual treatment the 
proportion of lethal violence increases with the intensification of repressive intervention after the 
initial period of uniformly low-intensity crackdown (transition to medium or high intensity). In the 
wake of the subsequent transition (from medium to high, or vice versa) the percentage of lethal 
violence drops significantly (either due to incapacitation effect, or in response to underworld 
stabilisation). It needs to be noticed that under shock treatment the drop is so substantial that the 
percentage of lethal actions in the third period constitutes only roughly two thirds of this proportion 
in the first period. Under gradual treatment the drop in lethal violence is less pronounced and the 
lethality of paramilitary violence in the final period surpasses its value in the initial one (even if not 
dramatically). What these findings might suggest is that the sequence matters. The lethality seems 
to depend less on the intensity of repressive action and more on its sequence: intense shock 
crackdown followed by the successive moderation of repressive intervention appears to diminish 
the lethality of violence in the long-run. The same is not true for gradual repressive treatment which 
somehow exacerbates the most extreme forms of insecurity in the long run.  
 What does it tell us about the trade-offs between shock and gradual repressive strategies and 
their impact on the paramilitary governance? Before answering the question I shall recall Falcone 
(1991) and Gambetta’s (1992) arguments where they claim that even the most criminal of extra-
legal governance providers (such as the Sicilian mafia) prefer to limit their use of violence if 
possible, especially its most costly modalities such as homicidal violence. Both arguments 
implicitly suggest that threats should be considered as extra-legal governance providers’ preferred 
modalities of disciplining people subject to their ordering. Having said that, one can argue that a 
diminished proportion of lethal violence combined with the significant increase in the relative 
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frequency of threats may actually reflect paramilitaries’ strengthening rather than their weakening. 
As a result, from state’s perspective the gradual repressive strategy seems more successful than the 
shock one at least in terms of destroying the stability of extra-legal governance and possibly 
recuperating some private ordering markets. At the same time, gradual repressive strategy brings 
publicly undesired outcomes, such as an increase in the most feared forms of insecurity (homicides 
and disappearances), and therefore, not surprisingly, remains highly unpopular.   
!
Repression and magnitude of paramilitary violence 
!
 In the next step I repeated the analogical analyses checking whether there is any relationship 
between the number of victims per paramilitary attack and anti-paramilitary repression’s intensity. I 
coded the number of victims as an interval variable yielding 1 if an attack involved no more than 
two victims; 2 if the number of victims per attack fell between three and ten victimised individuals; 
and 3 if a single victimisation act affected more than ten people. Table 4 shows that the number of 
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Table 4: The magnitude of paramilitary attacks per repression period, 2001-2012.
Number of victims per attack Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Shock treatment
1 to 2 64.79 (184) 84.86 (471) 82.50 (297)
3 to 10 29.93 (85) 12.61 (70) 13.89 (50)
Over 10 5.28 (15) 2.52 (14) 3.61 (13)
Sub-total 100 (284) 100 (555) 100 (360
Gradual treatment
1 to 2 65.24 (107) 75.31 (122) 81.04 (359)
3 to 10 18.05 (46) 19.14 (31) 16.48 (73)
Over 10 6.71 (11) 5.56 (9) 2.48 (11)
Sub-total 100 (164) 100 (162) 100 (443)
Note: T-test: p < .00. Frequency in parenthesis. Source: Noche y Niebla (author’s elaboration). 
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victims per attack seems to decrease with the intensity of repressive action. The repression intensity 
sequence does no appear to matter in this case. Nonetheless, there are few important reasons to be 
cautious in interpreting this finding. To begin with, when we exclude massacres with over 100 
victims, which significantly inflate means, we find that on average there were 1.96 victims per 
event in Eastern Plains and 3.18 in Pacific Coast. The baseline difference may be explained with 
different community structures in both regions. Pacific Coast is the region with the more significant 
indigenous presence, which hosts a large number of collective territories either of indigenous or 
afro-Colombian populations (Vasques and Vargas 2011; Barreto Henriques 2009). Despite the 
hostile law enforcement environment and an increased need for secrecy among irregular armed 
groups in the region, Pacific Coast paramilitaries may find atomised victimisation not always 
feasible given the nature of communitarian life prevalent in the area. For these reasons, the cross-
regional conclusions about the relationship between repression's intensity and the scale of an 
average paramilitary attack should be read with special caution. 
!
Repression and paramilitary victims’ profiles 
!
 Finally, thanks to the detail of the NN data in slightly more than half of the registered violent 
events I was also able to identify some basic characteristics of victims’ profiles. NN adds a short 
descriptions to registered violent attacks which characterise a victim by its profession or by any 
other labour-related etiquette (e.g. politician, unionised worker, street vendor, judge, journalist, 
school teacher etc). I decided to analyse only two characteristics of the victims retrieved from NN 
raw sources: general and case-specific one. The general characteristic regards victims’ working 
status (salaried worker, informal/precarious worker, entrepreneur, and freelance professional). Case-
specific characteristic concerns only this sample of the victims’ population who dedicated 
themselves to active anti-paramilitary fight. Among all paramilitary victims recorded in the NN data 
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a relatively large share (26.37 per cent) belong to the category of victims whom I call “prosecution 
advocates”. Prosecution advocates include those individuals who participated in legal prosecution 
of paramilitary members (such as justice operators, or victims’ families), those whose job was to 
reveal paramilitary crimes (e.g. human rights observers), as well as those who conducted public 
campaigns insisting on paramilitary prosecution from their own private initiative (e.g. journalists, 
educators). I coded four categories of prosecution advocates victims dependent both on their status 
in legal prosecution process (if they were directly engaged in paramilitaries’ prosecution) and on 
their resources (if they were engaged indirectly). These resulting categories go as follows: (1) 
justice operators (judges, magistrates), (2) victims’ families (plaintiffs), (3) human rights NGOs 
(organised denouncers), (4) civic society representatives (private denouncers). Analogically to the 
previous two sub-sections I am going to see how the proportions of some specific classes of 
paramilitary victims changed with the transitions from one level of anti-paramilitary repression’s 
intensity to another.      
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Table 5.1: Victims’ profiles per repression period (I), 2001-2012.
Victims’ working status Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Shock treatment
Salaried 35.42 (34) 42.71 (82) 24.43 (43)
Precarious/informal 54.17 (52) 44.27 (85) 64.77 (114)
Entrepreneur 8.33 (8) 9.90 (19) 9.09 (16)
Freelance profession 2.08 (2) 3.12 (6) 1.70 (3)
Sub-total 100 (96) 100 (192) 100 (176)
Gradual treatment
Salaried 37.65 (32) 52.58 (51) 29.10 (78)
Precarious/informal 48.24 (41) 41.24 (40) 60.07 (161)
Entrepreneur 3.53 (3) 5.15 (5) 7.84 (21)
Freelance profession 10.59 (9) 1.03 (1) 2.99 (8)
Sub-total 100 (85) 100 (97) 100 (268)
Note: T-test: p < .00. Frequency in parenthesis. Source: Noche y Niebla (author’s elaboration). 
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 My comparisons shall begin with the analysis of victims’ working status. Table 5.1 reports 
the proportions of victims sorted by their employment status in each of the three repression periods 
for both shock and gradual treatment groups. There is no evidence of sequence-related impact of 
state’s repression on the categories of workers targeted by paramilitary violence. What is more, the 
type of most frequently targeted workers do not seem to depend on the level of repression’s 
intensity neither. The common changes between the first and the third periods, such as relatively 
diminished proportion of salaried workers (proxy for unionised workers), or relatively increased 
proportion of informal/precarious workers and entrepreneurs among paramilitary targets, appear 
related to the long-run effects of persistent anti-paramilitary actions rather than to repressions’ 
intensity levels. Why is it so? One can expect that paramilitaries under prolonged siege will loose 
many areas of their traditional influence, either in labour unions, or in large employment centres 
(see Garzon 2008; CIT 2009). Coherently with this explanation, I learn from the qualitative reading 
of NN data that since 2007 downtrodden paramilitary groups (especially in Pacific Coast) have 
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Table 5.2: Victims’ profiles per repression period (II), 2001-2012.
Type of “prosecution advocates” Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Shock treatment
Justice operators 19.51 (8) 21.62 (16) 24.30 (26)
Victims’ families 14.63 (6) 18.92 (14) 8.41 (9)
Human rights NGOs 60.98 (25) 51.35 (38) 64.49 (69)
Individual denouncers 4.88 (2) 8.11 (6) 2.80 (3)
Sub-total 100 (41) 100 (74) 100 (107)
Gradual treatment
Justice operators 8.82 (3) 20.83 (5) 14.00 (14)
Victims’ families 8.82 (3) 20.83 (5) 29.00 (29)
Human rights NGOs 55.88 (19) 54.17 (13) 49.00 (49)
Individual denouncers 26.47 (9) 4.17 (1) 8.00 (8) 
Sub-total 100 (34) 100 (24) 100 (100)
Note: T-test: p < .00. Frequency in parenthesis. Source: Noche y Niebla (author’s elaboration). 
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often abandoned their aspirations to impose extra-legal governance within such milieus as unionised 
working environment (NN). Instead, they have began to select targets which were easier to threaten 
and coerce, such as small firms and independent labourers (street vendors, mechanics, unregistered 
taxi drivers, phone-sharing persons  , shoe cleaners).   24
 Lastly,  I would like to demonstrate a plausible relationship between victimisation patterns 
among prosecution advocates and the intensity of state’s repression against paramilitary groups. 
Table 5.2 shows that the transition from low anti-paramilitary repression to any of its higher levels 
of intensity occurred along with a non-negligible relative increase in the victimisation of direct 
prosecution advocates (justice operators and plaintiffs) compared to the victimisation of indirect 
prosecution advocates (social organisations and journalists). It all makes sense given the fact that 
determined anti-paramilitary crackdown encouraged denunciations and all sorts of legal actions 
against paramilitary groups, which since 2003 must have multiplied enormously. Two of the more 
specific changes in the victimisation patterns related to repression’s intensity are worth mentioning 
here. Table 5.2 demonstrates that victim’s families became most exposed to paramilitary violence 
during the highest levels of repression’s intensity, while justice operators had their toughest times 
during medium-intensity crackdown. Again it seems very reasonable. Because of heavier police 
presence and intensified intelligence work in all “sensitive” environments, high-intensity repression 
made it hard for paramilitary groups to victimise important justice operators. In this situation, 
paramilitaries decided to terrorise more frequently the second most important participant in their 
legal prosecution processes, the plaintiffs (victims’ families). When the surveillance relaxed and 
state’s appeared less cautious about its key officials, paramilitaries took the risks to threaten or 
eliminate some justice operators given the major benefits accruing to such actions compared to 
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to their belts, which prevents minutes-buyer to distance himself/herself from the phone´s owner.  
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plaintiffs’ elimination. There is no doubt that justice operators constitute more serious threat to 
paramilitaries’ impunity than the families of their victims — usually unable to read and write, and 
badly in need of assistance in order to formulate denunciation which might lead to paramilitaries’ 
prosecution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Sub-Regional Heterogeneity of DDR Outcomes 
!
 So far I have demonstrated that between-regional analyses yield the results strongly 
supportive to the central argument of this chapter demonstrating the plausibility of the positive 
relationship between state’s repression and paramilitary violence. However, there are few critical 
issues which need to be addressed before one can be certain about the robustness of such claims. 
First of all, it is entirely possible that I overestimated the socio-economic similarity between 
analysed regions using mainly qualitative information coming from various data sources which may 
not necessarily be perfectly comparable. Even if it happened not, I could have not accounted for 
within-regional socio-economic heterogeneity. What is more, the correlations discovered in the data 
which pools both regions’ observations (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) might not hold if I repeat analyses for 
each region separately. Finally, departmental analyses may suffer from the aggregation problem. 
Since my argument does not make claims about the populations’ characteristics but about 
individuals or groups of individuals’ actions (paramilitary purposive acts of violence), using highly 
aggregated data to explain the micro-dynamics of paramilitary violent behaviour seems excessively 
risky and may potentially obscure numerous micro-level complexities.  
 To address these issues, I am going to redesign my comparative framework in order to 
pursue within-regional comparisons of paramilitary violence heterogeneity for Pacific Coast and 
Eastern Plains separately. I am going to determine why some areas of Pacific Coast/Eastern Plains 
regions experienced increasing paramilitary violence rates in 2003-2009 while others saw 
significant reduction in paramilitary violence in the same period. Instead of annual departmental 
observations as the basic units of analysis I am going to turn to municipal-level comparisons. As a 
result, the socio-economic regional characteristics will be measured at municipal level and, as such, 
I should be able to address their within-regional variability. Moreover, I am going to use more 
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advanced statistical methods which allow me to introduce lag structures to my analyses, and to 
control for the possibility of reversed causality. For within-regional analysis my dataset covers the 
years 2003-2009  , the period since the beginning of DDR process until three years after the 25
conclusion of its “DD” components (disarmament and demobilisation). It coincides with the period 
of two terms of Álvaro Uribe’s presidency holding constant fundamental policy orientation. In sum, 
the above outlined research design follows a new civil conflict research agenda proposed by 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) who suggest to observe the changes in a single security milieu at 
the sub-regional level within possibly limited time period. 
!
Modelling Paramilitary Violence Dynamics 
!
 To begin with, I will test statistically the main proposition of the previous two chapters —
whether paramilitary violence increases in response to state’s anti-paramilitary repression. The 
initial analyses will proceed with Pacific Coast data only. Analogically to the previous chapter, 
paramilitary violence is defined here as an unilateral attack against any type of human civilian 
target, which includes actions varying from homicides and disappearances to arbitrary detainments 
and rapes. The organised crime theory laid out in theoretical section does not make any specific 
predictions about the modalities of organised crime violence most likely to occur in response to law 
enforcement crackdown and therefore I pool all violent events together. Dependent variable (DV) in 
all the models proposed in this section is a count of paramilitary unilateral attacks registered in a 
municipality during each year in 2003-2009 period. DV’s distribution is characterised both by an 
excessive number of zero counts and by an over-dispersion. Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
model seems the most appropriate estimation technique for this kind of response variable (Cameron 
and Triviedi 1998). Firstly, ordinary least squares regression cannot be employed for count DV 
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since it may lead to negative predicted values (King 1988). More importantly, the ZINB model may 
account for the fact that zero observations in my response variable can be generated in two different 
ways (Long 1997). On the one hand, there may be no paramilitary violence in municipality A at 
time t simply because there were no paramilitaries there at t (paramilitaries had no interest in the 
locality at that moment, or had been pushed out of the place by a competing group or law 
enforcement authorities). On the other hand, there may be no paramilitary violence in municipality 
B at t because the relations between local population and paramilitary groups were good throughout 
a year and there happened no significant breakdown in these relations which could get registered in 
NN data. In the case of municipality A we should speak of so-called “certain zero” observation 
which has to be explained in a different way than zero observation relative to municipality B. 
 The ZINB regression combines two separate models. In the first step, an inflation (logit) 
model is generated to predict whether a municipal observation falls into “certain zero” group or not. 
I use two instruments to single out “certain zero” cases at this stage. The first one comes from 
CERAC conflict dataset and measures paramilitary municipal presence on binary scale yielding 1 if 
any paramilitary group was present in a municipality during a year, and 0 otherwise. I noticed that 
in 59 municipal observations where CERAC dataset declares no paramilitary presence I still find 
evidence of violent events attributable to paramilitary groups. For this reason I add the second 
variable to the inflation model which uses the cumulative score of my DV. The logic behind the 
inflation model goes as follows: a municipality with no paramilitary violence at time t is likely to be 
a “certain zero” case if there is no evidence of paramilitary presence in the municipality at t, and if 
no previous paramilitary violence had been registered there since the beginning of the analysed 
period until t.  
 In the second step, the ZINB regression generates a negative binomial model in order to 
estimate the intensity of paramilitary violence for those municipalities which are not predicted as 
“certain zero” cases. For this part of the ZINB model I try three nested specifications. Firstly 
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(Model 1), I use two simple explanatory variables that criminologically-oriented studies usually 
associate with the intensity of organised violence in Colombia. Garzón (2008) suggests that the 
majority of paramilitary violence today may stand for within-paramilitary fighting which follows 
AUC’s dissolution (2003-2006) and the fragmentation of remaining and newly-emerged groups. In 
this argument violence begets violence because of its endogenous escalation dynamics which spirals 
out until “the [paramilitary] winner is decided” and the conflict can finally subside (see Gaviria 
1998, 12). To account for this escalation dynamics, Model 1 uses two variables: the cumulative 
score of DV and its square transformation (Escalation and Escalation Sq.). The two terms capture 
escalation and attrition processes, and as such they should have positive and negative effect on DV 
respectively (see Morselli, Tanguay and Labalette 2008, 157). The econometric literature on crimes 
in Colombia finds that the levels of violence both political and criminal, organised and not,   are 26
strictly related to the quality of public justice system, policing included (Gaviria 1998; Gaitán 2001; 
Sánchez, Solimano and Formisano 2005). In order to see whether the relationship holds for 
paramilitary violence, the model includes the variable which measures paramilitary members arrests 
rates (Arrests). I calculate it dividing the number of paramilitaries arrested in a department of 
reference each year (National Police statistics  ) by yearly counts of departmental crimes attributed 27
to paramilitary groups (my dataset estimates). Because of the variable’s over-dispersion I use its 
logarithm in the model. I expect it may have either positive (Smith and Varese 2001) or negative (in 
accordance with Howe et al. 2010) effect on DV. Nonetheless, any significant result should be 
interpreted with caution given the already discussed aggregation issues (see Chapter Two).  
 The second model (Model 2) combines the already described explanatory variables with the 
information about conflict-related dynamics that could have shaped extra-legal governance 
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environment in the analysed regions. The first conflict-related variable (Repression) tests the central 
proposition of the paper. It measures state’s anti-paramilitary repression on binary scale scoring one 
if there was any military clash between state’s armed forces and paramilitary groups in a 
municipality during a year, and zero otherwise. I use the word “repression” rather than 
“confrontation” because we have good reasons to believe that in the vast majority of the cases 
paramilitaries had not initiated these military disputes (Granda, Restrepo and Vargas 2009, 28). I 
hypothesise that the repression variables has a positive effect on DV. Model 2 introduces also 
another two conflict-related variables to test whether contemporary paramilitary violence follows 
the counterinsurgency logic of the past (see Romero 2003). The first variable (Guerrilla_clashes) 
indicates the incidence of guerrilla-paramilitary combats at the municipal level yielding one if there 
was any confrontation during a year, and zero otherwise. The second variable (Guerrila_presence) 
measures guerrillas’ municipal presence scoring one in case of any insurgent activity during a year, 
and zero otherwise. Most paramilitary groups operating in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains after 
2003 (both rearmed and non-demobilised ones) explicitly claim they continue to fight against the 
rebels (e.g. NN, Putumayo, 11.11.2004; Nariño, 20.03.2007). Although many studies disbelieve in 
counterinsurgency character of contemporary paramilitaries, they still admit that the criminal 
competition between guerrillas and paramilitary group may be the reason of persistently high levels 
of organised violence in some parts of Pacific Coast (Vásques and Vargas 2011, Barreto Henriques 
2009, 554-8). I expect that both guerrilla dummies may have a positive effect on DV. All the 
conflict-related variables discussed in this paragraph were coded thanks to CERAC conflict 
database.  
 Finally, in Model 3 I keep all the predictors from Model 2 adding three time-invariant 
controls to account for baseline differences in the levels of paramilitary violence attributable to 
municipalities’ individual characteristics. The first variable (NBI) controls for poverty level using 
the percentage of municipal population living with basic needs unsatisfied (source: Departamento 
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Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE  ). Although the poverty is usually associated with 28
lowering opportunity costs and increasing the returns from participating in organised violence 
(Dude and Vargas 2013), I do not think it correlates positively with municipal paramilitary violence. 
Local poverty means less economic exchange and therefore its high levels may actually discourage 
paramilitary type of extra-legal governance which most probably targets the areas with multiple 
economic transactions (see Bandiera 2003). For this reason I expect NBI may have a negative effect 
on DV. The second control variable (ICOFIS) uses institutional coverage index which takes into 
account 16 instruments to measure the presence of public institutions and the quality of public 
infrastructure at the municipal level (source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, DNP  ). The 29
index is measured on continuous scale scoring between zero and one, with lower scores indicating 
worse institutional coverage. ICOFIS can be interpreted as a static proxy of state’s capacity at the 
municipal level, and its effect on DV should be negative (see Howe et al. 2010). The last variable 
(Resguardo) controls for the presence of indigenous collective territories (resguardos). It scores one 
if there is any resguardo within municipal administrative borders, and zero otherwise. I coded this 
variable using the list of legally recognised resguardos published by Ministerio de Ambiente, 
Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial (MAVDT).   Indigenous communities are famous for self-30
governance which includes the maintenance of their own self-defence forces (Verdad Abierta 2014), 
and the management of independent justice (Reyes 2014). Consequently, they maintain rather 
conflictual relations with any alternative governance providers (Barreto Henriques 2009), and thus 
their municipal collective presence may have a positive effect on paramilitary violence. 
 Apart from already described variables, all models include the log of population’s size 
(Population) as semi-exposure variable (source: DANE), and year dummies which control for 
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regional conflict dynamics characterised by occasional large-scale events that affect the extra-legal 
governance in the entire Pacific Coast. Such events comprise three waves of collective paramilitary 
demobilisation, coca eradication operations, international investments, the arrival of new extra-legal 
governance actors, or signing and breaking of alliances between irregular armed groups operating in 
the region. Number of observations, mean, and standard deviation of each variable can be consulted 
in Table 6.1 for Pacific Coast sample and in Table 6.2 for Eastern Plains one. Unfortunately, the 
variables coded with CERAC dataset have a lot of missing data and for this reason many municipal 
observations get dropped from the final analyses. To understand the size and direction of a possible 
missing data-related bias, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reports DV’s descriptive statistics both for the entire 
population of municipal observations and for the subsample effectively used in the analyses (with 
no missing CERAC data). Not surprisingly, the observations with missing CERAC data regard few 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for variables in Models 1-3. Pacific Coast sample.
Variable Observatio
ns
Mean Standard 
deviation
Source
Arrests 1274 3.162 6.213 National Police
Repression 746 .181 .385 CERAC, v.5.2 
Guerrilla_clashes 746 .177 .382 CERAC, v.5.2 
Guerrilla_presence 746 .714 .452 CERAC, v.5.2 
NBI 1274 .495 .235 DANE, 
population 
census 2005
ICOFIS 1169 .289 .141 DNP, 1999
Resguardo 1274 .187 .390 MAVDT, 
indigenous 
census 2005
Population (2005) 1274 43,984 164,398 DANE, 
population 
census 2005
Dependent Variable 1274 .51 1.95 Noche y Niebla
Dependent Variable 
(analysed sample)
746 .82 2.47 Noche y Niebla
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almost complete municipal panels which experienced minimal levels of paramilitary violence 
throughout the entire analysed period (e.g. out of 528 Pacific Coast observations only 24 were 
different from zero). Their exclusion from the analyses should not bear on the results since the 
municipalities they represent probably fell beyond the interests of any organised violence actors, at 
least in 2003-2009 period.  
 Testing the association between paramilitaries violence, state’s repressive actions, and 
insurgents’ activities poses substantial methodological difficulties because of the endogeneity 
problem. In fact, any relationship between paramilitary violence and state’s repression (or 
insurgents’ competition) may work in both direction — with the latter being either the cause, or the 
consequence of the former. Carey (2006, 7) argues that the problem can be solved by using lagged 
values of all the endogenous explanatory variables. In my case it means that paramilitary violence at 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for variables in Models 1-3. Eastern Plains sample.
Variable Observatio
ns
Mean Standard 
deviation
Source
Arrests 441 11.18 22.65 National Police
Repression 283 .385 .486 CERAC, v.5.2 
Guerrilla_clashes 283 .208 .407 CERAC, v.5.2 
Guerrilla_presence 283 .717 .451 CERAC, v.5.2 
NBI 441 .491 .248 DANE, 
population 
census 2005
ICOFIS 420 .247 .129 DNP, 1999
Resguardo 441 .159 .366 MAVDT, 
indigenous 
census 2005
Population (2005) 441 23,207 49,117 DANE, 
population 
census 2005
Dependent Variable 441 1.50 4.63 Noche y Niebla
Dependent Variable 
(analysed sample)
242 1.50 3.41 Noche y Niebla
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time t can be predicted by state’s repression (and insurgents’ competition) at t-1 which excludes the 
possibility of reversed causality. The application of the procedure seems straightforward and I 
embrace it in all the above specified models. Finally, since my data is gathered both between panels 
and across time I cluster standard errors at the municipal level in order to correct for within-panel 
autocorrelations.  
!
Results 
!
 Table 7.1 reports the results of all three models run on Pacific Coast sample. Since my 
theoretical interest lies in understanding the dynamics of paramilitary violence where paramilitary 
kind of extra-legal governance effectively existed, I discuss only the results for negative binomial 
part of the ZINB models.   As expected, I find strong evidence that the intensity of paramilitary 31
violence is driven by the escalation dynamics — once triggered the violence becomes self-
perpetual. Escalation effect is highly significant and positive across all models, but concordant with 
the logic of attrition it subsides after surpassing certain violence threshold (negative coefficient of 
Escalation Sq.). This finding confirms the anecdotal evidence that within-paramilitary fighting 
explains the occasional escalation of post-DDR paramilitary violence (Vásques and Vargas 2011). 
Nevertheless, the escalation alone provides only partial explanation to the heterogeneity of violence 
dynamics in the region. By using Akaike information criterion (AIC) we can see that the inclusion 
of additional variables in the model significantly improve its estimation results. Respective AIC 
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“certain zero” observation are 3.2 to 3.9 (dependent on model’s specification) for each municipality 
where no paramilitary presence could be confirmed at the time, and which experienced no prior 
paramilitary violence. Any increase (or discrete change) in the variables included in the inflation 
model (DV’s cumulative score and paramilitary presence dummy) has a highly significant negative 
effect on these odds. 
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scores tell us that Model 1-PC is 4.4×10-33 times as probable as Model 2-PC to minimise the 
(estimated) information loss, and 3.7×10-39 times as probable as Model 3-PC.  
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Table 7.1: The intensity of municipal paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast (2003-2009). 
Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models.
Dependent Variable: Paramilitary violence 
Model 1-PC Model 2-PC Model 3-PC
Escalation .113*** 
(.017)
.102*** 
(.016)
.094*** 
(.014)
Escalation Sq. —.0009*** 
(.0002)
—.0008*** 
(.0001)
—.0008*** 
(.0001)
Arrests (log) —.003 
(.014)
—.007 
(0.014)
—.019 
(.015)
Repression .549** 
(.226)
.431** 
(.215)
Guerrilla_clashes —.171 
(.230)
—.070 
(.205)
Guerrilla_presence —.388 
(.242)
—.444** 
(.216)
NBI .351 
(.553)
ICOFIS —.727 
(1.138)
Resguardo .470* 
(.240)
Population (log) —.101 
(.108)
—.103 
(.110)
.111 
(.144)
Constant .128 
(1.082)
.765 
(1.271)
—1.549 
(1.499)
N 644 492 477
Wald 203.22*** 309.90*** 344.76***
Degrees of freedom 9 12 15
AIC 1,109 960 932
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Coefficients reported only from the negative binomial 
part of the ZINB models. Robust standard errors clustered on municipalities (in parenthesis).
Year fixed effects not reported. 
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 What new do we learn about paramilitary violence dynamics from the latter two models? 
Most importantly, they demonstrate that the intensity of paramilitary violence increases 
substantially in response to state’s anti-paramilitary repression. Other things equal, Models 2-PC 
and 3-PC predict respectively 73 and 54 per cent more paramilitary violence per year for the 
municipalities with immediately prior repressive intervention compared to the ones with no 
repression at the same time. The magnitude of this effect seems big enough to attract policy-makers’ 
attention. Model 3-PC shows also that indigenous collective presence constitutes an important 
factor which may account for a baseline differences in the experience of paramilitary violence 
attributable to municipal-specific characteristics. Other things equal, the municipalities with 
resguardo within their administrative borders are expected to experience on average 60 per cent 
more paramilitary violence per year compared to the municipalities with no resguardo at all. The 
explanatory power of this variable remains limited to between-municipal variation. 
 One of the most unexpected results of the analyses is the non-significance of 
Guerrilla_clashes variable. Yet, the fact of not finding a relationship should not be interpreted as 
equal to finding that there is no relationship. My models might not have captured the effect of 
guerrilla-paramilitary clashes on DV because they measure these confrontations on binary scale 
instead of reporting the exact counts (unfortunately not available at the municipal level in CERAC 
dataset). It need not be overlooked, though, that analogically measured Repression dummy still 
yields significant results in all models. I would argue with Granada, Restrepo and Vargas (2009, 28) 
that the long-run consequences of state’s repression on paramilitary violence outweigh the ones 
provoked by paramilitaries’ confrontations with insurgent groups. Surprisingly, controlling for 
guerrilla-paramilitary disputes and keeping all other variables at mean, I find that paramilitary 
violence at time t is on average 36 per cent lower in the municipalities with insurgents’ presence at 
t-1 compared to the ones which registered no rebel activity at the same time (Model 3-PC). 
Although these results are mixed (in Model 2 the coefficient of Guerrilla_presence is not significant 
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at .10 level), they render some plausibility to the hypothesis that nowadays paramilitary groups 
more often collaborate with guerrillas in drug-trafficking activities (by dividing territories) than 
wage counterinsurgency war against their “support base” (see Thoumi 2009). 
 Let me examine the results for Eastern Plains sample now. Analogically to the previous 
section, Table 7.2 reports the coefficients for negative binomial part of the ZINB models.   The 32
results confirm the claim that paramilitary violence dynamics are driven by escalation and self-
reinforcement logic. Escalation effect is highly significant and positive across all models, and — 
similarly as in Pacific Coast region — it subsides after surpassing certain violence threshold 
(negative coefficient of Escalation Sq.). Again the escalation alone cannot fully explain the 
heterogeneity of violence dynamics. Akaike information criterion (AIC) shows that the inclusion of 
additional variables in the model significantly improve its estimation results, although the 
improvement between Models 2-EP and 3-EP is not as evident as in Pacific Coast sample. It may 
suggest that the structural characteristics bear less on violence dynamics in Eastern Plains than in 
Pacific Coast.  
 Quite surprisingly, I do not find almost any evidence in support for the central proposition of 
the thesis which claims that paramilitary violence is a function of state’s anti-paramilitary 
repression. The repression variable in the present analyses is highly insignificant both in Models 2-
EP and 3-EP, and its sign remains negative. The very weak support for repression hypothesis could 
be found in Model 3-EP which shows that — ceteris paribus — paramilitary violence in Eastern 
Plains increases with the intensification of paramilitaries’ arrests. Even though the model yields 
coefficient significant at the 5 per cent level, the magnitude of the effect seems rather small. The 
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1) and 3.9 (Models 2 and 3) for each municipality where no paramilitary presence could be 
confirmed at the time, and which experienced no prior paramilitary violence. Equally as in Pacific 
Coast models, any increase (or discrete change) in the variables included in the inflation model 
(DV’s cumulative score and paramilitary presence dummy) has a highly significant negative effect 
on these odds. 
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scale of anti-paramilitary crackdown measured as paramilitaries’ arrest rates can explain no more 
than 22 per cent difference in the intensity of paramilitary violence between municipalities located 
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Table 7.2: The intensity of municipal paramilitary violence in Eastern Plains (2003-2009). 
Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models.
Dependent Variable: Paramilitary violence 
Model 1-EP Model 2-EP Model 3-EP
Escalation .073*** 
(.013)
.071*** 
(.012)
.074*** 
(.008)
Escalation Sq. —.0006*** 
(.0001)
—.0006*** 
(.0001)
—.0006*** 
(.0001)
Arrests (log) .020 
(.023)
 .033 
(.027)
.036** 
(.018)
Repression —.004 
(.247)
—.009 
(.231)
Guerrilla_clashes —.193 
(.156)
—.121 
(.184)
Guerrilla_presence .594** 
(.242)
.562 
(.355)
NBI .006** 
(.003)
ICOFIS —.899 
(.843)
Resguardo  —.699** 
(.315)
Population (log) —.050 
(.074)
—.032 
(.080)
.121 
(.140)
Constant .111 
(.707)
—.020 
(.867)
—1.984 
(1.630)
N 242 193 186
Wald  737.21*** 761.40*** 1740.08***
Degrees of freedom 9 12 15
AIC 405 376 369
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Coefficients reported only from the negative binomial 
part of the ZINB models. Robust standard errors clustered on municipalities (in parenthesis).
Year fixed effects not reported. 
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in the departments with the highest paramilitaries’ arrest rates and those with the lowest arrest rates.   
 What is more, Model 3-EP shows that indigenous collective presence accounts for baseline 
differences in the experience of paramilitary violence also in Eastern Plains region. Contrarily to 
Pacific Coast results, the indigenous collective presence has a negative effect on the amount of 
violence perpetrated by paramilitary groups in this region. Other things equal, the municipalities 
with resguardo within their administrative borders are expected to experience on average 50 per 
cent less paramilitary violence per year compared to the municipalities with no resguardo at all. It 
needs to be reminded that the variable accounts only for between-municipal variation, and do not 
explain within-municipal escalation/de-escalation observed across time. Among other structural 
controls I also find support for municipal poverty effect. Other things equal, Models 3-EP predicts 6 
per cent more paramilitary violence per year for each 10 per cent point increase in the proportion of 
population living with their basic needs unsatisfied. The magnitude of this effect seems big enough 
to attract policy-makers’ attention. 
 Eastern Plains analyses confirm the non-significance of Guerrilla_clashes variable. Still, 
while I control for guerrilla-paramilitary disputes and keep all other variables constant, I find that 
paramilitary violence at time t is on average 81 per cent higher in the municipalities with insurgents’ 
presence at t-1 compared to the ones which registered no rebel activity at the same time (Model 2-
EP). This is the exact opposite to what we have seen in Pacific Coast case. Does it mean that 
Eastern Plains paramilitaries may be less incline to cooperate with guerrillas than Pacific Coast 
ones? In Chapter Six I will demonstrate the plausibility of this ad hoc explanation showing that 
Eastern Plains paramilitaries developed much more complex forms of extra-legal governance in 
2003-2009 than Pacific Coast groups. The wider range of paramilitary governance means the higher 
probability of reaching out to guerrillas’ dominiums. Since extra-legal governance can be 
considered as a natural monopoly and as such remains indivisible, the higher complexity of 
paramilitary ordering in Eastern Plains may explain their more tense relations with regional 
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insurgent groups. Having said that, although the effect of Guerrilla_presence variable is very 
strong, it does not seem to be robust for changes in the model specifications. As we can see, Model 
3-EP fails to reproduce the variable’s significance even if the magnitude remains largely the same. 
Since negative binomial models are particularly sensitive to specification errors (see Oppenheim et 
al. 2013) I would rather be cautious with an interpretation of this effect. 
!
Discussion 
!
 The analyses presented in Chapters Three and Four demonstrate that there exists a positive 
relationship between state’s repression and paramilitary violence. Nevertheless, the relationship 
holds for Pacific Coast only, and not for Eastern Plains. How can one explain the macro differences 
between regions then? I have argued that initial anti-paramilitary repression was not correlated with 
groups criminal characteristics, but was driven by political motivations and targeted those groups 
which did not participate in paramilitaries’ political outfit, AUC’s union. In Eastern Plains the state 
targeted then Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare (ACC), while in Pacific Coast it concentrated 
its repressive efforts on two paramilitary factions associated with Norte del Valle criminal 
organisation, Rastrojos and Machos. The initial crackdown was much stronger in Eastern Plains 
than in Pacific Coast, but waned off spectacularly just two years later along with a substantial 
decrease in paramilitary unilateral violence. In Pacific Coast the crackdown’s intensity in 2012 
doubled its initial volume since 2004 — a period in which paramilitary violence was all but 
diminished (see Figures 4 and 5). How come did law authorities bring such spectacular success in 
one region and not in the other? Why did anti-paramilitary repression aggravate security in one 
region and improved it in another?   
 I believe that the answer to these questions lies in the qualitative differences in repressive 
strategies applied in each region. Generally speaking, there are two types of state’s repression of 
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extra-legal governance providers: partisan and nonpartisan ones (Morselli, Tanguay and Labalette 
2008). Partisan repression means targeting either weaker, or stronger criminal group(s). In the 
former case law enforcement authorities aim at regulating criminal conflict, while in the latter case 
they try to recuperate criminal markets (p. 161). The most important characteristic of nonpartisan 
crackdown concerns its perpetual character related to the fact that nonpartisan repressive 
intervention — theoretically speaking — leaves no room for any extra-legal governance provider to 
monopolise destabilised private ordering markets which usually means an increase in extra-legal 
governance-related insecurity and, consequently, reinforced state’s repression deployment (see 
Olson 1993).  
 With such distinction in mind one could hypothesise that the success of anti-paramilitary 
crackdown in Eastern Plains (measured in terms of observed security improvements) might have 
had something to do with the type of repressive strategy adopted there. Even though the intensity of 
partisan repression in Eastern Plains coincided with huge volumes of paramilitary violence at its 
heights in 2004, it did not contribute to the increase in insecurity in the long run because the 
situation seemed characterised by self-containment. There are good reasons to believe that the 
partisan crackdown adopted in Eastern Plains brought immediate security dividends simply because 
it succeeded in relatively quick elimination of targeted paramilitary group (ACC). Law enforcement 
authorities in Eastern Plains managed to eliminate the ACC in a relatively short period of time 
largely thanks to the active help of ACC’s paramilitary enemies (González 2007, CIT 2009). Once 
the crackdown’s primary goal had been accomplished the state left private ordering market in the 
region to become prey of its former paramilitary allies belonging to Bloque Centauros group, later 
renamed as ERPAC. In sum, I hypothesise that the qualitative differences between partisan and 
nonpartisan crackdown strategies determined the persistence of anti-paramilitary repressive actions 
in Pacific Coast and their self-containment in Eastern Plains. I believe that persistent nonpartisan 
crackdown in Pacific Coast pushed regional paramilitaries towards survival based on resource-
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substitution and organisational adaptations favouring predatory tendencies (Hypotheses 1 and 2 
from Chapter Two). Having said that, what I expect to find in the next two empirical chapters is the 
confirmation that only nonpartisan crackdown provokes organised crime violence. If empirically 
supported, such finding could reveal some of the most significant implications of the present study 
for organised crime theory in general and anti-organised crime policy in particular. 
 The final extension to the present discussion could introduce a question asking why the state 
adopted partisan crackdown in Eastern Plains and not in Pacific Coast given the advantages 
accruing to such strategy. Were Colombian public authorities unaware of possible consequences of 
partisan and nonpartisan strategies? Unfortunately, this issue cannot be fully addressed in this thesis 
and I believe that it may require an independent research effort. Few hypothetical explanations can 
be sketched though. Anticipating the evidence from the qualitative analyses presented in the next 
two chapters, one could argue that the decision of partisanship or nonpartisanship of state’s anti-
paramilitary crackdown did not lie in state’s hands at all. It is more probable that the choice between 
partisan or nonpartisan repression stemmed from the criminal embeddedness of each region’s 
“dissident” paramilitary groups. In Eastern Plains, the “dissidents” (ACC) were not the strongest 
paramilitary group in the region and remained in the conflict with the majority of powerful 
paramilitary factions operating in the area, especially those participating in AUC union. When law 
enforcement authorities decided to get rid of ACC, the group already seemed to be on the verge of 
elimination from the panorama of paramilitary governance in Eastern Plains because of their 
conflict with regional AUC’s units (CIT 2009, 106; González 2007, 265).  
 In Pacific Coast, on the other hand, the dissidents (Rastrojos and Machos) turned out to be 
the strongest paramilitary groups in the region. Even though in violent conflict between themselves, 
they happened to be well embedded in the underworld of Pacific Coast and belonged to numerous 
criminal networks in the region. Hardly any AUC or ex-AUC’s rearmed paramilitary faction wanted 
to join the state in the fight against them (at least until 2005-2006). Not finding any paramilitary 
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allies who would have helped law enforcement authorities to eliminate Rastrojos and Machos, the 
state did not achieve any tangible repression’s success in the short run and struggled on with its 
crackdown observing regional insecurity skyrocketed. As a consequence of that, the state saw itself 
under heavy criticism from public opinion which attributed regional security crisis to state’s 
historical tolerance of paramilitarism in the area (see Peceny 2006; HRW 2010; GMH 2013). Upon 
that pressure to terminate any non-belligerent relations with Pacific Coast paramilitaries the state 
abandoned the initial partisanship of their anti-Rastrojos and Machos crackdown and opted for an 
equally repressive treatment for all paramilitary groups in the region (HRW 2010, 83). 
 Summing it all up, the analyses presented in this chapter clarified many aspects of President 
Uribe’s paramilitary demobilisation programme and partly explained its variable contributions to 
regional security improvements in post-demobilisation Colombia. Apart from solving a good share 
of my original puzzle, the discussion at the end of the chapter introduced some new hypotheses 
which need to be verified empirically before one can unambiguously evaluate the achievements of 
this partial conflict resolution scheme. In the subsequent two chapters of the thesis I am going to 
look more closely at the qualitative characteristics of distinct repressive strategies adopted in Pacific 
Coast and Eastern Plains. I will try to evaluate their respective consequences for extra-legal 
governance in each region using case studies methodology. Thanks to these qualitative analyses I 
will be able to test the hypothesised mechanisms which drive the relationship between paramilitary 
violence and state’s repression. Quantitative evidence presented so far does not offer any 
straightforward answer to the question why repressive intervention shall intensify paramilitary 
violence. All of these yet unanswered questions and newly emerged hypotheses will be discussed at 
length in the last two chapters of the thesis.  
!
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Part III: Post-Demobilisation Paramilitary Governance. Case 
Studies  
!
CHAPTER FIVE: The Logic of Paramilitary Violence (I). Qualitative Evidence 
from Pacific Coast 
!
 The regional differences in post-demobilisation public security records are widely attributed 
to the more or less successful de-paramilitarisation of organised violence which varied across 
Colombian regions (Howe et al. 2010; Restrepo and Muggah 2009). In Chapter Three I showed that 
such de-paramilitarisation should not be defined simply as a reduction of paramilitary population 
actively operating in particular regions. The number of paramilitaries engaged in extra-legal 
governance was reduced both in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains, but in the former region no 
security improvement occurred given the fact that remaining paramilitaries became more violent 
than before. Quantitative analyses helped me to address this puzzling outcome revealing that 
paramilitary violence dynamics in 2003-2009 depended on the persistence of anti-paramilitary 
crackdown. The persistent repressive intervention contributed to the reduction of paramilitary 
population in many Colombian regions, but in some cases it also provoked behavioural changes 
among those paramilitaries who survived state’s offensive and developed greater propensity to use 
violence.  
 At the end of Chapter Four I have speculated why the intense media coverage of publicly 
acclaimed decision to exclude two Pacific Coast paramilitary groups (Rastrojos and Machos) from 
negotiated peace process along with the deployment of heavy repressive apparatus in the region left 
Colombian state with virtually no alternative but to launch fully-fledged and determined war against 
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all forms of paramilitarism in Pacific Coast. The concentration and persistence of anti-paramilitary 
repressive action, however, cannot fully account for macro-level insecurity crisis observed in the 
region. I argue that there were particular outcomes of state’s repression which permanently 
influenced the use of violence among Pacific Coast paramilitaries. To put it in another way, the 
analyses so far have not yet explained why state’s crackdown sustained paramilitary violence in 
Pacific Coast in the long run (which, in turn, might have reinforced state’s persistence in repressive 
action). 
 The quantitative analyses largely support the proposition of state’s repression’s positive 
effect on paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast, however they do not give much opportunity to 
understand which mechanisms drive this relationship. The present chapter attempts to fill this gap 
by examining two hypotheses laid out in the theoretical section. I argue that there were two specific 
outcomes of state’s military repression which intensified paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast — 
so-called resource and risks shocks. There are reasons to believe that these shocks triggered 
resource substitution processes in which paramilitaries used violence in order to recuperate losses in 
other crucial resources, such as reputation, advertising and intelligence (Hypothesis 1). It is also 
possible that crackdown-related shocks provoked paramilitaries’ organisational adaptations which 
reinforced their predatory tendencies and contributed to violence escalation (Hypothesis 2). In the 
subsequent chapter I will show that these repression’s side-effects were largely absent in Eastern 
Plains which constitute very good candidate for the explanation of between-regional differences.  
 To address these hypotheses I am going to use the qualitative data collected during the 
research. It includes NN’s descriptions of reported violence (e.g. testimonies from victims, 
observers, law enforcement authorities, or presumed perpetrators), official and NGOs’ sources, 
Colombian press, and secondary academic literature. The qualitative nature of the collected data 
will allow me to account for the already discussed nuances of repression and paramilitary violence 
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association answering why the relationship holds for one region and not for another. While I find 
some evidence to support each of two hypotheses outlined above, it needs to be said that given the 
anecdotic nature of the data the following discussion cannot be fully conclusive. The majority of 
available qualitative data (NN publications apart) regards only DDR-failure areas (municipalities 
with increasing rates of paramilitary violence) telling close to nothing about DDR-success ones. As 
a result, the basic standards of social science comparisons (counterfactual logic) cannot be 
guaranteed. Rather than testing the hypotheses, the chapter establishes their plausibility and 
indicates the issues which should receive greater attention in the future research. 
 The chapter is organised in the following way. I begin with historical discussion of 
paramilitary presence in Pacific Coast, trying to establish the structure of paramilitarism in the 
region and to identify its key figures. I outline state’s repressive intervention against Pacific Coast 
paramilitary groups showing the relative impartiality of the crackdown and the consequent 
fragmentation of paramilitary governance in the region. Then I address directly both hypotheses laid 
out in the theoretical section of Chapter Two. Firstly, I will show the evidence that paramilitaries in 
those parts of Pacific Coast most affected by state’s repression tended to substitute their non-violent 
resources with coercion. Then I will portray the organisational changes and the governance strategy 
shifts observed within one of the main paramilitary organisations in the region explaining how the 
documented adaptations influenced the predatory tendencies of this particular and other 
paramilitary groups operating in the area. The following chapter (Chapter Six) will repeat the same 
analyses for Eastern Plains describing its regional paramilitary groups in order to show that none of 
the repression’s negative externalities observed in Pacific Coast can be demonstrated in Eastern 
Plains. It will reinforce the soundness of the argument and confirm the plausibility of the 
hypotheses addressed in this part of the thesis even though all the conclusions from Chapters Five 
and Six should be interpreted with caution given the potential visibility bias intrinsic to qualitative 
data on violence (see Kalyvas 2006, 48).  
!117
Krzysztof Krakowski
  
The History of Paramilitary Governance in Pacific Coast 
!
 The first forms of post-Violencia paramilitary governance in Pacific Coast appeared as early 
as in 1970s (Verdad Abierta 2012a). The final consolidation of paramilitarism in the region dates 
back to late 1990s which coincided with the arrival of AUC bloques (battalions; Guzmán and 
Moreno 2007, 175). The first paramilitaries in Pacific Coast comprised two independent self-
defence movements. The first one, “a group of peasants of indigenous origin from the township of 
Ortega”, emerged at end of 1970s in response to violence exercised by FARC against indigenous 
communities of the region (Verdad Abierta 2012a). At the end of 1990s Ortega paramilitaries fought 
against much stronger guerrilla group, ELN, which made them desperately looking for allies. They 
were claimed to have asked Bloque Calima of AUC, recently dispatched to Pacific Coast by 
Castaño brothers, to support their counterinsurgency efforts — a request embraced enthusiastically 
by AUC leadership. The Ortega group disarmed in 2003 and some of its components were 
incorporated into AUC paramilitary factions (Ibid.). The second oldest paramilitary group in Pacific 
Coast emerged in Sevilla municipality, Valle del Cauca department, in the end of 1980s. 
Analogically to Ortega paramilitaries, they waged counterinsurgency war against FARC and ELN 
which gained them financial support of 3 million Colombian pesos from AUC’s leadership who 
decided also to send AUC troops to help Sevilla paramilitaries militarily (Ibid.). In 1999 Sevilla 
autodefensas joined one of the Bloque Calima’s fronts and became immersed into AUC structures 
(Ibid.). 
 The actual arrival of regular AUC forces into the region dates back to the end of 1990s. 
There were three independent AUC bloques which operated in the region since then. The biggest 
group, Bloque Calima (BC), operated in Northern parts of Valle del Cauca, majority of Cauca and 
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central Nariño departments roughly since 1999 (Guzmán and Moreno 2007). Another one, Frente 
Heroes de Chocó of Bloque Pacífico, established paramilitary governance around 2001 in Southern 
Chocó, Western parts of Valle del Cauca and few areas in Cauca’s territories. Some sources claim 
that Bloque Pacífico was actually a part of BC (see Verdad Abierta 2011). The third AUC bloque in 
Pacific Coast, Libertadores del Sur of Bloque Central Bolívar (BLS), operated in Nariño, Southern 
Cauca and above all in Putumayo departments. BLS were the oldest AUC’s structure in the region 
since their presence in Putumayo dates back to 1997 (although at that time they denominated 
themselves as Frente Sur del Putumayo). Despite frequent territorially overlapping governance, 
there is no evidence of internal fight between those AUC structures. They were said to have 
collaborated without serious disruptions in cooperative relations (Guzmán and Moreno 2007).  
 Before I discuss the changes in paramilitary governance following the first applications of 
DDR programme in 2003 and the disruption of non-belligerent relations between Pacific Coast 
paramilitaries and public forces, I would like to present more detailed descriptions of Pacific Coast 
AUC’s structures. It will help us to realise how profound were the changes in regional paramilitary 
organisations after 2003. Let us look more closely at the biggest AUC bloque in the region, Bloque 
Calima. The initial group counted 54 armed men who installed themselves in Cauca department 
from where they launched almost immediate conquest of Valle del Cauca territories (Verdad Abierta 
2012b). In 2000 the structure established its centralised command with “39” as the head 
commander, later replaced by “HH”. Bloque’s exponential growth led to the creation of its five 
fronts: 
!
Central (located in Tuluá and its neighbourhood), Pacific (located in Buenaventura and some 
coastal municipalities of Cauca), Cacique Calarcá (located in some municipalities of Valle del 
Cauca and Quindío), La Buitrera (located in Palmira and its neighbourhood) and Farallones 
(located in various municipalities in Cauca) (Verdad Abierta 2010). 
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Bloque Calima’s fronts maintained strong presence both in rural and urban areas. The key area of 
their activities lied in Valle del Cauca department where they controlled three areas: Cordilliera 
central, Buenaventura port and its connecting routes to big urban centres and the Southern regions 
of the department (Guzmán and Moreno 2007, 180-2). BC worked together in BLS in Southern 
Cauca but operated largely independently of Frente Heroes de Chocó which occupied some 
territories contingent to Bloque Calima’s strongholds in Northern Valle del Cauca (Verdad Abierta 
2013).   
 The motivations of AUC’s arrival into Pacific Coast are not clear. Carlos Castaño, the leader 
of AUC at the time of paramilitary conquest of Pacific Coast, argued that the arrival of AUC to the 
region followed the strengthening of guerrilla groups which progressively dominated this part of the 
country (Aranguren 2001). Having said that, there is no doubt that there existed drug-trafficking 
interests hidden behind AUC’s expansion. At the end of 1990s the region constituted the second 
biggest centre of coca cultivation(second only to Eastern Plains; see UNODC 2011). What is more, 
after the fall of Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel (mid-1990s), Pacific Coast became the hub of the 
most sophisticated Colombian drug-trafficking organisations (Peceny 2006, 101-10). In fact, the 
history of paramilitarism in general and Pacific Coast in particular is strictly related to the history of 
Colombian drug-trafficking (Medina Gallego 1990). Given that, guerillas’ strengthening in Pacific 
Coast might have brought AUC’s attention because it posed serious threats to paramilitaries’ drug 
monopolies in the region. In fact, there were rumours that Pacific Coast drug-traffickers themselves 
asked Carlos Castaño for help when their drug businesses became seriously threatened by 
guerrillas’ advances:  
!
One hypothesis which sets investigation about AUC’s arrival in Valle del Cauca is that  
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drug-traffickers gave birth to AUC’s entry [in the department] and for that reason AUC did 
not confront them as potential competitors in the territory (Verdad Abierta 2011b). 
Norte del Valle Cartel, and drug-trafficker Diego Montoya in particular, financed the arrival of 
paramilitaries [in Valle del Cauca] in order to launch attack against guerrillas, especially in the 
central zone. Nonetheless, the cartel did not permit paramilitaries to enter into Northern parts 
of the department where armed groups at their service maintained already sufficient territorial 
control and where guerrillas’ presence was not notorious (Guzmán and Moreno 2007, 215; see 
also Verdad Abierta 2011c). 
!
 AUC’s entrance into Pacific Coast markets was marked more by co-opting some of the 
established extra-legal governance operators in the region, than by taking over their businesses.   It 33
was said, for example, that in Northern parts of Valle del Cauca department AUC’s paramilitaries 
decided to share territorial control with Norte del Valle Cartel’s armed forces and then rigidly 
respected the negotiated division of influence in order to avoid potentially conflicting situations 
(Guzmán and Moreno 2007). Some sources argued that similar regional alliances reached beyond 
mere extra-legal governance market-sharing, reporting that Norte del Valle Cartel effectively bought 
Bloque Calima’s protection (Verbad Abierta 2011b). The significance of these rumours should not 
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!  Yet, it was not always all that easy for newly arrived paramilitaries to cooperate with smaller 33
criminal units operating in the region. The gangs which ran extortion racket and controlled few 
illicit markets appeared unwilling to let paramilitaries into their territories, and a mixture of 
violence and  negotiations were necessary to establish peaceful relations between them and AUC 
groups. 
The confrontation between gangs and “paras” was of such magnitude that according to some 
number of sources quoted by Fiscalía [Prosecutor’s Office] between January and September 
2001 168 persons died in a violent manner [due to that fighting]. In the wake of these events 
paramilitaries organised two meetings with young gangsters. In the first meeting, around 120 
gang members participated, along with their families and other people from the municipality 
(Verdad Abierta 2012b).
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be over-interpreted though. In reality most drug-traffickers and paramilitaries were almost 
indistinguishable group of people in Pacific Coast. We know, for instance, that Bloque Calima most 
probably sold some of its fronts as franchises to key drug-trafficking leaders (VR 2006, 16). Other 
sources claimed that bloque’s entire structure depended on “Don Berna”, at the time the leader of 
Medellín Cartel (Verdad Abierta 2013). Bloque Pacífico, on the other hand, was allegedly bought by 
another powerful dug-trafficker of the region, Diego Montoya (Ibid.). Moreover, Carlos Jiménez 
alias “Macaco", the commander of Bloque Central Bolívar and its front operating in Pacific Coast 
(BLS), became paramilitary leader only when he purchased Frente Sur del Putumayo from Rafa 
Putumayo thanks to his considerable drug-trafficking revenues (Verdad Abierta 2010b). Before the 
demobilisation of his entire bloque “Macaco" allegedly franchised some of its military units to 
Rastrojos group which could not participate in the peace process (Garzón 2008, 41). In sum, Pacific 
Coast paramilitarism and regional drug-trafficking remain enormously intertwined phenomenas. 
Paramilitary leaders of the region used to sell their paramilitary units to resourceful drug-traffickers 
when they needed to dedicate themselves to those forms of drug-trafficking which did not require 
the maintenance of military structure (e.g. international commercialisation, Camacho and López 
2008), only to buy back the franchised armed structures later on when those again turned out vital 
for the protection of their businesses. Paramilitary and drug-trafficking nexuses started to dissolve 
only in the eve of the first waves of Uribe’s demobilisation programme when some of the most 
recognisable drug-traffickers could not present themselves as the leaders of their respective 
paramilitary groups and had to cede the leadership to less notorious paramilitary commanders 
(Garzón 2005, 3-4). 
 In the end all AUC bloques operating in Pacific Coast demobilised voluntarily under Uribe’s 
peace process. The first to demobilise were four fronts of Bloque Calima. On 18 December 2004 
564 BC soldiers put down arms and entered DDR processes (Garzón 2005). “HH” presented 
himself as the commander at the demobilisation ceremony. Bloque Libertadores del Sur 
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demobilised on 30 July 2005. According to various sources between 677 to 689 paramilitary 
soldiers disarmed on that occasion led by “Macaco” (HRW 2010; Garzón 2005; GN 2005). The last 
Pacific Coast bloque to enter DDR scheme was Frente Heroes del Chocó commanded of Sebastian 
Guevara and on 23 August 2005 its 150 soldiers laid down arms (Verdad Abierta 2013). Many 
sources documented the numerous irregularities of these demobilisation processes. According to 
many analysts, Colombian state tried to hide the fact that the real leader of Bloque Pacífico, 
“Gordolino”, was one of the most powerful drug-traffickers of that time, largely famous for its long 
delinquent career. To avoid the scandal, the state allegedly allowed Bloque Pacífico to present some 
less controversial figure as their head commander (Garzón 2005). Other irregularities cast more 
doubts about the actual achievements of the process.     
!
[S]everal sources reported to Human Rights Watch that the Bloque Libertadores del Sur 
engaged in fraud during the demobilizations, inflating their ranks so as to allow portions of 
the paramilitary networks to remain intact. Local authorities said that for two or three months 
before the demobilization, paramilitaries were recruiting young men to participate in the 
ceremonies. Authorities heard reports from citizens who said they saw buses full of young 
men arriving in the area to have their hair cut and put on uniforms like the paramilitaries. 
“Not all the paramilitaries demobilized, and not all those who demobilized were 
paramilitaries,” said one local official. The same official described how, a few weeks before 
the demobilizations, he ran into a group of young men in a rural area who told him that they 
had received an offer to enter the process so they could receive the government stipend 
available to demobilized paramilitaries (the minimum wage for 18 months) (HRW 2010, 78). 
!
 As I have already said before, two significant paramilitary groups could not participate in 
the peace process because of the state’s refusal. These included Autodefensas Unidas del Valle, also 
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called Machos, and Rondas Campesinas Populares or Rastrojos. Duncan (2005) argues that the 
reasons behind DDR refusal in relation to these groups were linked to their historical association 
with big drug-trafficking organisations of the region, especially Cali Cartel and their direct 
descendants, Norte del Valle Cartel. Various authors stressed the paradox of such exclusion (Duncan 
2005, Thoumi 2009). Almost every single front demobilised under AUC’s umbrella had profound 
connections with Colombian drug-trafficking which could hardly be excused with a necessity 
created by war waging costs. In fact, in the latter parts of the chapter I am going to show that the 
refusal to demobilise these two leading paramilitary groups led to dramatic consequences for 
Pacific Coast security.  
 To begin with, the two DDR-excluded groups gave birth to the neo-paramilitary phenomena 
in Pacific Coast which from its very origins maintained war-like relations with law enforcement 
authorities in the region. Since AUC’s dissolution Rastrojos and Machos almost immediately started 
to purse the violent conquest of the Valle del Cauca’s underworld. What made it especially violent 
was the fact that the two groups remained in bloody dispute between themselves since 2003 when 
Machos allegedly appropriated coca cargo that belonged to one of deceased Rastrojos members 
(VR 2006, 35). Until AUC’s demobilisation AUC bloques partly succeeded in meditating between 
conflicted parties, managed to reduce tensions and limited the belligerent actions between the 
groups. After that Rastrojos and Machos fighting intensified. Guzmán and Moreno (2007, 216-7) 
claim that in 2003-2006 Rastrojos were more militarised than Machos and maintained classic army-
like organisation, relatively centralised command and clearly defined structure. Machos, on the 
other hand, were composed of separate bands loosely allied to each other which, nevertheless, used 
the same organisation’s name and shared the same leader, Diego Montoya. Initially Rastrojos’ ranks 
did not surpass 100 individuals, against approximately 120 Machos’s soldiers. The dispute between 
these groups led to hundreds of deaths before demobilised paramilitary leader of BLS, “Macaco", 
successfully mediated between the warring parties suggesting Rastrojos to move out of Valle del 
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Cauca and conquer some of the territories dominated previously by his bloque (Verdad Abierta 
2009). In the end, Rastrojos embraced “Macaco’s” suggestions and decided to expand to Chocó, 
Cauca and Nariño, where AUC’s demobilisation left enormous void at private ordering markets — 
which no paramilitary faction wanted to be filled by guerrillas’ governance. Machos, on the other 
hand, maintained control over large swaths of Valle del Cauca department with the plan to dominate 
this historical cradle of Pacific Coast paramilitarism (Prieto 2013). Rastrojos’ conquest soon proved 
very successful since they managed to establish a strong presence in many sub-regions with scarce 
state’s presence and huge trafficking opportunities.   Their expansion reached as far as to Putumayo 34
territory (Ibid.). Their exponential growth allowed them to recuperate Valle del Cauca in few years 
and defeat Machos who at the end of the day accepted an incorporation into Rastrojos’ ranks.  
  
State’s Repression and Paramilitary Violence in Pacific Coast 
!
 The already famous refusal to demobilise two paramilitary groups in Pacific Coast 
(Rastrojos and Machos) set the precedent in the entire demobilisation process. Some paramilitary 
factions in other parts of the country turned down an offer of DDR participation but none of those 
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!  Having said that, it should not be overlooked that Rastrojos’ expansion had had to overcome 34
some serious obstacles related to neoparamilitary competition. In Nariño they had to face strong 
competition from Nueva Generación and their secessionist faction sometimes referred to as Águilas 
Negras (HRW 2010, 76-92). The Rastrojos’ final success over Nueva Generación was facilitated by 
the fact that the latter group developed an old-style paramilitary organisation which made them 
especially vulnerable to law enforcement authorities’ action, finally launched against the group in 
2008 (HRW 2010, 83). In 2012 Rastrojos continued to fight with some paramilitary competitors in 
Nariño, Cauca, Valle and Chocó, but by the time they had managed to establish themselves as by far 
the biggest extra-legal governance provider in in Pacific Coast (guerrillas excluded). At that time 
Urabeños were their main competitor, with fighting between two organisations concentrated in 
Chocó and Valle del Cauca department. In 2011 Rastrojos and Urabeños “signed a peace treaty” 
which, nevertheless, was nullified one year later as a result of Rastrojos’ internal divisions (ISC 
2014, INDEPAZ 2013).
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groups which expressed their will to disarm was rejected such opportunity except Rastrojos and 
Machos. The refusal to demobilise the latter two groups equaled the declaration of “war” against 
them. Their pacification plan was designed as D6 operation (Arias Ortiz 2012). From its very 
beginning, the strategy seemed rather poorly trimmed to the specific Pacific Coast paramilitary 
environment. More particularly, it appeared inadequate in combating the groups such as Rastrojos 
and Machos whose support base comprised an extended network of protégées, paramilitary 
collaborators, local elite clients, drug-trafficking partners and paid informants (VR 2006, Duncan 
2005, Garzón 2008). Rastrojos and Machos’ paramilitary success did not bear so much on their 
military capacities as in the insurgents’ case  , and therefore many of D6 repressive instruments 35
turned out simply out of place in Pacific Coast (Granada, Restrepo and Vargas 2009; Granada, 
Restrepo and Tobón 2009).   
!
D6 Operation appears to be a good offensive plan against guerrillas, but hardly adequate to 
fight against Bacrim   given their local networks (political and institutional) preserved since 36
paramilitary era. Moreover, D6 implies the collaboration of civil society […] without taking 
into account fear and mistrust which persons feel towards public institutions (Arias Ortiz 
2009, 7). 
!
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!  We should remember that the Colombian guerrillas are the ones which Weinstein (2007) would 35
call “economically endowed” armed groups. What distinguishes such groups is the fact that they do 
not build their political success from the grass-root level. Quite contrarily, the guerrillas use 
violence and intimidation instead of adopting consensual social relations with civilians who live in 
the areas of their influence. Their support base, thus, is very limited and their perception among the 
larger population remains highly negative at least since late 1990s (see Gutiérrez 2008; Gutiérrez 
and Baron 2006; Kline 2007).
!  This is how public authorities refer to post-demobilisation paramilitary groups.36
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 Even though state’s anti-paramilitary repression in Pacific Coast was poorly designed to 
combat socially and criminally embedded paramilitaries, it still made their lives harder (Garzón 
2008). First of all, it forced them to abandon some of their “political” functions (a point to be 
developed later in this chapter). Secondly, downtrodden groups needed to adapt themselves to the 
new hostile environment, to become less visible, and to resign from elaborate forms of territorial 
control (discussed in depth later). Not every paramilitary group followed such adaptations. One of 
the exceptions was Nueva Generación (NG), which felt relatively safe at the outset of state’s anti-
paramilitary crackdown, and consequently developed an organisation more similar to the traditional 
paramilitary model (Granada, Restrepo and Tobón 2009, 475). That error costed them almost 
complete annihilation when law enforcement authorities finally decided to repress them.  
!
Various sources told Human Rights Watch that in 2006 and 2007, sectors of the Colombian 
army, particularly the Boyacá Battalion (the same battalion that allegedly helped the BLS 
enter the state in 2002) appeared to be tolerating NG. But in 2008 the 19th Mobile Brigade of 
the army entered the region and began to confront NG, and police officers killed Nene. 
According to the Nariño Secretary of Government, Fabio Trujillo, the regional government 
had called on public security forces to carry out actions against NG, especially after a 
massacre in Leiva in late 2007. NG is reported to have been significantly weakened, though in 
mid-2009 sources living in the region said that NG remained active in the mountains, with a 
new commander known as “El Tigre” and with about 200 men operating between the 
municipalities of Cumbitara and Policarpa (HRW 2010, 83). 
!
 The anti-paramilitary repression in Pacific Coast began in 2003-2004 and changed all the 
relations between the state and paramilitary extra-legal governance providers (even the rearmed 
DDR-participant units which elsewhere in the country enjoyed a relative tolerance on the part of 
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law enforcement authorities). Before that Colombian armed forces were famous for favouring 
regional paramilitaries’ interests and seemed rather non-belligerent towards Pacific Coast drug-
traffickers. “According to one demobilized BLS commander, the BLS first entered Nariño with the 
support of the Boyacá Battalion of the army in 2002, and the BLS conducted joint operations with 
the battalion” (HRW 2010, 78). There is evidence that the state tolerated paramilitaries and drug-
traffickers’ armies for the sake of terminating ever more thretening expansion of FARC or ELN in 
the region (Guzmán and Moreno 2007). At the same time, the army and local police’s support for 
paramilitary coalition in Pacific Coast helped them to dominate the regional extra-legal governance 
markets and to minimise the violent competition among paramilitaries who had not adhered to AUC 
union and its allied forces. Even before AUC’s arrival in Pacific Coast law enforcement authorities 
supported Cali Cartel in order to pacify the regional underworld and maintain relative peace in the 
region (see Peceny 2006). Yet, such a strategy ended with the demobilisation of the AUC’s Pacific 
Coast bloques and state’s decision to repress their close allies in the region (Rastrojos and Machos).  
 The crackdown resulted in an inevitable fragmentation of paramilitary governance in Pacific 
Coast with most of the remaining groups forced to divide and become more discreet for the sake of 
their immediate survival (Garzón 2008, Ch. 1). Why should it provoke violence escalation among 
paramilitaries of the region? I will try to respond to this question testing two hypothesis formulated 
at the begining of Chapter Two. They ask about the relationship between extra-legal governance 
provider’s violence and law enforcement repression against him. The first hypothesis suggests that 
anti-paramilitary repression in Pacific Coast and its consequent resource shocks (destruction of 
paramilitary intelligence networks, supression of their advertising channels, along with constant 
undermining of their reputation and credibility as extra-legal governance providers) might have 
triggered resource substitution processes in which paramilitaries used violence in order to 
recuperate losses in some crucial resources, such as reputation, advertising and intelligence. The 
second hypothesis, on the other hand, indicates that crackdown-related fragmentation of the 
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surviving paramilitary groups in Pacific Coast could have provoked their organisational adaptations 
which reinforced their predatory tendencies and contributed to generalised violence escalation. I am 
going to address each of these hypotheses in turn. 
!
Hypothesis 1: Resource Substitution 
!
 Human Rights Watch’s ethnographic work shows that in some parts of Pacific Coast post-
DDR paramilitary groups are no longer recognisable locally (HRW 2010, 88). It stands in sheer 
contrast to the reputation paramilitaries enjoyed in the region just few years before (see Guzmán 
and Moreno 2007). Undoubtedly, the lack of recognition affects their advertising capacities and 
minimises social acceptance for their extra-legal governance. Most paramilitaries in Pacific Coast 
transit between municipalities on the continuous basis, and at the arrival in a new place, they have 
to organise community meetings where they introduce themselves to local residents and “advertise” 
own services. “They [Rastrojos]’re in Santa Cruz a couple of days at a time and then leave. They 
come in and tax the businessmen. It appears that they sometimes confront guerrillas and other times 
the Black Eagles [Águilas Negras] and New Generation [Nueva Generación]. They identify 
themselves as Rastrojos... They’ve done two meetings with the community in Santa Cruz and say 
that they’re Rastrojos. They set schedules…” (HRW 2010, 85). Given the lack of recognition 
paramilitary newcomers usually resort to violence as a way of advertising. It allows them to 
demonstrate own “usefulness” and to warn those who may be unwilling to accept their services. 
“[W]e kill useless ones, thieves, violators, drunkards, all of this, you understand? This is a part of 
the organisation. But we do this for example when we reach a neighbourhood or a town of many 
thieves, marihuana addicts…” (ex-paramilitary soldier in Medina Arbeláez 2009, 115). 
 The recognition problem is linked the fact that very few paramilitaries in the region maintain 
contingent territorial control. The biggest groups may control some distant mountainous regions but 
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their prevalent disposition is mobility (see VR 2006, 46). Most paramilitaries in Pacific Coast avoid 
areas with good institutional coverage, and the majority of their actions “takes place among the 
populations where one can arrive only via rivers or roads in terrible condition” (Verdad Abierta 
2011d). In the areas of better institutional coverage they do not wear uniforms, stay dispersed and 
live among civilians occupying their homes (HRW 2010, 75, 83; DT 2011, 50). Apart from 
advertising difficulties, discontinuous territorial presence affects paramilitaries’ intelligence 
capacities. They cannot, for instance, avoid free-riding problem: 
!
There was a gasoline trader from Ecuador who had to pay “protection money” to the group in 
order to realise his travels via Mira river, at that time the territory under group’s [Rastrojos] 
domination. But during one of those travels they asked him for more than had been agreed on 
and he disobeyed and since then used another route to transport his products (NN, Nariño, 
15.01.2009). 
!
For this reason, even the most resourceful groups prefer to operate in very restricted areas such as 
poor neighbourhoods in port towns and other hubs of drug-trafficking activities (ISC 2014). In these 
localities they try to control civilian movements and often prohibit walking between neighbouring 
parts of the towns (NN, Nariño, 24.03.2012). If such rule gets violated, paramilitaries do not 
hesitate to victimise the transgressors (NN, Nariño, 14.03.2012). They resort to pre-emptive 
violence since they lack more efficient tools to discriminate between collaborative and defective 
behaviour of their “protégées” (people living in their control zones). A person who visits 
neighbouring part of the town may in fact be rivals’ informer, but more probably his movements 
have nothing to do with criminal activities. If the latter is true, paramilitaries incur unnecessary 
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costs by punishing him. Inefficiencies apart, violence remains a handy substitute for deficient 
intelligence capacities and continues to be performed in this function in some parts of the region. 
 Reputation for violence is the third crackdown-affected resource which many Pacific Coast 
paramilitaries substitute with actual coercion. Consider a following situation: a paramilitary rank-
and-file recently released from prison wants to take revenge for his sentence on a female lawyer 
threatening her on the bus. The attacked woman disdains his threats replying: “Señor, I am sick, let 
me go. I can’t talk, put down these things [gun]”. The soldier responds shouting that he is 
“Urabeño” [member of paramilitary group in Pacific Coast], but the woman seems not to care and 
alights from the bus where originally planned (NN, Cauca, 20.12.2012). In this case paramilitary 
membership did not suffice to effectively intimidate the woman. She decided to “test” the 
credibility of her victimiser’s threats because she had a strong suspicion of having to do with a fake. 
This situation was not an isolate case when paramilitaries’ seriousness was put to “test” in Pacific 
Coast recently. In Chocó paramilitaries lamented that people were refusing them any help, pain 
killers included (NN, Chocó, 04.05.2004). Elsewhere a taxi driver declined to give a lift to a small 
group of paramilitary soldiers (NN, Nariño, 30.01.2009). Most of those situations ended with 
bloodshed and the available evidence lends support to the hypothesis that paramilitaries reacted in 
this way to reaffirm their reputation for violence. 
 For Pacific Coast paramilitaries, individual defections are less of the problem than the 
collective ones. Collective defections cancel the negative externalities of extra-legal governance 
(Gambetta 1992) and may seriously damage organised crime activities. Qualitative reading of NN 
data confirms that paramilitaries fear any forms of collectivity which they cannot control (“we can’t 
let them organise themselves [author’s highlighting]”; NN, Nariño, 15.02.2010). Since 2006 Pacific 
Coast experienced unprecedented quantity of collective resistance against paramilitary rule. NN 
reports an event when a death of a villager triggered spontaneous outrage of local community, 
which ended up with eight paramilitary killers lynched to death and the flight of remaining group 
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members (NN, Nariño, 09.12.2012). It was not the only occasion when the entire village defected 
against Pacific Coast paramilitaries:   
!
The three people they killed were good neighbours... The [killers] were paras [Rastrojos]. They 
had entered the town before and the town had a meeting telling them they couldn’t enter or stay 
there. The paras took weapons from people in town and went around as civilians. The town is 
strong and when they heard shots they went to look for paras but by then the paras had left… 
(HRW 2010, 90) 
!
 In yet another place, NN reports the emergence of so-called “unidentified” groups of local 
youth determined to fight paramilitaries on their own. An arrest of two members of such a group in 
Guapi municipality triggered a “generalised strike” of town’s population who demanded their 
immediate release (NN, Cauca, 03.02.2012). Along with various forms of community defections 
Pacific Coast saw significant anti-paramilitary resistance led by indigenous groups (NN, Cauca, 
13.01.2007, 28.09.2008). The indigenous were not the only ones to collectively defy paramilitaries 
in Pacific Coast: student organisations (NN, Valle del Cauca, 21.04.2008), associations for 
displaced people (NN, Cauca, 27.01.2008), agriculture workers unions (NN, Nariño, 04.10.2006) 
followed the pattern. NN data confirms that all quoted instances of collective defections were 
related to paramilitaries’ reputation loss. Not surprisingly, paramilitary groups punished them with 
extreme severity in order to reaffirm their local authority. 
 Defections plague does not mean that populations of Pacific Coast no longer need extra-
legal governance. I believe that, more plausibly, it reflects the generalised dissatisfaction with 
particular extra-legal governance providers who operate in the region. Vargas (2004) demonstrates 
that in the late 1990s paramilitary groups triumphed over guerrillas as extra-legal governance 
providers in Putumayo because they were more flexible there — allowing demand and supply to fix 
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the price of illicit commodities, and permitting local intermediaries to operate independently in the 
underworld as long as they paid tributes to paramilitary leaders. Guzmán and Moreno (2007, 190) 
find that guerrillas’ retreat to Pacific Coast extra-legal governance market coincides precisely with 
the decline in those competitive advantages on the part of paramilitaries. Having said that, Nussio 
confirms the continuous demand for private security services recalling his conversation with one 
demobilised paramilitary soldier: “[he] testimonies that community members perceive his as 
someone who provides private security services […] as someone who can help in case of some 
inconveniences, some problems” (Nussio 2009, 227). Despite guerrillas retreat, paramilitaries are 
still the dominant actors at private ordering market in Pacific Coast, but the fierce competition 
among their fragmented factions prevents the monopolisation and pacification of the market (HRW 
2010, 76-91; MAPP 2009; CNRR 2007, 45). For this reason, paramilitary violence often serves also 
as an instrument of discrediting competitors. Competing groups not only kill each others, but also 
target non-criminal individuals who presumably agreed on rival’s protection. Groups kill or harm 
their rivals’ protégées in order to make them realise the mistake of purchasing inefficient protection 
and to convince the survived one to switch sides (NN, Cauca, 13.05.2001; see also Pérez 2011, 
124). In sum, violence serves both the purpose of one’s reputation building, and rival’s reputation 
damaging. 
 Yet another facet of paramilitaries’ reputation loss is the generalised disbelief in the quality 
of their services and in the credibility of their commitments. Few testimonies reveal these concerns: 
“They use many young people to deliver the drugs and receive money and when they return they 
kill them so they don’t have to pay” (HRW 2010, 87). “They threaten the girls and propose that they 
go as prostitutes for them. In Madrigal [Nariño], three girls went, and they killed one of them... The 
other two have disappeared…” (HRW 2010, 84). Even in drug industry, Pacific Coast 
paramilitaries’ are not perceived as credible guarantors. They charge for protection of coca 
cultivations, which they cannot deliver in face of US-sponsored anti-drugs campaigns (see Thoumi 
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2013). In case of cultivations’ damage caused by aerial eradication, paramilitaries simply leave the 
area and invest in coca cultivations elsewhere (see Sánchez, Vargas and Vásques 2011). 
!
Hypothesis 2: Predatory Turn 
!
 Garzón (2008) argues that state’s crackdown provokes organisational adaptations within 
those paramilitary groups which manage to survive it. I will illustrate this process with an example 
of Rastrojos, a paramilitary group which, according to non-governmental sources, at least towards 
the end of analysed period operated in the majority of Pacific Coast municipalities most regularly 
affected by state’s repressive interventions.   Rastrojos took their name from the armed wing of 37
Norte del Valle Cartel transformed into paramilitary organisation (called Rondas Campesinas) in the 
early twenty first century. After 2005 the group hired a significant portion of demobilised ex-AUC’s 
members who took control of its command structure (VR 2006, 27-8). Since the beginning of state’s 
anti-paramilitary crackdown, Rastrojos experienced numerous changes in their hierarchies as a 
result of law enforcement activities including imprisonment and extraditions of group’s key leaders 
(e.g. Juan Carlos Calle alias “Armando” and Diego Pérez Henao alias “Rastrojo”; see Verdad 
Abierta 2012c; ISC 2014). The repetitiveness of the situation and the obvious setbacks of 
organisational centralisation led Rastrojos to introduce more horizontality to their organisation and 
rely more heavily on its mid-level commanders (ISC 2014). Once the changes were put in practice, 
Rastrojos’ fragmented factions started to operate semi-independently with minimum cooperation 
among themselves. Not surprisingly, it created intraorganisational conflict and continuous dilemma 
of decentralised predation. “Following a disarticulation of the command nucleus — with 
imprisonment or death of most important leaders — [Rastrojos’] structures […] entered into 
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internal competition, falling in disputes about the markets, territorial domination, trafficking 
corridors, and the leadership of the remaining structures” (VR 2006, 17). 
 The situation of persistent repression and intraorgansiational instability affected Rastrojos’ 
relations with local populations subject to their extra-legal governance. We know that the 
crackdown dealt a serious blow to their revenues: “Testimonies indicate that they had gone for more 
than four months without pay” (Garzón 2008, 41). These financial problems pushed Rastrojos to 
look for alternative revenue sources which included the intensified recurrence to predatory and 
extortive practices. While it seems clear that group’s members recognised the new risks of 
paramilitary job, it should not surprise that they become more concerned about immediate rather 
than future rewards (VR 2006, 19). In practice it meant that Rastrojos started to impose their 
governance in the extortive manner targeting easy-to-monitor individuals rather than those who 
might effectively need their services. For example, “[t]hey ask for the vacuna (tax) and if there is 
cattle or a chicken, they take it. […] It’s very high ... in a very poor area” (HRW 2010, 87). What 
Rastrojos demand most frequently today are the payments in cheap electronic devices (television, 
radio, mobile phone), basic alimentary products (flour, bread, milk, vegetables) or medicine (see 
NN, Cauca, 10.02.2007, 27.11.2010; Chocó, 04.05.2004). Those demands are predatory because 
they cannot be exchanged with real services, such as the regulation of local competition or contracts 
enforcement, and usually involve substantial doses of coercion. One paramilitary soldier tried to 
justify his predatory actions in the following manner: “the things are hard here, and if one doesn’t 
defend himself, he dies” (NN, Cauca, 20.12.2012). I will demonstrate the evidence in support for 
this argument at length in the rest of the present chapter presenting the case study of Pacific Coast 
biggest paramilitary group, Rastrojos, and its organisational adaptations since the end of state-
paramilitary non-belligerent relations in the region in 2003. 
!
Rastrojos' Case Study 
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 In the final year of my study, 2012, Rastrojos were the largest paramilitary group in the 
country operating in the record number of all Colombian departments (INDEPAZ 2013). At that 
time Rastrojos’ influence stretched over Colombian borders reaching Venezuelan and Ecuadorian 
territories (Verdad Abierta 2012c, ISC 2014). The actual number of the groups members in its 
climax years, 2010-12 are not precisely known. Various sources quote different numbers and the 
disparity between those estimates is quite large and therefore the number of Rastrojos’ members in 
2012 may fall anywhere between 1200 and 1600 individuals (INDEPAZ 2013, ISC 2014).  At the 
time of the writing Rastrojos may no longer be the largest operating paramilitary group in 
Colombia. There are rumours that they became surpassed by Urabeños (ISC 2014). Law 
enforcement authorities’ sources report that the number of Rastrojos members fell approximately by 
20 per cent in the wake of the escalation of intraparamilitary conflict with Urabeños and the 
intensification of state’s crackdown against the groups’ principal bosses in 2012 (Ibid.). 
 The name of the group, Rastrojos, comes from the Spanish word which means “the cut 
stalks of cereal plants left sticking out of the ground after the grain is harvested” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2009). In a figurative way, “rastrojos” means “waste”, “remains” or “leftovers”. Such a 
name probably refers to group’s origins. Rastrojos descend from Cali Cartel, which was dismantled 
by Colombian law enforcement authorities in the mid-1990s. After the cartel’s defeat, some of its 
survived members reorganised themselves within Norte del Valle Cartel (NVC; Garzón 2008). At 
that time, Rastrojos along with Machos became NVC’s main paramilitary associates and served as 
the armed wings for the organisation. The dissolution of NVC at the beginning of twenty first 
century left Rastrojos and Machos as fully independent paramilitary factions who managed to take 
over the bulk of the cartel’s drug-trafficking. In early 2000s Rastrojos renamed themselves as 
Rondas Campesinas and enlarged the already established collaboration with AUC paramilitaries, 
more particularly with Bloque Calima and Bloque Libertadores del Sur. As I have already 
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mentioned before, in 2004 the group (along with Machos) was excluded from peace process and 
consequently returned to its old name (Garzón 2005). Since then, Rastrojos started their 
organisational growth from advantaged position of being the biggest paramilitary “leftover” in the 
entire country after the conclusion of demobilisation process. Due to that fact they were privileged 
to recruit all sorts of petty delinquents, drug-traffickers, ex-AUC demobilised paramilitaries 
disappointed with reintegration programs, and all those who did not participate in DDR scheme. In 
2005 Rastrojos might have appeared as the most serious employer in Pacific Coast for all those 
individuals looking for an opportunity to (re)enter into organised delinquency.  
 Until 2010 Rastrojos became the biggest neo-paramilitary organisation (banda criminal) in 
the entire country. The group's underworld success followed totally different dynamics from 
standard paramilitary expansion model observed in case of AUC in the late 1990s. Rastrojos’ 
internal growth and territorial conquest were based on new type of extra-legal governance, 
facilitated by very different organisational solutions. In fact, we can observe fundamental changes 
in the group’s internal organisation which occurred somewhere between 2003 and 2006. The 
adaptations happened gradually and therefore they cannot be dated with precision. However, I will 
do my best to link these changes to state’s intensified repressive actions against the group in the 
wake of Rastrojos’ exclusion from paramilitary peace process. The following analyses will support 
the argument of the intensification of predatory violence perpetrated by the group as a result of 
crackdown-related organisational adaptations observed within Rastrojos’ organisation since 2003. 
!
Organisational Model 
!
 To begin with, I will delineate organisational model adopted by Rastrojos since 2003. More 
specifically, I will show organisational horizontality as one of the crucial characteristics in 
Rastrojos’ hierarchies and describe the peculiarity of their division of labour. I would argue that 
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many of the described elements are typical for organised crime groups dedicated to “the control of 
trafficking” (see Zhang and Chin 2003; Sciarrone 2014) insofar as they create rather limited and 
commodity-oriented type of governance. The present section focuses exclusively on group’s 
organisational features which, as I argue at the end of the section, are the by-product of governance 
strategy adopted by the group in response to state’s crackdown. To put it in another way, I will 
claim that given group’s almost exclusive focus on drug industry any other organisational model 
would be impractical for Rastrojos’ criminal enterprise. 
 Rastrojos’ membership follows very specific recruitment strategy. The hardcore of Rastrojos 
in post-demobilisation period (2007-2012) was composed of their long-term associates and ex-
members of other organised violence groups (especially ex-paramilitaries and drug-traffickers). The 
long-term Rastrojos associates comprised retired or dismissed police officers, the most illustrative 
example of whom was the group’s most important leader (until his death in 2008), Wilmer Varela 
“Jabón". Ex-police officers seemed precious associates especially from the intelligence point of 
view: 
!
It needs to be stressed that a good share of Norte del Valle Cartel’s members, starting with 
Wilber Varela, are the agents and other officials retired from the public law enforcement 
forces, who in many cases stay in touch with their previous institutions which permits them to 
establish contacts and hire services from these institutions (VR 2006, 53). 
  
The majority of demobilised paramilitary soldiers who returned to their previous occupation via 
membership in Rastrojos belonged to the two demobilised Pacific Coast AUC groups: Bloque 
Calima and Bloque Libertadores del Sur (ISC 2014). The reasons why so many demobilised ex-
paramilitaries decided to join Rastrojos regarded security problems linked to the presence of FARC 
in the area and the lack of adequate round-the-clock state’s protection, scarce occupational 
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opportunities, and growing illegality in marginal zones of Pacific Coast cities (HRW 2010, 80; 
Guzmán and Moreno 2007; Ávila Martínez 2011; Villarraga 2013). It is hard to establish the exact 
number of ex-paramilitaries in Rastrojos’ structures. Some national-level police estimates based on 
the prosecution statistics indicate that in 2009 post-demobilisation paramilitary groups were 
composed of approximately 17 per cent of ex-AUC members (CNRR 2009, 5). Nevertheless, there 
are reasons to believe that Rastrojos could have incorporated more than 17 per-cent members with 
paramilitary precedents which I am to discuss in detail in later parts of the section. 
 The high percentage of ex-paramilitary recruits among Rastrojos ranks guaranteed a lot of 
expertise in group’s command structures which had to manage the rapid organisational growth of 
the group after 2005 (HRW 2010, 79). One of the main characteristic of Rastrojos’ recruitment since 
then was a high turnover among its lower ranks (Garzón 2008, ISC 2014). Given the type of 
governance exercised and the considerable mobility of the group (to be discussed in the next sub-
section) Rastrojos did not care about the experience and local-level recognisibility of its lower-rank 
personnel. In the face of hostile law enforcement environment (described at length later in this 
section), turnover was not so much the inescapable consequence of organisational management 
inefficiencies but actually seemed quite desirable and strategically motivated outcome. Some of the 
mechanisms of constant staff’s turnover included physical elimination of those group’s members 
who were no longer needed in the organisation and their immediate replace with new staff via 
coercive recruitment (HRW 2010, 84).  
!
In Alto Baudó, Rastrojos imposed an economic blockade at the length of Catrú and Dubasa 
rivers. ‘We’re receiving threats from all illegal armed groups’ says indigenous leader of the 
area. ‘They also want to recruit our children. For this reasons it is preoccupying that not all 
displaced people have been registered by the government in the past.’ (Verdad Abierta 2014). 
!
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 The exact Rastrojos’ command is very difficult to identify because of its fragmentation and 
already mentioned turnover (which reached also the mid-ranks of the group). Since Rastrojos’ 
founder and its longest standing leader, Wilber Varela “Jabón" was killed in Venezuela in 2008, 
supposedly by his associates and allies, the group abandoned clear hierarchical organisational 
model (Garzón 2008, 40; ISC 2014). After Varela’s death there was no Rastrojos’ leader who would 
have guided the entire organisation. Among the most visible and most powerful Varela’s successors 
one should name “Comba” brothers or Diego “Rastrojo". All of them did not operate in the group’s 
highest ranks for long. One of the “Comba" borhters was captured by the police in July 2012 in 
Ecuador (Verdad Abierta 2012c, INDEPAZ 2013), while another one few months later handed 
himself to justice authorities (ISC 2014). Diego “Rastrojo”, the boss responsible for group’s 
security apparatus, was captured in 2012 (Ibid.). “Loco Barrera”, known from his prominent role in 
drug industry around the country, was rumoured to have collaborated closely with Rastrojos’ 
highest command in facilitating international drug-trafficking until his arrest in 2012 (INDEPAZ 
2013, 10). The subsequent series of crackdowns and internal assassinations led to the elimination of 
other relatively important groups’ members: “Sebastián” (killed in 2011 by his security guards; 
Verdad Abierta 2011e) and “Caballo” captured by the police in November 2010 (NN, Nariño, 
29.03.2011). What we observe in this picture is an endless successions in Rastrojos’ hierarchies and 
group’s virtual impossibility to establish a stable command structure. 
 As a result of leadership’s turmoil, the group remained fragmented and poorly coordinated 
among its various factions since 2003. It was organised in a horizontal manner with far-reaching 
autonomy of its peer factions, and high level of conflict among them (VR 2006, Garzón 2008). An 
unquestionable characteristic of Rastrojos’ organisation was the diversity of criminal profiles among 
Rastrojos’ multiple bosses. Some of them were claimed to be above all criminal entrepreneurs (as 
“Comba” brothers) determined to avoid law enforcement authorities’ attention (Verdad Abierta 
2012c). They reinvested their illicit revenues in the legal economy and there is evidence of some 
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small and medium-size businesses in textile industry in Ecuador run with Rastrojos’ capital (Ibid.). 
Others leaders were famous for their audacity in inflicting violence (as “El Cholo”) whose revenues 
were above all supplied by the returns of large-scale violence-rife predation (forced 
misappropriations of land or occupation of immobile properties; NN, Nariño, 06.12.2009). The 
group had autonomous bosses in different parts of the country. Garzón (2008, 40) argues that since 
Varela’s death they were loosely connected and cooperation among them had to be limited to large-
scale drug trafficking.  
 What was the reason of poor cooperation among fragmented structures? Vicepresidencia de 
la Republica claims that the poor cooperation within Rastrojos organisation could be explained with 
its adoption of “grapple” hierarchical model which made all the structures loosely dependent on the 
central entity but rather unconnected among themselves. It should not surprise that once the central 
entity had been eliminated there existed no coordination hub to concert actions of semi-independent 
Rastrojos’ factions.  
!
[The groups was characterised by] ‘grapple hierarchy’ with a coordination hub and a series of 
criminal organisations under the same delinquent project — in this case drug-trafficking. 
From that perspective, we can understand the case of Cali Cartel [and their descendants Norte 
del Valle Cartel, and finally Rastrojos]. Following a disarticulation of the command nucleus 
— with imprisonment or death of most important leaders — their structures […] entered into 
internal competition, falling in disputes about the markets, territorial domination, trafficking 
corridors, and the leadership of the remaining structures (VR 2006, 18). 
!
While in the past there existed a leadership responsible for coordinating various Rastrojos’ 
franchises (ISC 2014), the recent dissolution of central command provoked numerous disputes 
among competing Rastrojos’ factions. The potential for conflict stemmed from the fact that the 
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majority of Rastrojos’ franchises opted for an individual involvement in drug trafficking and as such 
they preferred ad hoc short-lived and fluid task-oriented alliances with either fellow Rastrojos units, 
or other extra-legal governance providers (e.g. guerrillas; see Cubides 2005, Garzón 2008). 
 Another unquestionable characteristic of Rastrojos’ organisation since 2003-2006 was their 
military weakness. Various sources seem to agree that Rastrojos are no longer army-like structure 
which they used to maintain roughly until 2004. The differences lie in the doctrine (VR 2006, 46), 
command (ICS 2014), and iconography (Duncan 2005, 30). Post-DDR Rastrojos became more 
similar to urban gangs than to irregular army. What made them still different from gangs were their 
extensive networks, geographic dispersion, and incredible resourcefulness. Granada, Restrepo and 
Tobón (2009, 478, 492) classify Rastrojos as the group on the margin of neo-paramilitary 
phenomena, calling them “pandillas criminales” or “annexed criminal forces”. “Their military 
capacity is scarce, with weaknesses in terms of training, doctrine and command. Rastrojos maintain 
some sort of [territorial] control in the Cañón de Garrapatas mountains and show a disposition 
which permits them to have certain mobility” (VR 2006, 46). My own data sources suggest that the 
claims about Rastrojos’ weakness and their disaggregated structure may be slightly exaggerated. In 
NN publications I found numerous examples of Rastrojos’ wearing military uniforms and moving 
between territories in an army-like disciplined manner. There is also evidence that on some 
occasions they used AUC’s anti-subversion discourse (NN, Cauca, 04.11.2009). Moreover, they 
continued to use the same tactics of population control as old style autodefensas which included 
road blocks and the vigilance of many transportation routes (NN, Cauca, 27.11.2010). It happened 
that their leaders were largely recognisable figures in some localities, far from representing no-
name criminals without any ties with the territories of their influence (NN, Nariño, 06.12.2009). In 
many cases, the violence perpetuated by Rastrojos followed traditional AUC’s modality. 
Forthcoming violent attack was publicly declared and immediate military targets individuated. 
Unless to-be victims had complied with group’s threats (e.g. to abandon their community) they were 
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severely punished. Even though, I found a lot of evidence that Rastrojos organisation after 2005 
became characterised by less internal cohesion than the one observed among pre-demobilisation 
paramilitaries associated with Norte del Valle Cartel, the group still appeared more disciplined than 
local criminal bands, sicarios [pay-as-you-go hitmen] groups and urban gangs.  
 In sum, I argue that Rastrojos’ organisational transformation should be interpreted as a 
programmatic decision, which did not reflect its organisational inability to impose stricter cohesion 
among its structures but represented the adaptations required by modified extra-legal governance 
environment. If we were to believe in disarticulation hypothesis (Rastrojos falling to pieces because 
of their organisational instability), there would be no explanation of their exponential growth, 
persistence and non-incorporation into other criminal groups. In the rest of the section I am going to 
summarise the descriptive findings from the above presented discussion trying to show (a) why I 
believe that Rastrojos’ organisational adaptations should be attributed to state’s repressive action 
against the group, and (b) why I claim that these adaptations conducted to the intensification of risk-
driven increase in violence perpetrated by the group (in other words how they led to organisation-
level predation).  
 Above all, the present section demonstrates that risk increase triggered two major changes in 
Rastrojos’ organisation which reinforced their predatory tendencies in Pacific Coast. The first one 
was the introduction of greater clandestinity and mobility into the organisation, which diminished 
its monitoring and territorial control capacities. I have shown that Rastrojos no longer maintain 
army-like structure with unified command, doctrine and iconography (VR 2006, 46; Duncan 2005, 
30). Their military weakness is well illustrated in a testimony which recalls a situation when 
Rastrojos prohibited anyone to leave guerrilla-surrounded town and attempted to melt themselves 
into the crowd in order to avoid military confrontation with the rebels (NN, Cauca, 27.11.2010). 
Granada, Restrepo and Tobón (2009, 494) classify Rastrojos as “annexed criminal forces”, a group 
on the margin of new paramilitary phenomena. They avoid areas with good institutional coverage, 
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and the majority of their actions “takes place among the populations where one can arrive only via 
rivers, or via roads in terrible condition” (VA 2011d). In the areas of better institutional coverage 
they do not wear uniforms, stay dispersed and live among civilians occupying their homes (HRW 
2010, 75, 83; DT 201, 50). The lack of territorial dominium led them to another organisational 
adaptation which increased use of violence (via intensified predation). 
 The second organisational adaptation favouring predatory turn among Rastrojos 
paramilitaries was the increased independence of their mid-level commanders. Risk increase was 
not equal for each paramilitary member. The media coverage of anti-paramilitary crackdown 
created a pressure on law enforcement authorities to present public opinion with positive results. 
Capturing rank-and-files could not have earned the same public applause as high paramilitary 
commanders’ arrest, and it hardly contributed to dismantling an entire criminal group. For these 
reasons, high paramilitary commanders became the primary targets of law enforcement authorities’ 
actions. In order not to expose the central command (especially liable to police crackdown and 
especially important for groups’ survival) the analysed Pacific Coast paramilitaries introduced 
horizontality in their organisational model, which precluded the strict control over predatory 
violence, frequently exercised by their quasi-independent factions. Since the beginning of fully-
fledged crackdown Rastrojos suffered from imprisonment or killings of their key bosses: Wilber 
Varela, Comba brothers, Diego “Rastrojo” etc. “Following a disarticulation of the command nucleus 
- with imprisonment or death of most important leaders - [Rastrojos’] structures […] entered into 
internal competition, falling in disputes about the markets, territorial domination, trafficking 
corridors, and the leadership of the remaining structures” (VR 2006, 17). The internal conflict and 
high risks of centralisation led to the introduction of organisational horizontality and to the heavy 
reliance on midlevel commanders (ISC 2014). It created a dilemma of decentralised predation, in 
which everyone intensified his own looting because he was aware of the fact that whatever he 
leaves behind would undoubtedly fall prey to his fellow predators (Easterly 2006, 309). What is 
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more, in face of the above presented empirical material there are reasons to believe that 
decentralised Rastrojos' structures intensified their use of violence because it served also as a 
mechanisms of advancement in criminal hierarchies for ambitious mid-level commanders. 
!
Extra-Legal Governance Model 
!
 Rastrojos’ expansion strategy in 2005-12 did not resemble the traditional paramilitary 
conquest. As I have said before, following the decision of Rastrojos’ exclusion from Uribe’s DDR 
programme, Carlos Jiménez “Macaco”, demobilised paramilitary leader of Bloque Central Bolívar 
of AUC, suggested to Rastrojos to transfer the majority of their actions from Valle del Cauca to 
adjacent departments of Chocó, Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo (Verdad Abierta 2009). The decision 
turned out to become a strategically brilliant move. It resulted in group’s consolidation in the entire 
Pacific Coast territory and led to the exponential growth of the organisation thanks to the 
“recycling” of previously demobilised paramilitary soldiers from the region. From 2006 onwards 
Rastrojos started to spread to various parts of the country outside Pacific Coast (INDEPAZ 
2008-2013, ISC 2014). In an arch of few years they managed to establish their own underworld 
governance in some parts of Caribbean Coast, San Andrés islands and in the corridor between 
Urabá and Norte del Santander departments (Ariaz Ortis 2009, 10). The common characteristic 
across all those places regards their strategic position in Colombian drug-trafficking networks. First 
of all, the regions host ports where drugs are normally embarked on big vessels with the destination 
to Central American countries. Urabá corridor, on the other hand, is one of the most frequently used 
route to transport drugs in small speedboats from Colombia to Panama, from where they travel by 
road until El Salvador or Honduras. Norte de Santander department allows to export drugs across 
Venezuelan border, while Nariño department (the Rastrojos’ expansion’s endpoint in Southern 
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Colombia) has good connections with Ecuador and its port cities. Putumayo’ extreme scarcity of 
institutional coverage facilitates drug transportation along the rivers with final destinations in Brasil 
passing via Leticia river port town in the middle of Amazonian jungle (El Tiempo 2005).  
 One of the peculiarities observed in Rastrojos’ expansion strategy regards the fact that they 
did not necessarily maintain control in conquered municipalities for long time (INDEPAZ 2013). 
When controlling these municipalities turned out no longer beneficial (e.g. aerial sprayings 
destroyed most of coca cultivations in the area), the group did not wait to abandon such territories 
(see Torres 2012; Vásques and Vargas 2011). Rastrojos expansion followed new trafficking 
opportunities, while the group remained in charge for longer period only of those territories which 
proved most rentable. INDEPAZ (2013) reports that in 2012/2013 Rastrojos were present in all 
Colombian departments. Despite the impressive number of departments with Rastrojos’ presence, 
one should not overestimate group’s territorial coverage since they maintained very limited 
presence within many of the majority of Colombian departments. Given the high costs of 
controlling extensive areas in the situation of hostile law enforcement and intense extra-legal 
governance competition volatile territorial control seemed more profitable option from the 
economics of crime perspective (see Chojnacki and Metternich 2008). 
 How far does Rastrojos’ governance resemble the governance provided by other criminal 
groups in Colombia and around the world? The new criminological literature tries to classify 
organised crime and related phenomenas by organising them along some type of extra-legal 
governance continuum (Varese 2010). There are various ways to measure criminal governance but 
probably the most useful classification for the problem at hand could be represented by the 
continuum stretching from extra-legal governance based on territorial control to extra-legal 
governance based on the control of trafficking (Sciarrone 2009, 2014; Zhang and Chin 2003). In the 
present sub-section I am going to show Rastrojos as the representative of the latter form of extra-
legal governance, focused on the control of trafficking. There is no threshold which divides 
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territorial-control governance from trafficking-control one. In general, the nature of extra-legal 
governance can be described by its complexity which ranges from the regulation of markets for 
specific illicit commodities (e.g. gambling, prostitution, loan-sharking; see Haller 1971, Graebner 
Anderson 1979) to the regulation of broad range of socio-economic exchange (e.g. landlord-tenant 
disputes, street commerce, non-public transportation, private disputes; see Chu 2000, Varese 2001). 
The more complex the governance the closer it approaches territorial-control organised crime model 
(so-called “power syndicate”, Blok 1974). The historical studies relative to Rastrojos organisation 
found evidence of highly complex forms of extra-legal governance exercised by the group in pre-
demobilisation period which, nevertheless, have not been observed since 2003.  
!
[They used to] intervene as a third party in disputes among community members, in other 
words, they [used to] offer justice services […] eliminate thieves and bear the duty of public 
security provider. […] By and large, they assumed the role of traditional violent intermediaries 
in the region and converted themselves in some form of the State (Duncan 2005, 31).  
[T]heir activities d[id] not impose big costs on the society and, contrarily, they dynamise[d] 
local economies with inversion of illicit capitals via purchases of extensive land properties, 
employment creation, financing public constructions, among other activities, which turn[ed] out 
to be beneficial for the populations […] and convert[ed] the mafias into “State within the 
State” (VR 2006, 9). 
!
 The above quoted characterisation of Rastrojos’ extra-legal governance is no longer true. 
After 2005 the group radically reduced the complexity of its extra-legal monopolies. They limited 
themselves to the regulation of very few markets for illicit commodities (especially drugs), and 
showed very scarce interest in governing any other forms of local socio-economic exchange. As a 
consequence, in the period under study the main part of Rastrojos’ revenues came from drug-
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trafficking. The peculiarity of Rastrojos’ drug trade involvement was related to their apparent laxity 
of trafficking control, and relatively low level of monopolisation of the market. For example, 
Rastrojos allowed independent operators to negotiate prices and collect “taxes” from cultivators 
(Torres 2012, Vargas 2004) and collaborated with various illegal armed groups (such as FARC and 
ELN guerrillas; see Cubides 2005, Garzón 2008, 121).  
!
They are different from some of Colombia's other criminal groups in that they do not 
necessarily try to control every part of the drug distribution chain, operating instead via 
strategic alliances. These alliances include working with rebel groups and former rightwing 
paramilitaries to move their product. They also concentrate their forces along embarkation 
points, specifically the border with Venezuela, and the Pacific Ocean. Both points give them 
enough control over the drugs they are shipping or the chemicals they need to bring into the 
country (ISC 2014). 
!
Not surprisingly, Rastrojos’ most intensive territorial presence could be observed in the biggest 
ports towns of Pacific Coast, such as Buenaventura and Tumaco. It also shows that their special 
interests lied in controlling the final stages of drug-trafficking process, such as transportation and 
commercialisation of cocaine. Duncan (2005) argues that the similar division of labour in drug-
trafficking process has its roots in the fact that non-paramilitary illegal armed groups (such as 
guerrillas) remained prevalently concentrated in Colombian rural areas which could not offer very 
convenient access to drugs embarkation points. 
 Another part of Rastrojos incomes during the analysed period came from extortions. The 
group asked for money from small and medium entrepreneurs, as well as big extraction sites, such 
as oil plants or gold mines (Ávila Martínez 2011). They also taxed some of the properties which 
were not necessarily destined to the commercial use, such as rancho-like properties, speedboats, 
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(which might be used commercially for transportation or livestock enterprises), and luxurious 
houses (which could probably not, if not in the hotel industry; see Verdad Abierta 2010c). The 
typical targets of Rastrojos extortions consisted of small shops, entertainment spots, street vendors 
(milk and cheese sellers), minutos vendors, taxi drivers, or garages. Rastrojos mixed their extortive 
activities in those sites with pure pillage. Below I present few illustrative examples. “Recently there 
have been reports on extortions from cheese and milk producers […]. The responsible ones were 
Rastrojos” (Verdad Abierta 2012d).  
!
In the way-out of Pasto there are Rastrojos. Inside Tumaco — Águilas Negras. In the rural 
zones, along the rivers, there are FARC. As for now, they are taxing all the world, coming to 
receive vacunas [illegal taxation] from the owners of entertainment spots or simple shops. All 
the world sees them” (Verdad Abierta 2010c). 
!
 Following Varese’s definition, extortion can be understood a solicitude of a payment in 
exchange for the services promised but not delivered (Varese 2010). It gets often confounded with 
organised crime protection. According to Varese, the difference lies in the actual delivery of the 
service. Frye (2002) suggests that protection can also become extortionist if the security services 
provided by an organised crime group would not have been needed if the very group had not 
operated in the area. There is another service which extra-legal governance providers can deliver to 
their “tax-payers” — extra-legal regulation of markets. Gambetta (1992) gives example of the 
Sicilian mafia regulating fruit and vegetable market in Palermo by limiting the number of market 
participants, blocking new entrants and protecting the (non-)competitiveness of those already 
operating at the market. Chu (2000) shows Hong Kong triads regulating street vendors and private 
transportation companies in a very similar manner. Such a regulation may occur in the markets that 
are already regulated by the state, although unsatisfactorily, or when there exist relatively 
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generalised incentives for collusion (e.g. fixing high prices; see Gambetta and Reuter 1995). The 
other markets potentially in demand for such extra-legal regulation are the ones excluded from 
state’s regulation for the sake of their illegality (Haller 1971; Graebner Anderson 1978). In 
Colombian case, coca cultivators may need to have some form of extra-legal regulation of this type 
in order to guarantee minimum predictability of their illicit activities (Torres 2012). What I am 
going to do now is to see whether Rastrojos’ extra-legal taxation should be interpreted as merely 
extortionist — whether it was not exchanged with some real (and at least in the minimal measure 
useful) services. 
 It seems that the real services delivered in exchange for the tributes imposed by Rastrojos in 
the period under study remained relatively limited. In most of the cases of post-2003 Rastrojos’ 
“taxation” we could speak of extortion not exchanged with any services. To begin with, their 
security “tax” paid for the protection against guerrillas’ incurions can be classified as extortionist 
because in case of the actual insurgents’ raid Rastrojos were often quicker to escape the place rather 
than to effectively protect its residents (NN, Cauca, 27.11.2010). Almost all the group’s protection 
(against law enforcement and other organised violence groups) was concentrated on drug 
infrastructure (ISC 2014). Rastrojos protected coca processing laboratories, access routes to the 
plantations and the movements of the people in coca areas (Ibid.). The relative mobility of the coca 
industry because of Plan Colombia-related crackdown (US-sponsored drug eradication campaign) 
made protection services volatile and less tied to specific territories. Even in the drug trafficking 
milieu, Rastrojos were perceived as “patron duro" [hard master] because they imposed themselves 
at the markets relatively organised prior to their arrival and flooded with skilful extra-legal 
intermediaries. It made Rastrojos’ presence in these territories rather redundant but still unavoidable 
(Torres 2012). The biggest security-building effort attributed to Rastrojos since 2005 concerns the 
“social cleansing” campaign which consisted of group’s declaration of war against all marginalised 
individuals who supposedly threatened local security (e.g. NN, Valle del Cauca, 29.08.2008; 
!150
Krzysztof Krakowski
01.03.2011, 26.07.2012; Nariño, 15.05.2008; 18.07.2008; 27.07.2010). It included actions ranging 
from physical harassment to homicides and disappearances of common delinquents, drug addicts, 
prostitutes, beggars, homeless, alcoholics, trasvestites.   
!
Other group which was identified in the paramilitary court of Cauca were Rastrojos. In an 
arch of 2012 they sent various threatening leaflets to the communities in the Northern part of 
the department. In one of them they announced that in response to religious people’s request 
“the Central Command ordered patrols to end up with delinquency”. Equally, they threatened 
people who dedicated themselves to drugs cultivation or processing (Verdad Abierta 2013b). 
!
The extent of these practices is not known. There is an evidence of some demonstrative killings of 
drug addicts, prostitutes, homosexuals, transvestites and petty criminals in 2005-2012 (NN, Nariño, 
27.07.2010; Cauca, 27.01.2009) but it remains unclear whether these actions represented systematic 
commitment to some coherent security-building project, or whether Rastrojos promoted social 
cleansing campaign to justify group’s atrocities committed for other instrumental purposes. 
 Apart from largely bogus protection, Rastrojos offered some real services to their “tax-
payers” in the form of occasional markets regulation. In fact, they regulated the market of 
unauthorised natural resources extraction in Bajo Cauca (Antioquia), Valle del Cauca, Chocó and 
Nariño obliging any interested extractors to purchase mining “licences” (Ávila Martínez 2011). It 
prevented illegal mining from becoming flooded with too many entrepreneurs who could have 
attracted law enforcement authorities’ attention or pulled down the prices. In this milieu Rastrojos 
might actually be perceived less extortionist than elsewhere, but the pool of beneficiaries of their 
services still reminded extremely limited given the nature of illegal mining labour (with alleged 
slavery-like system; Ávila Martínez 2011) and its concentration in very rare and restricted areas. 
The group’s relations with small agricultural entrepreneurs, on the other hand, reveal very different 
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side of their markets regulation. Rastrojos used to block movements of fruit and vegetable vendors 
who transported their goods via rivers and prohibited them to carry commercial goods of a value 
exceeding 40,000 Colombian pesos (roughly 15 euros at the time of writing; NN, Chocó, 
17.02.2003). This form of economic blockade was not intended to benefit the participants of local 
fruit and vegetable markets but served Rastrojos to limit the traffic in strategically important 
corridors so as to facilitate the transportation of drugs hidden under their own fruit and vegetable 
cargos. Their disproportionate focus on cocaine distribution made Rastrojos increasingly unpopular 
in the region because they dealt with the drug for exportation purposes only. While bringing few 
benefits for local communities (scarce labour opportunities), cocaine processing and transportation 
imposed huge costs on social life in various Pacific Coast localities. For the purposes of safe 
transportation of drug cargos Rastrojos imposed evening curfews in both rural and urban areas, 
which badly affected “communitarian and social activities, such as juvenile groups’ reunions, street-
corner lingering, religious events” (DT 2011, 50)  
 It would be wrong to say that Rastrojos were uniquely extortionist. “They maintained, as 
happened in Norte del Valle, a complex structure which at times offered protection services, both 
for external agents and for their own clan, and at times delivered coercion — creating a social 
environment which propitiated and stimulated illegality” (VR 2006, 24). The difference between 
Rastrojos and traditional paramilitary groups in Colombia could be summarised in the following 
way: Rastrojos’ protection was available only to big, organised and resourceful actors such as illegal 
mining entrepreneurs or commercial cultivators (and thus very different from the usual beneficiaries 
of paramilitary governance in other parts of the country; see Gutiérrez and Baron 2006; Vargas 
2004). Rastrojos’ limited territorial control did not enable them to successfully settle small-scale 
disputes. Gaining legitimacy among low-level economic stratas (by delivering them genuine extra-
legal governance services) was of no importance for the group, because its volatile and ever-
changing territorial presence. For the lack of the incentives for grass-root legitimacy building, 
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Rastrojos turned to more extortionist practices of governance and exchanged payments with real 
services on the rare occasions when they considered it beneficial — when dealing with big criminal 
or semi-criminal actors whose influence extended beyond local or regional level.    
 In sum, it seems that the recent change in Rastrojos extra-legal governance strategy 
symbolises another form of organisation-level adaptation provoked by anti-paramilitary crackdown 
dynamics. Any extra-legal governance providers, such as Rastrojos, may gain a certain level of 
acceptance by delivering genuine services (e.g. protection, dispute settlement, regulation of 
competition, agreements enforcement) in the context of generalised demand for private ordering 
(Gambetta 1992), or may be perceived as extortionist or predator if it imposes services where they 
are not in demand or where they are efficiently provided by other actors (see Varese 2011). It is 
reasonable to assume that each paramilitary group would prefer to diversify its governance-related 
tributes and ensure stability of its revenues by providing governance to a wide variety of socio-
economic exchange, rather than to remain highly dependent on one income source (drug industry). 
Such a group should also prefer to build a certain level local legitimacy of its governance which 
guarantees it lower defection rates and less frequent need to resort to violence. I argue that 
Rastrojos did not achieve neither of these outcomes because of the pressing need to minimise own 
exposure to law enforcement authorities in Pacific Coast. In short, I believe I have convincingly 
demonstrated that state’s repression dealt a blow to Rastrojos legitimacy as governance providers 
and caused free-riding problems along with the fall in groups’ revenues (Garzón 2008, 50). It 
should not surprise that in order to compensate for the losses Rastrojos resorted to violence-rife 
predation. 
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER SIX: The Logic of Paramilitary Violence (II). Qualitative Evidence 
from Eastern Plains 
!
 The evidence presented in the previous chapter lends support to both hypotheses linking 
paramilitary violence with state’s repression. Nonetheless, the qualitative results may suffer from 
visibility bias which means that the available qualitative data that permitted me to address the 
hypotheses empirically regards only those parts of Pacific Coast which experienced deterioration of 
security situation since 2003. If I want to make sure that the mechanisms driving the association 
between repression and violence in case of Colombian paramilitaries have been correctly 
individuated, I shall be able to demonstrate that they did not take place in Pacific Coast sub-regions 
which improved their security record since 2003. Unfortunately, such verification of the argument is 
not possible because of the biased data. Nevertheless, the robustness of my qualitative findings can 
still be double-checked via the case-study analysis of Eastern Plains with equally biased data. The 
region did not experience repression-driven escalation of paramilitary violence and for this reason it 
may be informative to check if there is any evidence of resource substitution or predatory 
intensification phenomenas among regional paramilitaries. In case of positive results, there would 
be every reason to doubt that the individuated mechanisms do in fact explain the observed 
association between paramilitary violence and state’s crackdown in Pacific Coast. The idea behind 
this comparison goes as follows: if the preliminarily confirmed hypotheses cannot account for 
between-regional differences in violence dynamics they might not correctly explain within-regional 
heterogeneity in Pacific Coast.  
 In sum, what I am expecting to find in the present chapter can be summarised in two points. 
First of all, I believe that there is hardly any evidence that Eastern Plains paramilitaries were forced 
to exchange non-violent resources with the actual use of coercion (Hypothesis 1) since the outset of 
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anti-paramilitary crackdown which — as I have already suggested — spared dominant groups 
operating in the region. Secondly, I think that qualitative evidence relative to Eastern Plains will 
confirm that long-lasting paramilitary organisations operating in the region did not change their 
organisational models and extra-legal governance strategies in such a way to reinforce the predatory 
incentives among their members (Hypothesis 2). To prove my expectations right, I am going to 
begin the chapter with historical reconstruction of paramilitary panorama in Eastern Plains. Then I 
will describe anti-paramilitary crackdown launched by the Colombian state in 2003 stressing its 
particularities with a special attention to demonstrate the repression’s partisanship. After having 
addressed both hypotheses in short, I will move to a detailed case study of Eastern Plains biggest 
paramilitary group since 2006, Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano 
(ERPAC) explaining its considerable restrain in the use of violence with reference to state’s tolerant 
behaviour towards them.       
!
The History of Paramilitary Governance in Eastern Plains 
!
 The history of paramilitary governance in Eastern Plains started with the original 
colonisation of the region in the second half of the twentieth century. The first self-defence units 
appeared there along with the arrival of Liberal refugees which had suffered from Conservatives’ 
persecution during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Zamosc 1986). Paramilitary boom in the region, 
however, dates back to late 1970s when Buitrageños family created Autodefensas Campesinas de 
Casanare (ACC) and Victor Carranza established his group called Los Carranceros. Both of the 
groups were founded by emeralds traffickers and became later unified under the common name of 
ACC (González 2007, 251-6). Apart from ACC and its allies, in the late 1990s AUC coalition 
decided to branch out into Eastern Plains (Pérez 2011) with the biggest transplanted group, 
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Urabeños, led by Vincente Castaño, the third of the Castaño brothers — the highest commanders of 
AUC. A lot of sources claim that around 1997-1998 Vicente Castaño sold his Eastern Plains 
paramilitary franchise to drug-trafficker, Miguel Arroyabe (Pérez 2007, 77-8). Since then Urabeños 
rebranded themselves as Bloque Centauros of AUC and created two fronts: Meta and Guaviare. 
Roughly at the same time the most extreme parts of Eastern Plains towards Venezuelan border saw 
the emergence of a group called Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada (ACMV) led by 
Guillermo Torres.  
 During 2003-2004 period paramilitary governance in Eastern Plains experienced fierce 
conflict between some regional factions (Pérez 2011, González 2007). After the period of initial 
uncertainty about the competitors’ alliances, all paramilitary forces of the region converged into two 
large blocks. The first one was composed of “native” paramilitary groups, mainly ACC and 
Carranza’s autodefensas. Their enemies included Bloque Centauros and few minor groups: ACMV, 
Frente Vichada of Bloque Central Bolívar (led by already known “Macaco") and Frente Vencedores 
de Arauca (appeared in the region in the end of 1990s and led by Mellizos brothers). “Paramilitary 
war” in Eastern Plains ended with a defeat of ACC-Carranza coalition (González 2007). Despite 
winning, AUC-supported coalition suffered from a serious blow when Bloque Centauros’ leader 
Arroyabe got killed almost immediately afterwards. Since then the group fragmented into three 
smaller units: Heroes de Llanos (led by Jorge “Pirata"), Heroes de Guaviare (led by Pedro 
“Cuchillo”) and so-called Leales (led by Vincente Castaño). While the first two factions 
collaborated between themselves, the third maintained non-belligerent but far from cooperative 
relationship with both of them.  
 The successful demobilisation of almost all Eastern Plains paramilitary groups occurred 
between 2004-2006. During that time five paramilitary structures were effectively disarmed (see 
Figure 8). Those who failed to demobilise included Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare, whose 
defeat in Eastern Plains paramilitary war did not mean they had disappeared from regional 
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paramilitary panorama. Still the Colombian state did not insist on their demobilisation given their 
marginal role after 2004. There were some rumours that Martin “Llanos”, ACC’s leader, became an 
ally of Heroes de Guaviare Bloque which demobilised eventually within Uribe’s DDR scheme in 
2005 (Garzón 2005, 128). The successful demobilisation of Eastern Plains paramilitaries involved 
nearly 4,000 soldiers. It did not mean, though, the disappearance of paramilitary phenomena from 
the region. Those that ended up demobilised returned to arms in large numbers and formed or joined 
various newly-emerged paramilitary groups.  
!
Figure 8: Demobilisation statistics in Eastern Plains. 
Source: reproduced from CIT (2009, 105). 
!
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 Three groups of this kind managed to recruit enough soldiers to be considered a real security 
problem: Paisas, Macacos and Llaneros (CIT 2009, 105-6). Paisas represented a transplanted 
paramilitary group from Antioquia department closely linked to Urabeños. Their leaders included 
“Don Mario”, “HH” and “El Aleman”, although most of them operated from the distance 
(predominantly from Antioquia department). Paisas employed roughly 180 people recruited from 
Leales faction, the third descendants of dissolved Bloque Centauros. They occupied the Northern 
Meta with its urban centre in Villaviciencio, and controlled Piedmonte area in Casanare (CIT 2009, 
106). Macacos, on the other hand, were formed from the remaining part of Leales who did not join 
Paisas and from demobilised members of Frente Vichada of Bloque Central Bolívar. They were led 
by “Macaco" whose interests evidently stretched from Pacific Coast to Eastern Plains. The group 
counted approximately 400 men and occupied the area between Puerto Gaitán in Meta until Vichada 
department (Ibid., 106). The strongest post-demobilisation groups in Eastern Plains were called 
Llaneros led by “Cuchillo”. They occupied the Southern parts of Meta and Guaviare department. 
Their initial recruits came from demobilised factions of Heroes de Guaviare and Frente Vencedores 
de Arauca. The initial number of Llaneros members did not exceed 400 individuals (Ibid., 106).  
 Having three poorly coordinated paramilitary factions, Eastern Plains did not have to wait 
long for violent intraparamilitary conflict to outbreak. It lasted since 2005 until 2007 when the 
fighting ended with a definite and complete victory of “Cuchillo” group, Llaneros (CIT 2009, 106; 
ICG 2012, 5). The advantages of “Cuchillo’s” men included the knowledge of the territory and 
military experience. “The defeat of both groups was due to the fact that “Cuchillo” had better 
prepared soldiers who knew the terrain well” (Ibid., 106). Llaneros were well equipped for the fight 
and, above all, they could be considered as true natives in the region (compared to transplanted 
Macacos and externally commanded Paisas). It gave them strategic advantage and facilitated local 
coalition building. “Loco Barrera” and Jorge “Pirata", two resourceful drug-traffickers of the 
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region, supported “Cuchillo’s” group during the conflict since they considered Llaneros as the most 
credible and stable ally for the future re-organisation of illicit trafficking in the region (ICG 2012). 
After the final victory over competing groups Llaneros renamed themselves as Ejército 
Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano (ERPAC). Their territorial dominium was 
immediately extended to Northern Meta, Casanare and Arauca to the North, as well as to Vichada 
and Guainía departments to the South-East. “Cuchillo’s” group established nearly indisputable 
monopoly on extra-legal violence in Eastern Plains. It helped them to minimise even the 
confrontations with guerrilla groups. “Rather, the groups have sought to avoid disputes in order to 
escape government attention and reduce mutual damage. Territorial competition has not prevented 
some FARC fronts from cooperating with ERPAC in drug-trafficking activities” (ICG 2012, 6).  In 
2011, following “Cuchillo’s” death, the group apparently demobilised, but the next year its 
members were seen operating in the region within two new paramilitary bloques, Metro and 
Libertadores del Vichada (ICG 2012). It renders paramilitary future in Eastern Plains rather 
uncertain. 
!
State’s Repression and Paramilitary Violence in Eastern Plains 
!
 The beginning of state’s anti-paramilitary repression in Eastern Plains coincided with the 
first intraparamilitary conflict in the region, “paramilitary war” between Bloque Centauros and 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare. González (2007, 265-9) claims that the most important 
factor in Bloque Centauros’s victory over ACC was the help of the military forces which became 
“the part of the conflict rather than guarantors of the state” and concentrated their anti-paramilitary 
actions on ACC group. It is true that Bloque Centauros possessed more local allies (ACMV and 
other two AUC’s fronts) and were more resourceful due to Castaño brothers’ generous support. 
Nevertheless, ACC enjoyed better territorial embeddedness and their governance were partly 
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legitimised locally among various social stratas (including political and economic elites). Bloque 
Centauros’ commander, Miguel Arroyabe, used to admire Martin “Llanos” and his ACC unit for 
their grass-root work, relatively large social acceptance and complex governance services which 
included the regulation of various both legal and illicit highly profitable markets (see Pérez 2011). 
González (2007) seems sure that what decided of the outcome of ACC-Centauros contest had less to 
do with each group’s initial endowment and more with state’s anti-paramilitary intervention which 
targeted almost exclusive ACC’s members:  
!
For the leader of ACC, the declaration of war by Bloque Centuaros was supported by public 
military forces. That is how “Llanos” explains Operation Sanctuary ordered by the Army 
Commander Martín Orlando Carreño in the first half of 2004, principally against ACC. The 
operation coincided with one of the most intense moments during the confrontations between 
ACC and Bloque Centauros. “Llanos” considers General Carreño as Arroyabe’s personal ally 
(Goznález 2007, 265). 
!
 Apparently, state’s anti-paramilitary repression in Eastern Plains did not finish with ACC’s 
virtual elimination. Law enforcement authorities kept medium-intensity crackdown roughly until 
the end of the second intraparamilitary conflict in the region, three-sided contest between Llaneros, 
Paisas and Macacos (see Chapter Three). Repression relaxed when Llaneros, rebranded as ERPAC, 
defeated their paramilitary competitors and won control over most of private ordering markets in 
the region. What made it possible that ERPAC established relatively complex extra-legal 
governance monopolies in such short time? The evidence from many sources point to the 
importance of public forces’ partisan behaviour: “The defeat of both groups [Paisas and Macacos] 
was due to “Cuchillos’s”collaboration with some sectors of public forces which furnished them with 
information and helped in logistics” (CIT 2009, 106). ERPAC’s success was possible not only 
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thanks to army’s intelligence and monitoring support. Probably the biggest contribution came from 
the fact that the army decided to directly crack down on ERPAC’s paramilitary rivals and actually 
offered military protection for “Cuchillo’s” men. Good relations between state’s forces and ERPAC 
persisted long after group’s consolidation as the leading paramilitary actor in Eastern Plains. Thanks 
to these relations the group managed to avoid outward repression despite the fact that their 
organisation grew in size, became visible and continued AUC’s legacy of territorial control 
characterised by extra-legal regulation of social, economic and political life in the region.   
!
Ties to the security forces were crucial for maintaining the position of “Cuchillo”. He 
reportedly paid bribes to members of the police, the military and DAS (the now disbanded 
presidential intelligence agency, the Administrative Department of Security) in order to 
conduct his activities and repeatedly elude capture. In 2008, President Uribe publicly rebuked 
the military for its failure to pursue ERPAC and discharged three generals of the 4th army 
division, including its top commander, General Guillermo Quiñónez Quiroz (ICG 2012, 6). 
!
 In sum, state’s anti-paramilitary crackdown in Eastern Plains can be interpreted in twofold 
manner. On the one hand, it may be judged as corrupt and bogus since paramilitary governance 
seemed somehow strengthened after two waves of anti-paramilitary repression than it had been 
before. On the other hand, state’s move can appear as a very intelligent one from public security 
perspective since it saved a lot of state’s effort in “de-paramilitarising” civil conflict in Eastern 
Plains. Military support to Bloque Centauros and ERPAC was not exchanged only with bribes for 
few corrupted officials (see ICG 2012). Both groups “repaid” the state by effectively destroying the 
entire regional paramilitary opposition to Uribe’s peace process which facilitated the successful 
conclusion of the programme. If ACC or Carranzas had been left non-demobilised and operating in 
the region, they could have turned themselves into the peace process’ threatening spoilers (as 
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Rastrojos and Machos in Pacific Coast). For example, they might have re-shaped the actually 
observed re-emergence of paramilitary phenomena after 2006 by reincorporating the first 
disappointed DDR-participants and continuing their fight with AUC’s paramilitary “leftovers”. As a 
result, the region could have experienced less security improvements in exchange for lesser 
penetration of mafia-like organisations into social, political and above all economic life of Eastern 
Plains. What would have been worse is open to debate.  
 My role here remains limited to analyse whether state’s partisanship can actually explain the 
observed security improvements. In Chapter Four I have already shown that state’s intervention in 
Eastern Plains did not provoke the escalation of paramilitary violence. If this finding is true, I 
should be able to demonstrate that none of the hypothesised mechanisms linking anti-paramilitary 
repression with paramilitary violence were present in the region between 2003-2012. In other 
words, I should find that Eastern Plains paramilitaries did not substitute their non-violent resources 
with coercion (Hypothesis 1), nor did they adopted organisational solutions activating latent 
predatory tendencies (Hypothesis 2). If, in fact, there is no evidence of such mechanisms being at 
work in post-2003 Eastern Plains, it does not only confirm quantitative results presented in Chapter 
Four, but also indirectly validates my casual model increasing the plausibility that the hypothesised 
mechanisms correctly explain the link between repression and violence.  
!
Hypothesis 1: Resource Substitution 
!
 To begin with, I would like to examine the present state of reputation for violence among 
Eastern Plains paramilitaries and its possible deterioration during the period of anti-paramilitary 
repression since 2003 until 2012. According to my argument, I should not find any substantial 
evidence in support for such reputation deterioration in contrast to what we observed in Pacific 
Coast. In fact, the non-violent resources of Eastern Plains paramilitaries seem not to have suffered 
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any significant loss since 2003. As we remember, state’s anti-paramilitary actions in the region were 
always partisan in a sense of tolerating either Bloque Centauros or ERPAC as the biggest 
paramilitary groups in the area. It cemented their local monopolies and disincentivised their 
potential competitors (CIT 2009). Pérez (2011, 16-7) observes that denunciations against ERPAC’s 
members to the police might have stigmatised a denouncer as “subversive compliance” and might 
have resulted in his/her victimisation. Military forces did not seem to intervene to reverse this 
perception. In fact much of the paramilitary post-demobilisation violence was recorded in highly 
militarised areas of Arauca which reinforced the image of the regional agreement between Eastern 
Plains paramilitarism and the state. 
!
Similarly, in Balconcitos, another small town in Vistahermosa, a woman said: We lived under 
the pressure of the guerrillas [and] then the army came. [It left] and then the paramilitaries 
arrived in November 2008... When the paramilitaries arrived in November they said they were 
self-defence forces. They entered houses by force and said people had to let them stay.... Eight 
people were displaced. [The paramilitaries] didn’t do much. They would arrive and ask how 
many guerrilla troops had been there, what they were doing. They left on December 22 and the 
army arrived on the 24th. We didn’t tell the army... They say they’re with the army and their 
boss will know if someone talks about them... It’s the law of silence (HRW 2010, 75). 
!
 What about other facets of Eastern Plains paramilitaries’ reputation since 2003? 
International Crisis Group’s report on the paramilitary situation in the region in 2010 (2012, 5) 
notes that paramilitaries in Eastern Plains were not only feared but also respected. Firstly, the leader 
of the biggest regional group, ERPAC, was allegedly perceived as a sort of sorcerer. What is more, 
ordinary people were reported to have approached him with micro credit requests in case of 
financial shortages. His economic support to Eastern Plains residents arguably made him credible 
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and well-advertised patron as well as regionally desirable business partner. “ERPAC’s narco-
business gave it a stable social base, but it also capitalised on “Cuchillo’s” charisma and capacity to 
intimidate, reportedly including manipulation of local fears of black magic Some rural parts of 
Mapiripán (Meta) were virtually dependent on him economically. This allowed him to cast himself 
as a social benefactor” (ICG 2012, 6). 
 In the period under study, ERPAC’s paramilitaries were also easily recognisable in Eastern 
Plains departments and did not suffer from identification problems. NN sources indicate that in 
many Eastern Plains communities the group was not perceived as newly created paramilitary 
faction and people continued to call them Bloque Centauros of AUC. They wore uniforms and held 
AK-47 rifles in groups’ strongholds, such as Mapiripán, Puerto Concordia and San José del 
Guaviare, and in various rural localities (ICG 2012, 5). They became more discreet, though, in more 
urbanised areas: “Before you know who is who, you know who was a commander, who gave orders 
[…] now one doesn’t know whom to talk to when he receives a threat, verbal or written one, which 
orders him to keep his mouth shut or to leave the town” (CIT 2009, 114). ERPAC’s intelligence 
capacities were undoubtedly reduced compared to ACC and Bloque Centauros who controlled the 
region between late 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, the group reminded still far more 
resourceful in monitoring its territories than Pacific Coast paramilitaries described in the previous 
chapter. In sum, there is substantial evidence to support a claim that Eastern Plains have not 
intensified their violence since the beginning to state’s crackdown in 2003 because their non-violent 
extra-legal governance resources have been dramatically affected case and they have not had to 
substitute them with actual coercion. I argue that it happened so because of state’s crackdown’s 
evident partisanship which left some paramilitary groups unworried about the stability of their 
governance which incentivised them to adopt more consensual relations with the governance-
subjected populations. 
!164
Krzysztof Krakowski
!
Hypothesis 2: Predatory Turn 
!
 My second hypothesis links paramilitary violence with state’s crackdown via the mechanism 
predation’s intensification. One way to measure paramilitary predation is to observe their extra-
legal governance’s complexity and legitimacy. In fact, paramilitary governance in Eastern Plains did 
not seem to change after the re-emergence of local paramilitary groups dissolved within DDR 
program (González 2007, 240-1; Pérez 2011). González (2007, 272) shows that paramilitary 
ordering in the region historically went far beyond production and commercialisation of coca. In the 
period under study Bloque Centauros, later substituted by ERPAC, used to capture significant oil-
associated rents, a fraction of local administrative budgets, and received a lot of protection money 
from big and small economic entrepreneurs and agricultural workers. Their private protection 
services were never limited to any single economic activity, territory or social class of clients. 
Eastern Plains paramilitaries “extend[ed] their private security offer to the regions of medium or 
small land properties, peasant and colonisation economies included” (González 2007, 271). “On 
one hand, ERPAC extort[ed] big companies, on the other, the companies offer[d] them money in 
exchange for security […] and for the regulation of various types of labour and social 
conflicts” (CIT 2009, 123). What is more, both Bloque Centauros and ERPAC were famous for 
investing in regional and local development which historically guaranteed the impressive social 
support for paramilitarism in the region. The investments included infrastructural development (e.g. 
transportation improvement), promotion of commercial agriculture, sponsoring producers and 
agriculture workers’ associations, and maintenance of public vigilant structures (González 2007, 
272). Those activities created numerous job opportunities “in an area where jobs in the legal 
economy and efficient civilian state institutions were traditionally scarce” (ICG 2012, 6). 
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 The lack of defections- and competition-related preoccupations made it more profitable for 
Eastern Plains paramilitaries to invest in long-term relationships with their social environment 
(becoming “stationary bandits”; see Olson 1993) and to minimise their actual use of violence, 
contributing to the pax mafiosa observed today in the region (NN, Arauca, 21.04.2012; CIT 2009). 
These two relatively centralised paramilitary organisations prevented individual predatory 
initiatives originating among its insubordinate factions (usually outsourced groups of hit-men called 
sicarios) to become generalised and to undermine group’s rather positive reception at the level of 
local society and regional politics. 
 Yet, the hypothesised “predatory turn” among paramilitary groups usually happens when 
law enforcement authorities’ actions provoke paramilitaries’ organisational adaptations, such as 
increased clandestinity and command’s decentralisation, responsible in turn for the explosion of 
violence-rife predation. As a matter of fact, I find no evidence that any of post-2003 organisational 
adaptations undermined traditional self-restrain in predation among Eastern Plains paramilitary 
factions which survived state’s repression. The dominant group, ERPAC, maintained by and large 
organisational structure of their original paramilitary unit, Bolque Centauros of AUC (CIT 2009, 
108; Granada, Restrepo and Tobón 2009, 492). The charismatic leader from military background, 
Pedro Guerrero “Cuchillo”, safeguarded the internal cohesion of the group until his death in 2010. 
His authority guaranteed that ERPAC’s outsourced parts did not rebel against the highest command 
and followed the central directives (avoiding decentralised predation dilemmas; CIT 2009, 108). 
 Analogically to the previous chapter, in order to validate these preliminary conclusions I am 
going to describe the biggest paramilitary group in Eastern Plains in 2003-2012 period, ERPAC, in 
more depth in the rest of the chapter. I will pay a special attention to its organisational solutions and 
discuss at length group’s extra-legal governance strategy. To anticipate the main findings, the case 
study that follows confirms the central argument of this thesis where I claim that state’s anti-
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paramilitary repression provokes intensification of paramilitary violence only if it is administered in 
relatively nonpartisan and therefore persistent manner. Crackdown that spares some paramilitary 
groups while defeating others (as happened in Eastern Plains) does not produce such negative 
externalities as resource substitution and reinforcement of predatory tendencies, and may in fact 
strengthen the remaining paramilitary governance providers by eliminating their internal 
competition problems and communicating their “semi-legal” authority. 
!
ERPAC’s Case Study 
!
 In the period immediately after the conclusion of Uribe’s demobilisation programme in 
2006, ERPAC was one of the most resourceful and probably the best organised paramilitary group 
in Colombia (CIT 2009, ICG 2012). Since the disarmament of its original paramilitary structure, 
Bloque Centauros of AUC, they needed only three years to double their initial fighting force from 
250 to 500 individuals. The group experienced very rapid membership growth also in the 
subsequent period. In 2009 between 700-750 paramilitary soldiers worked for ERPAC which made 
them one of the three biggest neo-paramilitary groups in the country at that time (CIT 2009, 107). 
Moreover, various sources estimate that in 2010 ERPAC employed between 1000 and 1200 
individuals (the lower bound refers to inherently optimistic police estimate; Ibid., 106). In 2011, 
following the death of its maximum leader, the group decided to demobilise within a special DD  38
program offered by the government of Juan Manuel Santos. Some sources claim that the group is 
still active in the region despite the fact that it most probably split into two rival factions (Bloque 
Metro and Libertadores del Vichada; see ICG 2012, 12). 
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or reintegration component (accommodation, paid training, financial bonuses) into ERPAC’s 
demobilisation scheme (ICG 2012, 9-12).  
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 The rest of the chapter follows in the two-step order. The next sub-section discusses the 
characteristics of ERPAC’s organisational model. More precisely, it describes group’s command 
structure, recruitment practices and division of labour. I believe that many of the described elements 
are typical for the traditional territorial-control paramilitary model known in Colombia at least since 
late 1970s (Medina Gallego 1990). This discussion will introduce us to the following sub-section 
where I am going to show how most of the elements of ERPAC’s organisational structure were 
functional to the specific forms of extra-legal governance exercised by the group in Eastern Plains 
territories. I conclude by placing the present discussion in the context of the full explanatory model 
proposed throughout the thesis.  
!
Organisational Model 
!
 During the initial phase of ERPAC’s organisational growth, there were rather well 
documented rumours that the group recruited predominantly from the pool of ex-paramilitaries 
demobilised within Uribe’s DDR programme. The percentage of  ex-AUC’s soldiers within ERPAC 
ranks seemed higher than in any other paramilitary groups operating in Colombia at the same time 
(ICG 2012, 5; CIT 2009, 106). This fact may actually explain their rapid expansion throughout 
Eastern Plains. Ex-AUC soldiers were obviously more experienced to guide paramilitary conquest 
than recruits without paramilitary past. More importantly, those individuals belonged to relatively 
close-knit social networks which comprised numerous individuals potentially keen on delinquent 
careers and ready to join paramilitary ranks. In short, initial ex-AUC recruits facilitated ERPAC’s 
massive and rapid recruitment. Pedro Guerrero alias “Cuchillo”, the founder and the leader of the 
group until his death in 2010, recruited the hardcore of ERPAC among his ex-subordinates from 
Heroes de Guaviare Bloque of AUC. In fact, various sources report that he managed to conscripted 
almost immediately between 250 and 300 people in a similar way (CIT 2009, 106).  
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 The skilful recruitment allowed ERPAC to enter organised violence markets in Eastern 
Plains almost immediately as the dominant and most powerful paramilitary actor in the region. It 
might seem puzzling how “Cuchillo” managed to recruit so many ex-paramilitaries who only few 
months earlier had voluntarily abandoned paramilitary profession via the participation in DDR 
programme. What makes it even more puzzling is that fact that DDR participation consisted of 
numerous individual benefits such as: accommodation, financial benefits for the period of one year 
and a half, job training, as well as one-shot transfers of the equivalent of 1,000 dollars in cash 
(Porch and Rassmussen 2008, 526-9). Villarraga (2013) tries to address this puzzle explaining the 
phenomena with reference to various often non-material hardships faced by the demobilised 
combatants during their reintegration period (already discussed at the end of Chapter One). For 
demobilised paramilitaries, one of the remedies to the situation included an immediate comeback to 
armed activities which, paradoxically, might have seemed the most secure and at the same time 
relatively profitable option. “Cuchillo” proved to be aware of these post-demobilisation dynamics 
and knew how to benefit from them.  
 Unfortunately, there is no detailed information (gender, age, social status) about the 
composition of ERPAC recruits. We know that there is a considerable number of female soldiers 
(CIT 2009, 108), which seems a novelty in paramilitary recruitment strategies, since in the past 
women constituted an absolute minority in paramilitary ranks (Arjona and Kalyvas 2008). The vast 
majority of ERPAC members who did not belong to the category of demobilised ex-AUC rank-and-
files were predominantly young (CIT 2009, 108). What we may learn from such age composition of 
the group is the rather evident fact that “Cuchillo” targeted impoverished urban youth with scarce 
occupational possibilities other than delinquency. For these individuals, joining ERPAC constituted 
an attractive labour opportunity, since it offered paradoxically more stable and more predictable 
occupation than unorganised or gang-type delinquency. In fact, in the next sub-section I am going to 
show that the favourable extra-legal governance environment allowed ERPAC to avoid the 
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outbursts of violence and made the group the most secure employer in the criminal markets in 
Eastern Plains.  
 ERPAC’s hierarchy was organised around the figure of its founder and unquestionable 
leader, Pedro Guerrero “Cuchillo”. “In Eastern Plains people say he [was] new Pablo Escobar” (CIT 
2009, 107). The comparison between “Cuchillo” and Pablo Escobar, the biggest drug-trafficker of 
all the times in Colombia, may be just casual, but it may also reflect the generalised perception of 
ERPAC’s leader. Dismantling Escobar’s metaphor we find that “Cuchillo” was perceived as a 
resourceful man with connections to the local and possibly regional politics, law enforcement 
authorities, economic elites, who operated as intermediaries between those social stratas which 
normally do not cooperate nor even communicate between each other (Ibid., 106). “Cuchillo” was 
the most visible leader but not the only leader of ERPAC. “Loco Barrera” occupied the second most 
important figure in ERPAC’s organisational hierarchies. His role was to maintain group’s 
hierarchical structure (with all faction being close to their visible leader) and at the same time to 
think how group’s territorial influence could be extended without the risks of internal fragmentation 
(Ibid., 107). In other words, “Loco Barrera” had to guard the organisational unity within the group 
which controlled the territory of the size of Spain and characterised by very poor transportation 
infrastructure. The task proved manageable thanks to an intelligent division of labour and skilful 
intermediation among relatively independent sub-structures.  
 In the period under study, ERPAC’s organisational structure showed high levels of 
specialisation and complex division of labour among its members. There existed various categories 
of “employment opportunities” within the group: full-time soldiers, part-time members, 
collaborators, “outsourced” informants and other services’ providers. What is more, most of 
ERPAC’s members could hold another job apart from paramilitary duties (also in the formal job 
market) and could participate in reintegration programmes within DDR scheme (CIT 2009, 108). 
The idea behind such solution was twofold. On the one hand, in order not to expose themselves to 
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law enforcement authorities, newly recruited ERPAC’s members divided their time between 
criminal and DDR-related activities. On the other hand, the group wanted to bind its recruits by 
mutually profitable interests rather than by time-consuming ideological training. Such training 
might not have been available anyway because of the changed paramilitary environment (ERPAC 
could no longer operate freely in Eastern Plains territories and must have avoided becoming too 
visible to less tolerant law enforcement authorities). 
!
[Demobilised soldiers] can participate in the group’s activities on full-time basis — according 
to the rank they had before demobilisation — and work as informants or spies in the 
neighbourhoods, urban centres, critical venues; or they can be responsible for specific 
activities such as recruitment of new members, extortions, transportation of chemicals, 
firearms and other military devices, at the same time being employed at the formal labour 
market. There are also people who participate in reintegration programme and continue to be 
parallelly involved in illegal activities at urban or rural level (CIT 2009, 108). 
!
 As we have already seen, the group largely adopted organisational solutions drawn from 
earlier paramilitaries’ experience, especially from Bloque Centauros of AUC, while adding some 
significant novelties to them. One of these novelties included the distinction between organisational 
models in urban and rural areas. 
!
In ERPAC there exists division of labour and clear differentiation between urban activities 
(intelligence, information gathering, control of micro drug markets, extortions, recruitment, 
intimidation, paid assassinations) and rural ones (vigilance of critical venues, protection of 
coca and chemicals transportation, patrols). In this way the group maintains organisational 
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structure of Bloque Centauros, however with smaller number of members, organically divided 
in three factions (CIT 2009, 108). 
!
ERPAC’s leadership correctly observed that both kinds of territories (rural and urban) allowed for 
rather different modalities of paramilitary governance. It made it beneficial then to create groups 
specialised in dealing with governance exercised in each type of terrain. For example, ERPAC’s 
rural groups were better quipped military, being prepared for the possibility of unexpected combats, 
especially with guerrilla’s forces. 
!
They operate in groups of five to ten individuals (maximum squad), not necessarily wearing 
uniforms, with rifles or handguns, to monitor critical venues such as those offering access to 
river and land routes, the entries to viewing points and pathways historically controlled by 
paramilitaries which reunite in resguardo areas [indigenous collective territories] (CIT 2009, 
109). 
!
At the same time, urban squads maintained greater secrecy since their operations depended more on 
the intelligence work rather than on physical confrontations with armed groups (Ibid., 109).  
 It is important to stress that the population did not always possess discriminating tools to 
learn the exact structure of ERPAC’s local factions, which stood in sheer contrast to AUC’s times. 
The command was not known, the hierarchy kept secret. “They are not easily recognisable as in the 
case of AUC’s members, but remain undercover in urban centres, wear civilian clothes, not 
necessarily carry arms and stay very discreet” (CIT 2009, 107). The territorial control was exercised 
on the impersonal basis. It seemed less “bureaucratised” and did not allow for many informal 
solutions. In the past Eastern plains communities could come to paramilitaries commanders to 
negotiate punishments and ask for favours, which did not seem to be the case in ERPAC’s era:  
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!
Before you knew who was who, you knew who was a commander, who gave orders […] now 
one doesn’t know whom to talk to when he receives a threat, verbal or written one, which 
orders him to keep his mouth shut or to leave the town (CIT 2009, 114) 
  
 As noted before, a big part of ERPAC’s structure was composed of outsourced parts. 
ERPAC’s most frequent outsourcing applied to external hit-men or intimidators, so-called sicarios, 
contracted for one-shot operations. The other outsourced functions in ERPAC organisation 
included: “collection agencies [a type of extortion/protection racket], bodyguards, intelligence units, 
automobile logistics managers” (CIT 2009, 109). These people were not linked to any paramilitary 
structures on a permanent basis. Having done their job, they usually became free to pursue their 
own businesses. ERPAC contracted those sicarios on the base of their reputation for violence in 
various localities of Eastern Plains. By selecting those who were feared locally, the group hoped to 
avoid the actual exercise of violence, achieving its goals via the combination of  fear-driven 
obedience and limited intimidation in case of defiance. In other words, ERPAC allowed local 
criminal actors to operate independently as long as they did it in compliance and in co-ordination 
with the group’s particular objectives (HRW 2010, 72-6). 
!
Extra-Legal Governance Model 
!
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 In 2006 ERPAC started as a group of around 250 individuals concentrated mainly in 
Guaviare department. In the course of group’s rapid growth it expanded its activities to the territory 
of all five departments constituting Eastern Plains region.    39
!
ERPAC is present in urban centres, especially in degraded neighbourhoods in Villavicencio, 
San Martín, Granada, Puerto López, Puerto Gaitán, Mapiripán, Puerto Rico, Puerto Concordia 
(Meta), San José del Guaviare, El Retorno, and Calamar (Guaviare). On the other hand, 
interviewed sources indicated that they can also be present in municipalities of Vichada, 
Casanara and Guainía, even though it is not sure if they entered urban areas there (CIT 2009, 
114). 
!
In the first place ERPAC’s territorial expansion covered almost all territories of prior paramilitary 
influence. It managed to enter into the areas previously controlled by Bloque Centauros, 
Autodefensas de Meta y Vichada, Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB), and some traditional niches of 
Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare’s governance. At the same time ERPAC extended its control 
also to border zones where AUC had never reached before other than via intermediaries (CIT 2009, 
110). The new frontier localities, including some parts of Arauca, Vichada, and possibly Guainía, 
were contiguous to those where ERPAC’s presence had already been firmly established. 
!
!
!
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Eastern Plains region, Guainía, at least since 2009 (Prieto 2013, 5). Nonetheless, my NN sources do 
not report any paramilitary activity in this region. It may not be surprising given the fact that 
Guainía department covers rainforest area with minimal strategic significance other than hideout or 
emergency transit zone.
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Map 1: The territory of Eastern Plains.  
Source: reproduced from ICG (2012, 22). 
!
 Human Rights Watch report (2010, 74) warned of “the consolidation of the expansion 
project of the paramilitary group known as the “Cuchillos” [other name for ERPAC] … in a strategy 
that has focused on cutting the territorial, economic, and transit circuit considered strategic.” In 
general, ERPAC’s expansion appears to have been based on two principles. To begin with, the 
contingency between new and already held territories mattered. Contrarily to ERPAC, other 
paramilitary groups operating in Colombia at the same time more frequently opted for 
discontinuous expansion strategy (Prieto 2013, 5). The second prerogative of ERPAC’s territorial 
expansion seems related to communication opportunities offered by newly conquered territories. 
The groups wanted to control areas historically deficient in terms of public infrastructure which, 
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nonetheless, still possessed some rudimentary transportation facilities. How did the accomplishment 
of both expansion principles influence ERAPC’s governance in Eastern Plains?  
 In the early twenty first century the highest leader of Bloque Centauros and “Cuchillo”’s 
superior, Miguel Arroyabe, expressed his full admiration for Martin “Llanos”, the leader of the 
biggest paramilitary group in Eastern Plains until 2003, Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare 
(ACC), for the manner in which he exercised paramilitary governance in the region. Arroyabe 
admired “Llanos” because he justly observed that ACC’s leader was more skilled in managing 
complex extra-legal governance than an average paramilitary commander, drug-trafficker, or 
organised criminal. During the long years of his group’s domination in Eastern Plains “Llanos” 
established a complex paramilitary governance characterised by diversified revenues (coming from 
drug-trafficking, public contracts’ manipulation and “quasi-institutionalised” extended extortions 
machine) and by generalised social support among almost all Eastern Plains social stratas. Arroyabe 
saw “Llanos” as an example of extra-legal governance provider who combined three achievements 
rarely observed simultaneously in a criminal-like enterprise: rapid self-enrichment, stability of one’s 
businesses and wide supporting coalitions (Pérez 2011, 30). Admiration apart, Arroyabe along with 
his Bloque Centauros’ soldiers proved to be very good observers and quickly learnt ACC’s lessons. 
In order to defeat Martin “Llanos”’s organisation, they actually decided to imitate their extra-legal 
monopoly in Eastern Plains in which they partly succeeded (see Pérez 2011, González 2007).  
 Bloque Centauros’ objectives had not fully materialised until 2006 when ERPAC took over 
paramilitary governance in Eastern Plains. Following Arroyabe’s footsteps, “Cuchillo” and his men 
tried to mirror ACC’s paramilitary achievements. The group was said that “as in the cities as in the 
countryside they have concrete interests — either economic (rents control), military (consolidation 
of mobility corridors, information gathering and new members recruitment), or social ones 
(intimidations of individuals and collective actors, populations’ confinement)” (CIT 2009, 124). In 
the rest of this sub-section I am going to characterise ERPAC’s governance in more detail. I will 
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pay attention to an analytical distinction between group’s economic and “political” activities. 
Among the latter ones I am going to describe those activities which did not directly earn them 
money, but at the same time had a fundamental significance for the stability of group’s governance 
and its long-run profitability. 
 Unfortunately, there exists no precise quantification of ERPAC’s economic activities. The 
most detailed account available includes an examination of the structure of ERPAC’s finances cited 
by González (2007, 272). The largest share of their revenues came from drug-trafficking. The 
importance of drug-trafficking for ERPAC’s finances could be well illustrated by the regional 
distribution of coca cultivation and its coincidence with the most concentrated group’s presence:  
!
ERPAC keeps presence in four out of ten municipalities with the biggest area dedicated to 
coca cultivation in the country (Cumaribo, El Retorno, Mapiripán y San José del Guaviare), 
which amounts to 12.2 per cent of national cultivations, or 9,866 of 81,000 hectares (ha). At 
the same time, ERPAC operates in minimum seven out of eleven Meta municipalities with 
coca cultivations, which equals 94.1 per cent of total departmental areas. In Guaviare, despite 
the reduction of coca cultivations between 2006 and 2008 (from 9,477 ha to 9,299 and 6,629 
ha), ERPAC keeps urban and rural presence via informants, sicarios and coca paste buyers in 
San José del Guaviare y El Retorno, municipalities which concentrate the biggest cultivation 
area in the department with 2,143 and 2,145 ha cultivated respectively (equivalent of 68.8 per 
cent of the departmental territory) (CIT 2009, 111).  
!
Some sources claim that ERPAC presence in drug industry might have been limited to the role of “a 
security contractor and owner or protector of cocaine laboratories, rather than directly controlling 
coca cultivation or international trafficking” (ICG 2012, 7). In Varese’s analytical scheme (2010) 
ERPAC could be placed closer to mafias rather than other organised crime groups or gangs. It 
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seems that the group not only aimed to monopolise the actual provision of certain illicit 
commodities (by having them managed directly by its own members) but also searched to 
monopolise the market indirectly by imposing their own rules and order on other independent drug-
traffickers. In other words, ERPAC did not pretend to be the only group to work in the drug industry 
in Eastern Plains, but it pretended to be the one who organised the market, imposed its order, 
decided who could operate in the market and who could not. The second biggest share of ERPAC’s 
revenues, on the other hand, came from the extortions of big oil extraction companies (Pérez 2011). 
Both types of activities — drug-trafficking and extortions in oil industry — needed a powerful 
military apparatus capable of using violence which evolved with ERPAC’s already described 
expansion. The difficulty in managing these activities lied not in identifying the targets, but in being 
able to impose one’s will and to get oneself respected. 
 Protection and extortion of small and medium agricultural, industrial or service 
entrepreneurs constituted group’s third revenue source.  
!
ERAPC continues to extort cattle ranchers in the regions in Southern Casanare and has 
repeatedly threatened them for being the accomplices of Autodefensas Campesinas de 
Casanare. They repeat this practice with small organisations of fishermen who, apart from 
paying [extra-legal] taxes, have to inform about their movements and about the movements of 
public forces. The same happens with merchants from San José del Guaviare y San Martín 
(CIT 2009, 122). 
!
Diversification of extortion/protection revenues (collecting them from various classes of 
entrepreneurs) was especially important for the group from the point of view of their firm territorial 
presence in Eastern Plains. Thanks to the widespread control over various forms of socio-economic 
exchange, the group became more recognisable, feared, and therefore obeyed locally. ERPAC 
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created a network of individuals and enterprises dependent on them in terms of credit availability, 
private security (protection against common delinquency or guerrilla’s ambushes), social and labour 
disputes settlement, and contracts enforcement. For example, Eastern Plains’ employers used 
ERPAC intimidatory power against their disobedient workers, trade unions, or communities when 
those protested. In some sense, the group could count on some of their clients as their accomplices 
or supporters who facilitated group’s intelligence activities, or organisational reproduction (e.g by 
advertising recruitment among family members; see HRW 2010), and alarmed them in face of law 
enforcement authorities movements. It is well illustrated in the quote below:  
!
The principal objective [of territorial control] is to obtain rents from micro illicit cultivation 
markets, prostitution networks and legal sectors through extortions and/or facade enterprises 
(entertainment spots and hotels for example); co-opt networks, hit-men and gangs which 
operate as paid assassins; and recruit new members (demobilised ones during reintegration 
process, demobilised ones who no longer participate in the programme or have been expelled 
from it; and children and adolescents) (CIT 2009, 113). 
!
 In sum, I believe that group’s economic activities can be divided into those which brought 
the gross revenues (such as drug-trafficking and oil companies extortion) and those which helped 
them to build a complex extra-legal governance system privileged to settle disputes and to enforce 
all sorts of collusive agreements (Pérez 2011). Given the nature of their governance, it would be 
wrong to see ERPAC as the continuation of AUC paramilitaries whom Mauricio Romero (2003) 
defined as the guardians of status quo (conservatory, unequal and exclusive). It seems that ERPAC 
became more “democratised” offering services both to small and medium-size entrepreneurs: 
“ERPAC extended its “security offer” towards regions of medium or small rural properties, peasant 
economies and colonisation areas included” (González 2007, 271). Nevertheless, ERPAC’s 
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protection services, from time to time offered to local entrepreneurs without any obligation to accept 
them, in most of the cases were imposed on Eastern Plains entrepreneurs without any possibility to 
reject them. In the following paragraphs I am going to show that the group found it beneficial not 
only to exercise the less lucrative economic activities, but also to occupy themselves with activities 
which apparently brought them no material return while incurring quite considerable costs. 
 In fact, ERPAC not only earned money but also spent them, or — to put it more precise 
terms — invested money. I would argue that these expenditures or investments represented 
ERPAC’s costs of maintaining social support and reinforcing group’s legitimacy as extra-legal 
governance provider. Let us recall that “ERPAC’s narco-business gave it a stable social base,  […] 
Some rural parts of Mapiripán (Meta) were virtually dependent on him [“Cuchillo”] economically. 
This allowed him to cast himself as a social benefactor in an area where jobs in the legal economy 
and functioning civilian state institutions have been traditionally scarce” (ICG 2012, 6). González 
(2007, 272-3) shows that ERPAC’s expenditures covered small local investments as well as macro 
regional development projects such as:  
!
• Active linkage with local and regional economic development dynamics, through huge 
projects and participation in the entrepreneurial activities in the areas of agriculture, agro-
industry, commerce, land/river/air transportation, services, and infrastructure. 
• Purchase of […] school materials and alimentation. 
• Participation and creation of the units of social and entrepreneurial management, such as 
cooperatives, producers’ associations, corporations for development, associations of 
peasants, displaced populations, agriculture workers, small cattle ranchers.  
• Support for the military structure, beginning with patrolmen and squad leaders, to bloques’ 
commanders and members of  the high command.  
• Medial assistance to public troops. 
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!
 Why shall I consider these expenditures as “political” rather than economic activities of the 
group? Why do I treat them as costs rather than investments? Of course, some of the expenditures 
could bring both “political” and material returns. A good example of such situation came from large 
infrastructural investments realised by ERPAC-affiliated construction companies. On the one hand, 
the works definitely benefited some local communities by building them roads or by extending the 
closest electricity network to reach their settlements. On the other hand, those investments let 
paramilitaries lay their hands on government-sponsored regalias or other generous public subsidies. 
The idea behind regalias was to speed up infrastructural development in Eastern Plains in the wake 
of oil extraction opportunities discovered in the region in the late 1990s (Pérez 2011, 20). The 
government knew that the region might attract many lucrative investments on the condition that 
some basic facilities necessary for extraction to operate could be guaranteed (Garay and Salcedo 
2012). Pérez (2011, 21) shows that in fact a great part of those development-directed subsidies were 
actually captured by ERPAC-affiliated enterprises. 
 Nevertheless, not all ERPAC’s “political” activities turned out so profitable in purely 
financial terms. They exercised a vast range of charity-like activities. For example, they provided 
food and health assistance to local communities and ran associations for the handicapped (suffering 
from violence-related physical or mental handicaps, displaced, or impoverished ones; see NN, 
various entries). Those forms of ERPAC’s community support may appear a little bit paradoxical 
given the fact that a great majority of associated handicapped people found themselves in that 
miserable condition at least partly as a result of previous paramilitary violence. What seems even 
more puzzling is the fact that I do find a lot of evidence that social organisations such as 
handicapped or displaced associations were actually the constant targets of paramilitary 
victimisation since 2003. How can one explain the fact that ERPAC supported these types of 
organisations whom they (along with other minor paramilitary groups in Eastern Plains) were most 
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likely to persecute according to NN data? Reuter’s (1984) analysis may be helpful to understand the 
paradox of the situation. His argument regards the Italo-American mafia in New York, however it 
seems applicable to the case at hand. Reuter claims that Italo-American mafiosi did never repress 
organised forms of resistance or collective bargaining as long as they could have assumed the 
leadership of those initiatives or movements (Ibid., 56). The same mechanism appears to have been 
at work in ERPAC’s case. The group promoted social organisations in order to be able to control 
and channel the expressions of social protest. At the same time, they severely repressed any similar 
initiatives which escaped their control (e.g. NN, Meta, 02.04.2005).  
 The last not strictly profitable group’ “political” activity consisted of supporting national 
army and local police forces — either with terrain knowledge, equipment or even staff. In fact, law 
enforcement authorities and paramilitaries in Eastern Plains were said to have conducted 
coordinated actions against petty criminals, drug addicts, prostitutes and other “bad reputation” 
individuals in 2006-2010 period (e.g. NN, Guaviare, 12.09.2011, 17.12.2011; Casanare, 
24.04.2009). How can we explain similar collaboration? One answer is to see ERPAC’s initiative as 
aimed at demonstrating their taste for order in Eastern Plains region. Counterintuitively, extra-legal 
governance providers do not usually operate in the territories characterised by excessive anarchy 
and disorder. The likelihood of their success is oftentimes described as a U-shape function of public 
order observed in the territories of their interest, with both minimum and maximum levels of order 
making it close to impossible to establish extra-legal governance (see Tilly 2003; Shortland and 
Varese 2014; Centeno 1997). An alternative explanation of ERPAC’s costly support for the benefit 
of local law enforcement authorities might suggest that those services were tacitly exchanged for 
greater benevolence and tolerance on the part of police and the army towards paramilitary 
governance in the region.  
 In general, the reasons why ERPAC decided to embark on “political” activities as well as 
those for maintaining some less profitable sources of their economic syndicate seem related to 
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group’s strive for strict territorial control. Why was this control so important? ERPAC found couple 
of reasons which justified their investments in socio-political milieu which did not bring direct 
financial returns. The first one was the need to reduce the actual use of violence. The efficiency of 
mere intimidation is the function of group’s reputation for violence and the credibility of its threats 
(Gambetta 1992, Falcone 1991). The very fundamental prerequisite to build such a reputation is to 
be visible and criminally recognisable — which means in practice to maintain relatively firm 
presence in the territory. ERPAC seems to have understood this lesson and developed such 
territorial presence with an aim of minimising its actual use of costly violence: “To manage 
communications over a vast and sparsely populated terrain, it established a chain of informants 
(“puntos”) in strategic locations. This also ensured its integration in the community, reducing the 
need for armed intimidation” (ICG 2012, 7). The quote points to another reason for costly 
investments in tight territorial control — to make drug-trafficking safer and faster. Having a variety 
of secure and monitored transportation channels, traffickers become less predictable and more 
difficult to intercept by law enforcement authorities.  
 Both of these reasons come to the same thing if we think of them from another perspective. 
They were all about the stability of groups’s extra-legal governance. On the one hand, for extra-
legal governance providers the surge in violence always means a loss. The “paramilitary war” in 
Eastern Plains (2003-2004) shows how uneconomical it was to fight.  For example, in an aftermath 
of that intraparamilitary conflict both competitors lost a good portion of their influence in local-
level politics (Pérez 2011, 31). On the other hand, organised crime analysts such as Sánchez-
Jankowski (1991) or Akerlof and Yellen (1994) always stressed the importance of extra-legal 
governance providers’ “safe heavens”. It was in those places where gang members or mafiosi 
encountered benevolence and supportiveness of local communities who stayed on their side in case 
of law enforcement authorities’ actions against the delinquents. Following the logic, the multitude 
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of ERPAC’s “safe heavens” made their job all the easier, more beneficial and more stable, and it 
might have seemed reason good enough to invest in them. 
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CONCLUSION 
!
!
 The thesis addressed the problem of conflict resolution and post-conflict risks with reference 
to the ongoing Colombian civil war. I analysed puzzle of the heterogeneity of paramilitary violence 
dynamics in the two Colombian regions of Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains since the beginning of 
the partial (paramilitaries-oriented) peaces process initiated in 2003. In Chapters Three and Four I 
demonstrated quantitatively that the presence of state’s anti-paramilitary repression during and after 
the application of President Uribe’s resolution scheme increased the intensity of municipal 
paramilitary violence at least by 54 per cent each year in Pacific Coast, but apparently had not such 
effect in Eastern Plains. These divergent results invited me to reconsider the dynamics of 
paramilitary violence in the context of anti-paramilitary repression paying greater attention to very 
specific mechanisms driving the relationship between violence and repression. The qualitative 
analyses from Chapters Five and Six clarified the between-regional heterogeneity in paramilitaries’ 
response to state’s crackdown. They suggest that repressive intervention in Pacific Coast fuelled 
paramilitary violence by triggering resource substitution processes and creating predatory incentives 
— the outcomes largely absent from Eastern Plains paramilitary panorama. The absence/presence of 
these negative externalities of anti-paramilitary intervention was found dependent on the 
partisanship/non-partisanship of the crackdown.  
 In needs to be stressed that the aim of anti-paramilitary repression in the two analysed 
regions was not to eradicate the social roots of private ordering markets but only to destroy their 
main actors. A resident of one Pacific Coast municipality recalls: “Before the Rastrojos, we had NG. 
The army attacked NG about a year ago...The army stayed three weeks. They left, and a few days 
later the Rastrojos entered Santa Rosa and Santa Cruz. The NG did too, but as Black Eagles.... The 
Rastrojos do checkpoints in Santa Cruz.... The Black Eagles and Rastrojos are fighting over 
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territory” (HRW 2010, 85). The quote illustrates why military interventions cannot guarantee 
everyday order in the long term (quelling demand for private ordering) and why they cannot prevent 
the arrival of new extra-legal governance providers nor the retreats of previously defeated ones 
(quelling supply of private ordering). As a result, Nussio (2009, 227) finds that the defeat 
(disarmament) of particular paramilitary group does not affect local demand for paramilitary 
ordering, and he shows that community members still perceive paramilitaries as those “who provide 
private security services […] who can help in case of some inconveniences, some problems.” What 
has changed since the outset of anti-paramilitary repression in Pacific Coast region — but not in 
Eastern Plains one — was the kind of regional governance paramilitaries could and wanted to offer. 
Rastrojos’ case study demonstrates that the state’s repressive intervention dealt a serious blow to the 
group, but not serious enough to eliminate them from regional extra-legal governance markets. 
Rastrojos remained operating in Pacific Coast but had to adapt organisationally and strategically to 
the new hostile environment. The result of these adaptation was group’s greater propensity for 
predatory violence which explains the non-improvement of regional security records in post-
demobilisation era.  
!
Implications 
!
 I believe that the thesis offers important policy implications for the ongoing peace process 
with the biggest Colombian guerrilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC). My study suggests that the security outcomes of insurgents’ future DDR may largely 
depend on the behaviour of law enforcement authorities in extra-legal governance markets 
abandoned by demobilised FARC — an issue notably neglected in the existing forecasts (e.g. 
Nussio & Howe 2012). A positive message of the present research is the one that the success or 
failure of future FARC’s demobilisation lies largely in state’s hands. Empirical data from the past 
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conflict resolution achievements shows, for example, that the heterogeneity of “de-
paramilitarisation” of violent conflict in Pacific Coast can hardly be explained with the argument of 
the weakness of the state. As a result, my initial preoccupations with the scarcity of public 
institutions to manage post-conflict reality in Colombian peripheries may be less of a problem than 
I hypothesised at the end of Chapter One. In fact, in Chapter Four we have seen that within-
municipal variation in paramilitary violence does not seem to diminish with improved policing as 
implied by Howe et al.’s study (2010). I would argue that the concept of state’s capacity needs to be 
disaggregated in order to understand which weaknesses and which strengths may contribute to the 
perpetuation or reduction of insecurity. The thesis shows that the structural forms of state’s 
weakness (widespread private ordering) cannot be fixed with emergency instruments (military 
repression) in order to bring immediate security dividends, but at the same time the structural forms 
of state’s weakness should not automatically translate into failed security improvements in post-war 
Colombia. 
 State’s reactions aside, the present study shows that the re-emergence of many demobilised 
insurgents to extra-legal governance markets in an aftermath of FARC’s disarmament can be taken 
for granted. Compared to paramilitaries, insurgents are more strongly indoctrinated and less 
prepared for civilian live (Oppenheim et al 2013). Their education, on average, is lower than 
paramilitaries’ one (Arjona and Kalyvas 2006). It all makes their reintegration into the society even 
harder than in the case of demobilised paramilitaries. Nussio and Howe (2012) argue that the 
insurgents’ return to organised violence can be different from paramilitaries’ one due to the diverse 
nature of their respective organisations. Guerrillas groups are highly centralised and characterised 
by internal cohesion and strict discipline (Gutiérrez 2008). As such, there is every likelihood that 
they are going to suffer from frenzy fragmentation once their central command gets dissolved. More 
importantly, when we take into account the fact that law enforcement authorities today are strongly 
opposed to negotiated solution with insurgents (Nussio and Howe 2012, 60), it seems almost certain 
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that ex-rebels’ entrance into private ordering markets will be accompanied by heavy repressive 
actions. Additionally, because of their lack of social embeddedness (Villarraga 2013), ex-insurgents 
are very unlikely to build complex extra-legal governance monopolies (see Gribaudi 2009, 
Brancaccio 2011). In short, their post-demobilisation re-emergence is more likely to occur 
according to the same model as in Rastrojos’ case, which will reduce their non-violent resources 
and disincentive even the highest commanders to impose restraints on predatory tendencies. All the 
empirical evidence considered, I believe that the forthcoming peace accords with the biggest 
Colombian guerrilla, FARC, may bring short- or medium-run escalation of violence rather than 
security improvements. 
 There are few theoretical implications from the present study for organised crime research. 
Firstly, my work illustrates the trade-offs inherent to anti-organised crime actions and the role of 
public opinion in determining anti-criminal policy choices. Paradoxically, it seems that in case of 
anti-organised crime fight the least painful repressive solutions are usually those which are met with 
the biggest public criticism. The Colombian case shows that it happens so because activists, 
journalists and all sorts of so-called neutral observers (e.g. pro-legality associations, human rights 
organisations) try to condition law enforcement authorities’ strategies by making public opinion 
rage, for example, at state’s alleged tolerance towards criminals (which may in fact be strategic). If 
massive, the similar public campaigns can force political leaders to adopt more radical forms of 
anti-organised crime fight which bring such negative externalities as increased insecurity or the 
escalation of the most lethal forms of organised crime violence. In the end, it turns out that some 
expressions of civic commitment to rule of law (no matter how highly appreciable per se) 
unconsciously promote repressive interventions associated with the highest costs for citizens.   
 Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that there is diminishing utility of the military strategy in 
face of resourceful criminal groups which are usually very quick to adapt to the new situation. This 
finding echoed a common conviction that mafias cannot be completely defeated with military 
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strategy alone (see La Spina 2008). The problem is well illustrated in a comment on anti-mafia 
military repression adopted by Italian general Dalla Chiesa:  
!
Dalla Chiesa makes only one error. The one of vanity. In fact, he remained a soldier and, thus, 
above all, an orator. He liked to transform any challenge in an open war, with all vain glories 
of the combat: flags, tambourines, proclamations, applauses, popular love demonstrations. All 
of that against an enemy who was always underground, a mortifying, threatening knot of 
snakes which could be anywhere, at any time under his feet; which could be sitting next to 
him at the stage during national celebrations, shaking his hands, offering him greetings and 
congratulations (Fava 1983). 
!
This thought leads us to the last tempting question which still remains unanswered at the end of this 
work: did Colombian state do well to launch fully-fledged crackdown against paramilitaries in 
Pacific Coast instead of mildly repressive solution adopted in Eastern Plains? Undoubtedly the 
intervention has had its high costs, but were not they actually inevitable? Smith and Varese (2001, 
364-76) argue that “[t]he level of violence observed by citizens actually increases precisely at the 
moment when the State is supplying better policing to the community […] Violence is unavoidable 
consequence of fighting organised crime […] from a public policy perspective, these instances of 
violence are signs of success, rather than failure.” This quote reminds us that what looks like a 
failure from the perspective of conflict resolution practitioner could be judged in a positive manner 
by organised crime analyst.  
 Having said that, military repression of Pacific Coast paramilitaries resulted in rather 
excessive volumes of violence in the region. Given that the main goal of anti-paramilitary offensive 
was to improve public security, the repressive strategy appears more of a failure. High levels of 
violence in Pacific Coast are too persistent to treat them as ordinary outcome of anti-criminal 
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action. What is worse, the consequences of the military crackdown in Pacific Coast may stretch 
beyond the insecurity crisis (already evident), possibly contributing to the slowdown of regional 
economic development. As I have demonstrated in the empirical section, law enforcement 
authorities’ actions in Pacific Coast led to the emergence of decentralised predation system. Easterly 
argues (2006, 309) that while all forms of predation are bad, the decentralised one is especially 
harmful to economic growth and development. Probably, the greatest mistake of Uribe’s 
administration in Pacific Coast was the hazardous meandering between negotiated and repressive 
anti-paramilitary solutions which made each of them less effective than it could have been if 
applied with consistency.  
 On the other hand, was the all-encompassing negotiated strategy applied in Eastern Plains 
more successful? Undoubtedly, security improvements in the region after 2006 were overshadowed 
by the discovery of public administration’s profound infiltration by criminal actors, which 
reinforced the perception of criminals’ impunity and undermined already scarce trust in public 
institutions. Its shortcomings aside, the local and regional state in Eastern Plains managed to 
maintain political, economic and social order. For this reason I shall argue, along with Shortland 
and Varese (2012, 16-7), that the states engaged in fighting organised crime may still find it more 
opportune to negotiate with some forms of organised crime as long as they ”provide effective 
governance to local communities”, even if such move is bound to become highly unpopular among 
voters. 
!
!
!
!
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